The administration of the law among gentlemen in Ireland fifty years back, is curiously illustrated by the following little narrative, the circumstances whereof have been communicated to me from such a quarter as not to admit of their being doubted.
Our laws, in their most regular course (as every body knows, who has had the honour and happiness of being much involved in them), are neither so fleet as a race-horse, nor so cheap as water-cresses. They indisputably require eloquent advocates and keen attorneys;—who expound, complicate, unriddle, or confuse, the respective statutes, points, precedents, and practice, of that simple science, which too frequently, like a burning-glass, consumes both sides of what it shines upon.
Some prudent and sensible gentlemen, therefore, principally in the country parts of Ireland (who probably had bit upon the bridle), began to conceive that justice ought to be neither so dear nor so tardy; and when they reflected that what were called their “barking irons” brought all ordinary disputes to a speedy termination—why, thought they, should not these be equally applicable to matters of law, property, and so forth, as to matters of honour? At all events, such an application would be incalculably cheaper, than any taxed bill of costs, even of the most conscientious solicitor.
This idea became very popular in some counties, and, indeed, it had sundry old precedents in its favour,—the writ of right and trial by battle having been originally the law of the land, and traditionally considered as far the most honourable way of terminating a suit. They considered, therefore, that what was lawful one day, could not be justly deemed unlawful another, and that by shortening the process of distributing justice, they should assist in extending it. The old jokers said, and said truly, that many a cause had been decided to a dead certainty in a few minutes, by simply touching a trigger, upon which attorneys, barristers, judges, jurors, witnesses, and sometimes all the peers of the realm, spiritual and temporal, had been working and fumbling for a series of years without bringing it even to an unsatisfactory issue.
My old and worthy friend, “Squire Martin,” afforded a most excellent illustration of this practice; and as all the parties were “gentlemen to the backbone,” the anecdote may be deemed a respectable one. I have often heard the case quoted in different companies, as a beneficial mode of ensuring a compromise. But the report of my friend makes it any thing but a compromise on his part. The retrograding was no doubt on the part of the enemy, and equally unequivocal as Moreau’s through the Black Forest, or that of the ten thousand Greeks, though neither so brave nor so bloody as either of them.
I name place, parties, cause, proceedings, and final judgment—just as I received these particulars from the defendant himself; and I consider the case as forming a very valuable precedent for corresponding ones.
Eustace Stowell, Esq. challenger.
Richard Martin, Esq. acceptor.
Operator for the challenger, D. Blake, Esq.
Operator for the acceptor, Right Honourable St. George Daly, late judge of the King’s Bench, Ireland.