The dignity of these exalted personages, the importance and consequences of the affair, the zealous wish to do my duty, and a reasonable apprehension that I shall not be able to do so properly, sufficiently justify my sorrow at being compelled to see the queen lay off her purple, descend from the throne, and, like the most wretched of women, seek protection from the law. Can there possibly be a more affecting example of the insecurity of human happiness? She, in whose person we do homage to the blood of so many kings, is suspected of having dishonoured it. She who gave the king her hand and heart, is accused by the man who, at that time, promised to be her lord and protector. She, who by the unanimous verdict of the nation, received the name of mother of the country, is tried by those men who at that day would have joyfully shed their blood for her. So unhappy is Queen Caroline Matilda, and she alone among all the Queens of Denmark! At an age, and gifted with all the qualities, which seemed to determine her felicity, she finds herself on the verge of an abyss, in which her honour, her dignity, and her peace may be lost. What a thought to lose her husband, her children, her throne, on the same day, and to survive the loss! Suspected, accused, in danger of leading the most wretched life for a long course of years: can there be anything more cruel for hearts that are capable of thinking and feeling? Thus the queen regards her fate, and she described it to me, when I had the honour of waiting upon her, in the following words:
"I must despair, had my intentions been other than the welfare of the king and the country. If I have possibly acted incautiously, my age, my sex, and my rank must excuse me. I never believed myself exposed to a suspicion, and even, though my confession appears to confirm my guilt, I know myself to be perfectly innocent. The law requires me to be convicted: my consort has granted me this, and I hope he will, through the mouth of his commissioners, acknowledge that I have not rendered myself unworthy of him."
I quote her Majesty's words exactly as she uttered them, but how much do I wish that I could reproduce the emotion with which they were spoken, the frankness that gave them increased weight, and the trembling voice, which justly claimed compassion. The latter, no one can refuse her without insulting humanity.
Among the charges brought against her Majesty, is the sanctity of the duties imposed on her by her marriage with her royal husband: it has been stated that the king's bed must remain unsullied, that his own honour, and the honour and prosperity of the country, require this. But these truths are so far from affecting the queen, that she demands the strictest investigation ere she can believe that she has acted contrariwise. The more important the duties she had to perform, the more fearful are the consequences of any infraction of them, and the more familiar the two parties were, the clearer must be the evidence that her Majesty has really committed a fault. We may first ask in which manner the honour of the king and his family will be best promoted? By proving the queen guilty, or must it not be sought in her innocence? Has her Majesty, perchance, never known and fulfilled what she owed to herself, her husband, and his people; or will it not rather be allowed that from the period when her accusation begins, she proved herself a tender mother, an affectionate wife, and a worthy queen? Can it be credited that her Majesty should so easily have forgotten herself? And can she, who at that day sought her delight in modesty, virtue, and the veneration and affection of the king and the country, have banished all noble feelings from her heart in a single moment?
Advocate Bang produces, in the king's name, three varieties of proofs against the queen: Count Struensee's statement, her Majesty's confession, and, as he knew that neither was sufficient, the evidence of witnesses.
Assuredly, Count Struensee, on February 17 and 25, as the documents prove, made a statement of a most insulting nature to her Majesty. But that he forgot the reverence due to the queen, that either through unfounded alarm, confusion of mind, or the hope of saving himself, if he could cause the queen to be regarded as interested in his affair, or for other reasons he has made absurd allegations, can only injure himself. For what belief can be given to the assurance that he, if the queen thought him worthy of her confidence, should have been so daring as to misuse it in so extreme a way, and that her Majesty should have tolerated it? The honour of a private person, much more that of a queen, could not be affected by it. And how improbable it is, that such a thing should have gone on for two whole years at court, under the eyes of the king, and in the presence of so many spies? They are accusations made by a prisoner not on his oath, and are utterly destitute of probability.
Advocate Bang allows that Count Struensee's declaration in itself is of no weight against the queen, and hence he tries to confirm it, partly by the acknowledgment which her Majesty made on March 9, as to the correctness of Struensee's declaration, partly through her answer that she had broken her marriage vows and, hence, lost her marriage rights, which he wishes to be regarded as perfect proof after the law 1—15—1. Certainly, in all civil causes, a confession is the most perfect form of proof: but in criminal matters, and such as we are now trying, the Danish code completely rejects this evidence, when it says: "It is not sufficient that the accused person should himself confess it, but the accuser must legally bring the accused before the court and properly prove the offence."
Other proofs, consequently, are requisite; and as it is his Majesty's wish that the law alone shall be followed in this cause, and the judgment be founded on the evidence, it is self-evident that the queen must have a claim to this benefit as much as the meanest of her subjects.
The letter of the law is clear, and does not admit of the slightest doubt. Hence it will be quite unnecessary to examine the motives which induced the Danish legislator to make this regulation. I will not speculate whether the respect and authority which the law grants to one sex over the other—fear of its abuse on the one hand and of excessive compliance on the other—an anxiety to prevent the dangerous consequences of precipitation and inattention, &c., may have had their share in it. As, however, the king's advocate remarks that her Majesty cannot appeal to this law, because it is based on two legal reasons, neither of which affects the queen, I must clear up the incorrectness of this conclusion. Though the law states that it is not enough for the accused party to make a confession, and adds: "Because it is often found that many persons make false statements, so that the one may get rid of the other, or injure the person with whom he or she declares to have committed a crime," I will humbly urge that these are not the sole motives why the law rejects a confession in this case, as is clearly shown; for it adds directly after the words quoted, "or for the sake of other things." Although, therefore, the law only mentions expressly some of the motives for its regulation, it is clear that it had various others in addition to these; and hence the benefit granted to the accused belongs to her Majesty equally in regard of the motives alleged in the law and of those unalleged, and she consequently claims it.[79]
I will now pass over to the third class of proofs, consisting of the statements of persons summoned by the prosecutor as witnesses.