By a physical "explanation" is meant a clear statement of a fact or law in terms of something with which daily life has made us familiar. We are all chiefly familiar, from our youth up, with two apparently simple things, motion and force. We have a direct sense for both these things. We do not understand them in any deep way, probably we do not understand them at all, but we are accustomed to them. Motion and force are our primary objects of experience and consciousness; and in terms of them all other less familiar occurrences may conceivably be stated and grasped. Whenever a thing can be so clearly and definitely stated, it is said to be explained, or understood; we are said to have "a dynamical theory" of it. Anything short of this may be a provisional or partial theory, an explanation of the less known in terms of the more known, but Motion and Force are postulated in physics as the completely known: and no attempt is made to press the terms of an explanation further than that. A dynamical theory is recognised as being at once necessary and sufficient.
Now, it must be admitted at once that of very few things have we at present such a dynamical explanation. We have no such explanation of matter, for instance, or of gravitation, or of electricity, or ether, or light. It is always conceivable that of some such things no purely dynamical explanation will ever be forthcoming, because something more than motion and force may perhaps be essentially involved. Still, physics is bound to push the search for an explanation to its furthest limits; and so long as it does not hoodwink itself by vagueness and mere phrases—a feebleness against which its leaders are mightily and sometimes cruelly on their guard, preferring to risk the rejection of worthy ideas rather than permit a semi-acceptance of anything fanciful and obscure—so long as it vigorously probes all phenomena within its reach, seeking to reduce the physical aspect of them to terms of motion and force,—so long it must be upon a safe track. And, by its failure to deal with certain phenomena, it will learn—it already begins to suspect, its leaders must long have surmised—the existence of some third, as yet unknown, category, by incorporating which the physics of the future may rise to higher flights and an enlarged scope.
I have said that the things of which we are permanently conscious are motion and force, but there is a third thing which we have likewise been all our lives in contact with, and which we know even more primarily, though perhaps we are so immersed in it that our knowledge realises itself later,—viz. life and mind. I do not now pretend to define these terms, or to speculate as to whether the things they denote are essentially one and not two. They exist, in the sense in which we permit ourselves to use that word, and they are not yet incorporated into physics. Till they are, they may remain more or less vague; but how or when they can be incorporated, is not for me even to conjecture.
Still, it is open to a physicist to state how the universe appears to him, in its broad character and physical aspect. If I were to make the attempt I should find it necessary for the sake of clearness to begin with the simplest and most fundamental ideas; in order to illustrate, by facts and notions in universal knowledge, the kind of process which essentially occurs in connection with the formation of higher and less familiar conceptions,—in regions where the common information of the race is so slight as to be useless.
Primary Acquaintance with the External World.
Beginning with our most fundamental sense I should sketch the matter thus:—
We have muscles and can move. I cannot analyse motion,—I doubt if the attempt is wise,—it is a simple immediate act of perception, a direct sense of free unresisted muscular action. We may indeed move without feeling it, and that teaches us nothing, but we may move so as to feel it, and this teaches us much, and leads to our first scientific inference, viz. space; that is, simply, room to move about. We might have had a sense of being jammed into a full or tight-packed universe; but we have not: we feel it to be a spacious one.
Of course we do not stop at this baldness of inference: our educated faculty leads us to realise the existence of space far beyond the possibility of direct sensation; and, further, by means of the direct appreciation of speed in connection with motion,—of uniform and variable speed,—we become able to formulate the idea of "time," or uniformity of sequence; and we attain other more complex notions—acceleration and the like—upon a consideration of which we need not now enter.
But our muscular sense is not limited to the perception of free motion: we constantly find it restricted or forcibly resisted. This "muscular action impeded" is another direct sense, that of "force"; and attempts to analyse it into anything simpler than itself have hitherto resulted only in confusion. By "force" is meant primarily muscular action not accompanied by motion. Our sense of this teaches us that space, though roomy, is not empty: it gives us our second scientific inference—what we call "matter."
Again we do not stop at this bare inference. By another sense, that of pain, or mere sensation, we discriminate between masses of matter in apparently intimate relation with ourselves, and other or foreign lumps of matter; and we use the first portion as a measure of the extent of the second. The human body is our standard of size. We proceed also to subdivide our idea of matter,—according to the varieties of resistance with which it appeals to our muscular sense,—into four different states, or "elements" as the ancients called them; viz. the solid, the liquid, the gaseous, and the etherial. The resistance experienced when we encounter one or other of these forms of material existence varies from something very impressive—the solid,—through something nearly impalpable—the gaseous,—up to something entirely imaginative, fanciful, or inferential, viz. the ether.