CHAPTER XIV
CONFUCIANISM—II
Persons whose religion is bounded by dogmas and rituals, and who take such a dismal view of human nature that they cannot conceive of the existence of moral goodness apart from faith in a particular creed, are always (consciously or unconsciously) on the look-out for evidences of "sin" or imperfection or human frailty in the doctrines of those who are ethical rather than religious teachers, and who do not profess to have been favoured with a "divine revelation." Some of the failings ascribed to Confucius—such as his alleged insincerity—have been already dealt with; but if his Christian critics are unable to substantiate their charges of moral depravity they are on much firmer ground when they declare that Confucianism is not a religion at all, but merely (though why "merely"?) a system of morals. This is a point which every one will decide for himself in accordance with his own views of what constitutes Religion. Cardinal Newman said that by Religion he meant "the knowledge of God, of His Will, of our duties towards Him." According to this definition Confucianism can hardly be called a Religion. Carlyle said that whoever believes in the infinite nature of Duty has religion. If this be so, it may after all be argued that a religion is possessed by the true Confucian. Legge, who admired Confucius as "a very great man," but was prompt to seek out evidence that the Confucian system was altogether inferior to Christianity, admitted that Confucianism was not "merely" a system of morality, but also contained religion.[301] Sir Charles Eliot, on the contrary, says "it has produced twenty centuries of gentlemen. Still, it is not in any ordinary sense a religion."[302] Similarly Sir Thomas Wade declared that the Chinese "have indeed a cult, or rather a mixture of cults, but no creed." Hegel said that Religion is the Infinite Spirit of God becoming self-conscious through the medium of the finite spirit. The late Father Tyrrell held that what distinguishes religion from ethics is "the belief in another world and the endeavour to hold intercourse with it." Kant said that when moral duties are regarded as divine commands, that is religion. Fichte said that religion was Knowledge rather than morality. Matthew Arnold defined religion as "morality touched with emotion." Schleiermacher said that religion consisted in the consciousness of absolute dependence on a Power which influences us though we cannot influence it in turn.
It is obvious that until we are all agreed on what we mean by Religion it is useless to enquire whether the Confucian system is or is not entitled to the name. One might as well try to determine whether a given literary composition is a poem before we have agreed upon a definition of Poetry. Some writers have been apt to look for some quality that is common to all religion as the best basis for a definition; but, as Edward Caird has reminded us, "such a quality, if it could be found, would be something so vague and abstract that little or nothing could be made of it."[303] As nobody has yet invented a definition which will satisfy every one, we must perforce leave Confucianism unlabelled: though if we all agree that a religious attitude implies a deep sense of moral responsibility (either to our own higher selves or to an external Power) and a feeling that to do what we believe to be right—irrespective of how we come to have ideas of right and wrong at all—is "wisdom in the scorn of consequence," then we cannot go far astray in asserting that Confucianism is not an irreligious or unreligious system, but is merely an untheological one.
HILLS NEAR AI-SHAN (see p. [388]).
HILL, WOOD AND STREAM
If the word Religion may be said to have almost as many meanings as there are cultivated human minds, what is to be said of the word God? The Christian objection to Chinese ancestor-worship, of which Confucius approved, is that it is a form of idolatry, inasmuch as the deceased ancestors are worshipped as gods. Here again our concurrence or dissent must depend upon the exact shade of meaning to be attached to the word "god." A rough unhewn stone may be a "god" at one place and time—though probably, as in the case of the meteoric stone that is said to have been carried in the Ark of Jahveh, it is never regarded by "initiates" as more than a sacred emblem or representation. At another place and time God becomes an ineffable Spirit invisible to the human eye and only partially attainable by human thought. "Of Thee," said Hooker, "our fittest eloquence is silence, while we confess without confessing that Thy Glory is unsearchable and beyond our reach." Nor need it be supposed that the sublimer conception of Deity is the newly-won possession of Christians only. Perhaps no loftier idea of the Godhead has ever existed in man's mind than that of the composers of some of the Indian Vedas and Upanishads which were produced many hundreds if not thousands of years B.C.; indeed Hooker's prayer and many other Christian prayers grander and nobler would not seem at all out of place if they were put into the mouth of an Indian forest-sage or a prehistoric Brahman.