Lion and Dragon in Northern China

by Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston

On the other hand, if the Government adheres to its present course of alternate radicalism and conservatism and continues to play with reform schemes as if they were ninepins and foreign treaties as if they were packs of cards, the new fleet and naval bases will not only be of no avail to the country in her hour of need but will serve to hasten a catastrophe in which the dynasty, at least, will in all probability be overwhelmed and foreign intervention will once more become a painful necessity. We saw in a former chapter that to charge the Chinese, as a people, with a proclivity to untruthfulness, or at any rate to assign such untruthfulness, if it exists, to Confucianism, is erroneous and unjust. But let it be admitted at once that the charge of insincerity in politics is one that can without unfairness be brought against the Chinese Government—as, indeed, it can be brought against some other states that have had less excuse for their conduct than China.

In her transactions with Western Powers she has too often shown want of straightforwardness, duplicity, even treachery. Not only does she try to play off one Power against another (a game that is played with more or less assiduity by every government in the world) but she makes promises which she does not intend to fulfil except under compulsion, she adopts an attitude that is now arrogant and now cringing, she is alternately dilatory and hasty, she is often hypocritical, and her perpetual changes of external and internal policy are a source of the greatest embarrassment to the governments and merchants of foreign lands and a source of gravest danger to herself. Nothing distresses the sincere friends and well-wishers of China so much as the manner in which she palters with her international obligations, unless it be her haphazard and erratic attempts at administrative reform—now hesitating and half-hearted, now extravagant and ultra-progressive.

As regards her foreign relations one is tempted to assert that Obstruction, Prevarication and Procrastination seem to be the three leading principles of Chinese statesmanship. Those who know how sound China is at heart, how able, industrious and intelligent are her sons, and how well fitted their great country is in many ways to play a grand part in the history of the world and in the development of civilisation, are perhaps even more ready than others to denounce the Manchu government of China for its gross mismanagement of the internal and external affairs of the nation, its pitiful misuse of splendid material and its shameful waste of magnificent opportunities.

It is obvious to every foreigner who knows China well that the first and most urgent necessity is the thorough reform of the entire Civil Service in all its branches. So long as offices are bought and sold, so long as salaries are so meagre that they must necessarily be supplemented in irregular ways, so long as revenue and expenditure accounts go through no proper system of audit, so long as bribery and the "squeeze" system are practically recognised as necessary features of civil administration—so long will it be utterly futile to attempt far-reaching reforms in other directions. When these abuses have become things of the past the general progress of the country will be swift and sure, but not till then. It may be that they will never be abolished until the new Provincial Assemblies—the most striking development of Chinese political life that has been witnessed since the opening of the country to foreign intercourse—have compelled the central government to admit the popular representatives to an active share in the real business of administration.

A question was recently asked in the British House of Commons[430] as to whether the Chinese Government had taken any steps to carry out the provisions of Article VIII. of the Mackay Treaty relating to the abolition of the Likin system. The reply was that China had not yet done anything in the matter except in so far as to express a desire to enter into negotiations for an increase of the Customs tariff in return for the abolition of likin.[431] "In view, however, of the failure of the Chinese Government to carry out other important provisions of the Treaty of 1902, His Majesty's Government are not at present disposed to give this proposal their support; more especially in view of the fact that new likin stations are being established in China, and that foreign trade is being subjected to likin exactions of greater frequency and amount."

Probably the most important of the other unobserved provisions of the Mackay Treaty, to which Mr. McKinnon Wood referred, was the second article, in which China undertook to reform her currency. Financial reform (including a reorganisation and readjustment of the system of internal taxation as well as the establishment of a uniform national coinage) is, next to the thorough cleansing of the whole machinery of administration, the most urgently necessary of all the tasks that confront the Government, yet though nearly eight years have elapsed since the Mackay Treaty was signed, the only indications that the Chinese Government has given any serious consideration to this vitally important problem have consisted in the despatch of a costly Mission to enquire into the financial systems of other countries and in the periodical issue of Imperial Edicts which promise the standardisation of the coinage and other useful reforms but have not as yet been followed up by practical measures. Not to dwell upon the commercial interests of the great foreign communities of Hongkong, Shanghai and Tientsin, which are most seriously hampered by the apathy of the Chinese Government in the matter of currency reform, there can be very little doubt that if the present policy of "drift" is adhered to, the country will be gravely menaced by the peril of bankruptcy. The wiser heads among the Chinese officials know perfectly well that an inability to meet their foreign liabilities will inevitably result in the loss of the economic independence of their country, yet they hesitate to introduce the drastic financial reforms without which China cannot hope to make real progress or to assume a dignified position in the councils of nations.

Provincial independence in matters affecting currency and finance is still to a great extent unchecked; local officials still make large temporary profits out of the excessive issue of copper coin; the most elementary laws of economics are ignored; innumerable native banks are allowed to issue notes against which are held cash reserves that are generally inadequate and sometimes (so it is whispered) non-existent.[432] If China would declare her intention of engaging the services of a European or American Financial Adviser—the best and ablest she could get—the mere announcement would do more to re-establish her financial reputation than a hundred plausibly-worded Imperial Decrees. Yet even the ablest of advisers would accomplish little of permanent value unless he were given a free hand to deal with official corruption in high places and safeguarded against petty jealousies and underhand intrigues; and judging from the present temper of Chinese officialdom it is very doubtful whether any satisfactory guarantees of this kind would or could be given.

The Chinese, not unnaturally, resent the suggestion that they should apply to a foreign government for the loan of a guide and teacher, or that among all their millions of population they possess no able statesmen of their own; but what they should understand is this, that though there may be and probably are hundreds of Chinese officials who in intellect, energy, and devotion to duty (if not in actual experience) are quite as fully qualified to reorganise the finances of the country as any foreigner could be, yet it is inconceivable in the present state of Chinese politics that any native official, however capable and energetic, would be able to withstand and overcome the conservative forces that would certainly oppose him as soon as he began to assail the fortresses of corruption. A foreign adviser might be denounced to the Throne in memorial after memorial and yet possibly retain his position and authority; a Chinese minister who attempted to initiate reforms worthy of the approval of foreign experts would probably be overwhelmed by his enemies before a single important measure had been carried into effect.