The benefits of free and popular rule were offered by the Danish Government to Iceland. But the offer was based upon the supposition, indignantly repudiated in the island, that she was subject to the Rigsdag;[144] and it was repeatedly refused, as falling short of the royal promise made in 1848. Hence arose the Radical party, whose extreme left, though disclaiming the idea of separation, is distinctly republican. The author has compared it with the Home Rule movement in Ireland, warning his readers, however, that there are salient points of difference; while the absence of social and religious complications is all in favour of the Scandinavian. The head of the party was and is the highly distinguished scholar Hr Jón Sigurðsson; there is none beside him, but “proximè accesserunt” Ex-Justice Benidikt Sveinsson, Professor Haldór Friðriksson, Rev. Eiríkr Kuld, and Jón Sigurðsson of Gautlönd, a farmer in the north. They complained that the king, whose rule at home was limited by the Chambers, remained absolute in Iceland; that the constitution did not place them on an equal footing with their fellow-subjects; that they were governed by men living in Copenhagen, who knew little of local requirements, and of a doctrinaire clique which has done abundant harm. They described paternal rule as equivalent to the rule of red tape; they distrusted the Danes even dona ferentes, and they declared that there is still “something rotten” in a certain state. It was, indeed, evident that the national Liberal party of Denmark, with the usual liberality of “Liberals,” aimed only at subjecting their Icelandic fellow-subjects.
In vain the ministers of Frederick VII. offered what appeared to the outer world the fairest terms—the establishment of an Upper and a Lower House, and a settlement of all claims by a perpetual allowance of $60,000 per annum.[145] The Home-Rulers “totted up” all that the Danes stole, such is the mild word used,[146] from chalice to landed estate, with interest, simple and compound, for the last three centuries. These pretensions exceeded those of the United States in the Alabama affair: everything was placed to the debit of Denmark, nothing to her credit. But Hr Sigurðsson, the opposition leader, sensibly said, “The money claims are the most awkward to the Liberals, and pressing them is the best lever when moving for self-government.” The Danes laughed at the idea of holding a constitutional country liable for the debts of absolute kings, contracted in A.D. 1550-1800, when Denmark herself was plundered, as well as Iceland, by irresponsible rulers. There was, however, this difference, that while Iceland was plundered to enrich Danes residing in Denmark, Denmark was plundered to enrich her own citizens. And Hr Sigurðsson was fated to win. Important events have happened since the author left the island. A public meeting, attended by delegates from every district, was held (June 26, 1873) at Thingvellir. Here it was resolved to use every effort either to end Danish rule in Iceland, or to obtain an extended constitution which should give the island a government of her own. Correspondents assured the writer that the movement passed off without undue excitement. “Hereditary bondsmen” know in those days that no physical blow need be struck, and that “every institution,” to use the words of a well-known separatist, “can be modified or destroyed by the weapon of agitation, under the guidance of popular opinion.”
At this preliminary to the opening of the Althing it was decided to send three delegates to Denmark, and to submit to the ministry a draft constitution, drawn up with the view of developing the island and its inhabitants. The two principal provisions were (1.) That Iceland should be connected with the home country by a “personal union only;” and (2.) That it should be governed by a Jarl, earl, or viceroy, with a minister or ministers responsible to the House of Representatives.
After the close of the meeting the Althing assembled at the usual place. Some of the more advanced kept, it is said, their seats when the usual cheers were given for the king; but no disloyal manifestation was made beyond rejecting almost all the bills brought in by the local government. The draft constitution was referred to a committee, which on July 28, 1873, reported in its favour, and added a resolution that the king should be requested to concede the following temporary arrangements as soon as possible, and not later than the next year:
1. That the Althing be at once invested with full legislative powers, and a new budget be submitted for its approval once in every two years, on the principle that no tax or impost shall be levied in Iceland for defraying expenditure incurred by the Danish Government.
2. That a special minister be appointed for Icelandic affairs, and that he be responsible to the Althing.
3. That this arrangement be valid for six years only, after which the entire constitution shall be laid before the Althing for its consideration.
On January 5th, 1874, after a struggle of thirty years, the new Icelandic constitution was signed by the king, and came into force on August 1st of the same year, the millenary festival commemorating the occupation of the Northmen. The original plan of the two houses has been carried out. The biennial Althing will consist of thirty members voted in by the people, and of six nominated by the Crown. The Upper House will contain the six royal nominees, and six others elected by the general body of the Althing from its members, duly returned by their constituencies; while the Lower House will number the remaining twenty-four. The vote is confirmed to officials, to ecclesiastics of every grade, to all university graduates, and even to students who sign themselves “Candidat” (B.A.). It is extended to citizens who lease farms, to those who pay a minimum of eight crowns a year in government taxes, and to the country people that contribute either cess or parish rates—evidently universal suffrage, excluding only women and minors, paupers and criminals. Every voter must be twenty-five years old, and of unblemished character; and he must have resided at least a twelvemonth in his electoral district. Any person who has a right to the franchise, who is thirty years of age, who has been domiciled in Iceland or Denmark for five years, and who is not in the employment of a foreign state, is qualified for election to the Althing. The session may not outlast six weeks without special royal assent, and provisions are made for extraordinary sessions.
The new constitution, which purports to regulate only home affairs, is a distinct improvement upon the old platform. The Secretary for Iceland is independent of the Danish Cabinet and Rigsdag, and becomes responsible to the king and to the Althing. This minister will be answerable for the maintenance of the constitution, and he will nominate for royal approval the chief local functionary. The governor’s functions will be determined by his majesty, and constitutional complaints against him will be investigated by the Crown. Thus the Althing will enjoy certain legislative rights, and have some control over the administration of its country. Finally, as Iceland has no representative in the Rigsdag, and as she has never taken part in the legislature, nor in the general government of the empire, she will not contribute to the home expenditure.[147]
But the power of passing laws is not granted absolutely; it is subject to royal confirmation. The relative position of the Secretary for Iceland to the people, represented by the Althing, remains to be defined. Even less satisfactory are the arrangements concerning the local governor; his power and duties are not settled, and the Althing will have no voice in settling them. Hitherto he has mostly acted as a mere channel of communication between the island and the Copenhagen Cabinet, and the new constitution does nothing to remedy this evil. On the contrary, the king makes a special reservation concerning the expenses of the “highest local government of the island,” meaning that the governor’s salary will be dependent upon the Crown, and will not be discussed by the Althing with the rest of the budget. Thus the ruler becomes wholly independent of the ruled, and dependent only on the Secretary for Iceland. Again, the nomination of six members by the king will have the effect, in case of disagreement between the Upper and Lower Houses, of enabling the royal commissioners to frustrate legislation simply by absenting themselves from the debates. This is perhaps the weakest point of the new constitution; it may be necessary in Denmark where the tone of the middle classes is distinctly democratic and republican, but it is looked upon and is protested against in aristocratic and conservative Iceland as an affront to their loyalty. And it can serve for nothing but to create an artificial opposition and to strengthen any minister or governor in anti-national or Danising measures. The provision that the governor may sit in the Althing and speak as often as he pleases, is distinctly unconstitutional; nor is the paragraph concerning the fixed contribution and the sinking contribution at all satisfactory.