My first examination being finished, I was informed that Mr. Robert Smith, then head of the Twopenny Post Department, would be called on for his evidence, and that afterwards I should have opportunity of commenting thereon. Knowing that there would be much difference between us, and fearing that reply and rejoinder, if made in the ordinary way, might weary out the Commissioners before they could arrive at any sound conclusion, I ventured to suggest that we should be examined together. I was not aware of any precedent for this course, nor do I know that it has ever been repeated. The plan, however, was adopted by the Commissioners, and with good success. In this manner, statement promptly met counter-statement, and argument counter-argument; so much so, indeed, that the proceeding, as will be seen on reference to the evidence,[132] eventually took the form rather of discussion between Mr. Smith and me than of examination of either; much to the saving of time, and the facilitation of conclusions.

Mr. Wallace also gave earnest evidence in support of my views, and the result was that the Commissioners recommended as immediate measures, by way of experiment, the optional use of stamped penny covers within the London District, increase in the weight allowed in a single packet, and an additional daily delivery; and on the presentation to the House of Commons of an important petition, of which I shall speak hereafter, Lord Duncannon announced that it was the intention of Government to carry so much of the plan into effect.

While I could not but regard this concession as a great triumph, I had nevertheless to guard against a serious danger, the reality of which subsequent events did not fail to demonstrate. Lord Duncannon’s intimation that the contemplated change would be considered as a trial of the general plan, made it necessary to guard against inferences to be drawn from a partial failure, which was but too probable; for where the reduction in postage would be but small, frequent and rapid delivery was my main dependence; and this, in the proposed measure, was to receive scarcely any attention. Now should this be regarded as a trial of my plan, and should its results, in consequence of its incompleteness, fall short of what I held out as likely to follow its complete adoption, there was little chance that either the Post Office, or the Government, or the public, or even the Commissioners, would draw the necessary distinction and attribute the partial failure to its true cause. I therefore felt that I must put the matter in its true light, and that before the trial should begin. I consequently wrote to the Secretary of the Commissioners a letter, in which, while expressing my satisfaction at the intended change, I very distinctly pointed out that it would afford no test of my plan, as this could not be fairly tried unless adopted in its integrity so as to comprehend division into districts with hourly deliveries.[133] This last course, therefore, I again urged on the Commissioners; pointing out that the amount of revenue at stake in so limited a change was but small; that success here would warrant extension of the plan, while failure would set the matter at rest.

I had the satisfaction to learn that this letter produced its intended effect. After reconsidering the question, the Commissioners, guardedly, but yet distinctly, spoke in favour of complete adoption within the London District;[134] a course, I may observe, which, besides its immediate benefit, would have subjected my plan to a tolerably fair experiment. It is curious to remark that the point on which the Commissioners spoke with most hesitation is one which never presented any real difficulty, viz., the practicability of general prepayment.

It now only remained to see whether the Government would act on the recommendation of its own Commission, which certainly seemed the more probable as all the Commissioners were likewise members of Government. This fair prospect, however, ended in disappointment; nothing whatever was done. My only consolation for the moment was that my plan had escaped an unfair trial.

The rejection of this very moderate and limited improvement made it clear that the only course left was to bring the public voice to bear forcibly on the question. I was, as already implied, very reluctant to take any step to promote such a result; and I had even, in the first edition of my pamphlet, held forth an earnest warning on the subject. I give the passage. Unfortunately for the Government, as well as for myself, it proved prophetic to the letter:—

“Judging from the rapid growth of public opinion which we have recently witnessed with regard to other institutions, we may expect that in a few years, or even months, if ‘the still small voice’ which, at present, gives scarcely audible expression to half-formed desires, be neglected, it will swell into a loud, distinct, and irresistible demand; and then a reform, which would now be received with gratitude, as one of the greatest boons ever conferred on a people by its Government, would perhaps be taken without thanks, and even with expressions of disappointment, because less extensive than unreasonable people might have expected.”[135]

But could the public voice be drawn forth? Doubtless the proposed reduction of postage would be acceptable enough; but would the measure be regarded as practicable, as capable of adoption without such loss to the revenue as would necessitate the imposition of yet heavier burdens? Could the public be got to take the plan into its serious consideration? Was not a proposal so paradoxical likely to be classed with numberless wild schemes, which had enjoyed a momentary attention only to be thrown aside with scorn? Was not a conclusion, which had startled myself, even when I had arrived at it by laborious investigation, likely to be ridiculed as absurd by those to whom it was presented in the abrupt manner in which it would inevitably reach most minds? That a large portion of the public would thus deal with it was beyond all doubt; and would there be a yet larger or more influential body to take the opposite course? Even supposing this to be so, would the majority be sufficiently large and influential to carry Parliament with it, to constrain Government, and to overbear the Post Office; which, so far as indications went, seemed likely to put forth all its powers of obstruction?