The reader will remember[111] how long and how ineffectually I once strove to obtain the rectification of accounts relative to the true amount of the postal revenue. In 1852, however, I succeeded in demonstrating to Lord Hardwicke that if the Post Office were charged, on the one hand, with a fair share of the packet service, and received credit, on the other hand, for the stamp duty on newspapers,[112] the net revenue would be found, not, as was then maintained by some persons, nothing at all, but, as set forth in the ordinary accounts of the department, more than a million per annum. A year later Lord Canning, then Postmaster-General, giving me the draft Report of the Packet Commission which he had prepared as chairman, with a request that I would look it over, I found that he had adopted my views, though he expressed doubts as to the agreement of his colleagues.[113] I may mention here that ten years later I prepared an elaborate memorandum as to the means of ascertaining the true net revenue of the Post Office. This paper, in which the incidence of the packet service expense, as well as other questions relative to the subject, is duly treated of, will be found in the [Appendix (I)].
PACKET SERVICE.
Lord Canning’s Commission.
Of the able Report of the Commission, already mentioned, commonly called Lord Canning’s Commission, the following are some of the leading points. It will be observed that the question relative to the just incidence of the charge for mail-packets is not directly dealt with, though there is enough to show that the feeling of the Commission accorded with my view.
The Commission, which included not only Lord Canning, but Sir Stafford Northcote, gave, in their Report, a brief history of the introduction of contract mail-packets, explained under what special circumstances heavy subsidies for these packets appeared necessary, and expressed it as their opinion that when use can be made (as is now the case in every instance) of steamers which carry passengers and freight, large subsidies are no longer required. They added that after a new route has been opened for the extension of commerce, and sufficient time allowed for the experiment, the further continuance of the service, unless required for political services of adequate importance, should be made to depend on its tendency to become self-supporting. The Commission also advised the omission in future contracts of many conditions which tend to increase the cost; and recommended that the contract should be reduced to a simple undertaking (with penalties for failure) to convey the mails at fixed periods and with a certain degree of speed. This recommendation was afterwards to a great extent carried into effect; as was also, though not in the same degree, another recommendation, viz., to make the payment, when practicable, consist of a portion of the sea-postage.
The Commission further advised that, except on the establishment of a new route, no contracts should be entered into to run for a long period. On this head, as on that of dispensing with conditions regarding the construction, size, and steam-power of the ships to be employed, and other matters, the course thenceforth generally taken by the Post Office, on my brother’s advice, was so to frame the forms of tender as to ascertain the exact amount of expense involved in the several requirements. This specification naturally led to the abandonment of any whose cost exceeded their value, and thus, in effect, produced a large economy.
The following passage shows the opinion of the Commissioners as to the extent to which Government should undertake and maintain transmarine postal communication. The recommendations are still very worthy of attention:—
“In undertaking this duty [transmarine postal communication] the Government will, in the first place, have regard to the national interests, whether political, social, or commercial, involved in the establishment and maintenance of each particular line. Care must, however, be taken, in cases where the communication is desired for commercial purposes, to guard against an undue expenditure of public money for the benefit of private merchants. The extension of commerce is undoubtedly a national advantage, and it is quite reasonable that Parliamentary grants should occasionally be employed for the sake of affording fresh openings for it by establishing new lines of communication or introducing new methods of conveyance, the expense of which, after the first outlay has been incurred, may be expected to be borne by the parties availing themselves of the facilities afforded them. But this having once been done, and sufficient time having been allowed for the experiment, the further continuance of the service, unless required for political reasons of adequate importance, should be made to depend upon the extent to which the parties chiefly interested avail themselves of it, and upon its tendency to become self-supporting.”[114]
How valuable these recommendations were, how long they were observed, when they were set aside, and with what result, will appear hereafter.