They advise that, in order to place “the highest prizes within the reach of every deserving person,” means should be taken “for opening the ranks of the Secretary’s Office to all members of the establishment.”
They further advise that, throughout the department, individual salaries should advance by annual increments, instead of by large jumps at long intervals; all advancement, however, to be contingent on good conduct.
After mentioning the division of the circulation department into the “Inland Office,” and the “London District Office,” and showing “the analogous character of these two offices,” they recommend the consolidation of the two.
They point out that to obtain suitable men on reasonable terms, it is “necessary to hold out prospects of advancement to those who conduct themselves well, and who manifest the qualifications which are required for superior posts,” so that “by a proper encouragement to merit, economy and efficiency may be combined.”
To improve the discipline of the provincial offices—an improvement then much required—they recommend that the respective postmasters should, under approval and in accordance with prescribed rules, appoint their own clerks.
They proceed to make the golden recommendation that “all promotion should be strictly regulated according to qualification and merit”; a rule which, could its complete observance be secured, would in time raise any department to the highest state of efficiency and economy.
Their next recommendation deals with one of those anomalies in which our political and social structure, from its unsystematic nature, so much abounds. Every uninformed person would naturally assume that all provincial postmasters (deputy-postmasters, as they are technically called) must be appointed by the Postmaster-General; whereas, at the time in question, all such appointments were in the hands of the Treasury. Still worse, the nomination was left in effect to the member of parliament for the district where the vacancy occurred, provided only he were a general supporter of the Government. Of this anomaly the Commissioners recommended the removal, not only on account of the more obvious reasons, but also “because the power which the Postmaster-General would possess of rewarding meritorious officers in his own department, by promoting them to the charge of the important provincial offices, would materially conduce to the general efficiency of the whole body.”
This recommendation the Treasury so far adopted as to concede to the Postmaster-General the appointment to all postmasterships where the salary exceeded £175 per annum, observing that the principle of making such appointment the reward of merit “would be inapplicable in all cases where the post office is held in conjunction with a private business or profession.” And here I may remark that, though it is true that the powers and responsibilities of the chief office can never be placed on a completely satisfactory footing until all subordinate appointments are placed at its disposal, still the concession made was very large and highly valuable, and the relinquishment of so much patronage reflects great honour on the Liberal Administration then in power.[116]
The last recommendation which I shall cite is one of far more importance than would appear on the face of it, viz., that the Postmaster-General “should determine the future complement of each class according to the nature and amount of duty to be performed in it.” It might seem incredible that such a recommendation should be needed, but hitherto the number in a class had had but little reference to the amount of duty that fell to it to perform, and indeed, as mentioned in an earlier part of this narrative,[117] the division implied no real classification whatever, so that in many instances men of high class were, through lack of ability, employed at low-class work, and vice versa.