On the outside walls are the marks of various cannon-shot which appear to have been successfully resisted by the soft but tough sedimentary limestone, which is of similar quality to that used in the construction of the fortress. I observed that the impact of the shot has been confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the blow, and that the concussion has not been communicated to the adjoining stone, but has expended itself in crumbling the opposing surface to the depth in which it was eventually imbedded. It would be interesting to try some experiments upon those walls of Famagousta (which may already require repair or alteration) with modern heavy artillery, as should this stone exhibit unusual powers of resistance it may become valuable. Nothing would be easier than to fire a few rounds from a ship's battery to prove the question.
The courtyard of an ancient Venetian palace now forms the British parade-ground. This faces the cathedral entrance, and is ornamented by piles of marble cannon-shot, which are upwards of ten inches in diameter; these were the Venetian relics of the siege of 1571.
From Cape Greco to Cape Elaea, south to north, is about twenty-five miles; these points form the bay, nine miles in extreme width. Although open to the east and south-east, Famagousta is the only real harbour in Cyprus that can be available for large vessels, and there can be no doubt that a very moderate outlay would not only restore its ancient importance, but would make those additions of modern times that are required for a first-rate and impregnable coaling-station and arsenal.
It was blowing a fresh gale from the south-east when I was standing on the ramparts facing the sea above the water-gate, and an admirable example was displayed in the wave-breaking power of the long line of sunken reefs which form a continuation of those natural breakwaters above the surface that have formed the harbour. A tremendous surf exhibited a creamy streak along the margin of comparatively still water within the reefs for about a mile parallel with the shore, comprising an area of about 700 yards' width at the extremity of the sunken rocks, and 500 from the existing breakwater exactly opposite the water-gate. Within this secure haven several native vessels were snugly at anchor, but ships of war would hardly venture among the varying shallows caused by centuries of silt; such large vessels generally anchor in seventeen fathoms about a mile from the shore, but they are completely exposed to wind from east and south-east. The inner harbour is formed by the artificial connection of raised heads of projecting reefs by stone jetties. At right angles with this complete defence of limestone rock is a wall or jetty from the shore, which for a distance of 170 yards incloses the basin of perfectly still water within. The entrance to this snug little port is about forty yards in width, and the depth is most irregular, varying from dry silt close to the south end of the reefs up to twelve feet beneath the walls of the fortress. There were many small coasting-vessels and caiques which trade between the various ports of Syria and Asia Minor, all having sought shelter from the bad weather within the port; and the picture presented during the strong gale was thoroughly illustrative of the natural advantages and the future requirements of the harbour. The long line of reefs which form the outer protection would, were they exposed in their whole length, represent an irregular incline from about twelve feet above the sea level at the southern end to three fathoms below water at the northern extremity. A wedge laid with its broad base to the south would represent the inclination of this long line of useful reef, which can be converted into a sea-wall by simply filling-in with blocks of concrete to a sufficient height above the extreme water-mark. The ancient jetty which connects the small islands that form the northern head of the reef is in itself an example of the necessity of such an extension throughout the line. A natural headland terminating in disconnected rocks upon the north boundary of the reef about half a mile above the fortress is a secure protection from the sea, but it admits the silt. This has completely filled in a considerable portion of the original harbour, and were this sea-communication destroyed by connecting the various reefs with the main headland, the evil would be at once prevented, and the inclosed area might be cleansed by dredging. This would not only add to the accommodation of the inner harbour by a considerable extension, but it would afford an admirable position for a series of docks, and yards for the repairing of vessels. I walked through the whole of this confined mass of rocks, silt, and water only a few inches deep, and was much impressed with the capabilities of the locality. Such powerful dredgers as are used in the Suez Canal would clear away the deposit, with an outlay that could be calculated by the cubic contents, and the large margin that must generally be allowed in all estimates for harbour works would, in the case of Famagousta, be superfluous.
There are two enemies to be resisted—the sea, and the silt. The latter has been and still is brought down by the Pedias river; this has entirely blocked the ancient harbour of Salamis, and partially destroyed that of Famagousta. The engineer has to repel these enemies, and he possesses a great advantage in the fact that Famagousta has already existed as a most important harbour, therefore he is not experimenting upon an unknown bottom. The line of reefs affords the engineer's chief desideratum, "a sound foundation," and the materials for his concrete blocks are close at hand in the chaotic mass of stone now choking with ruins the area of the city, in the neighbouring ruins of Salamis, and, nearer still, in the native rock from which Famagousta has been quarried. The island of Santorin from whence the pozzolano is supplied for hydraulic cement, is only three days distant. Few places possess in so high a degree the natural advantages for becoming a first-class harbour, and it has been computed that about 300 acres of water can be converted into a wall-locked basin, with an entrance from the south that would be secure during all weathers. The Bay of Famagousta is extremely deep, exceeding 150 fathoms which affords an additional facility for getting rid of the contents of the lighters, as the mud from the dredgers could be discharged at sea without danger of its return.
All competent persons who have examined the present harbour are unanimous in the opinion that "a very moderate outlay would secure a first-class port, which would, as an impregnable coaling-depot and arsenal, complete the links of the chain of fortresses which are the guardians of the Mediterranean. In a war with any maritime Power the first necessity is an uninterrupted line of fortified coaling-stations, at intervals not exceeding five days' steaming at ten knots. A naval war will depend entirely upon the supply of coal, which will in all probability be declared "contraband of war." In the absence of a dependable chain of stations THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, the action of the most powerful cruisers will be extremely limited, as they will be rendered helpless when their supply is reduced to the minimum sufficient to carry them to a friendly port.
Where oceans must be traversed, the difficulty will be increased, as the coal-capacity of the vessel will only command a given mileage; she will therefore be in her weakest condition after a long voyage, and as her fighting power must depend upon her steam, precisely as the strength of man depends upon his food, she must be absolutely certain of obtaining a supply of coal in every sea where her presence is required.
Should the most powerful vessel afloat, after a long cruise during which she has encountered head-winds and weather that had caused delay and a great consumption of fuel, be reduced to only a few hours' steaming, she would be at the mercy of an inferior antagonist whose bunkers might be well filled. The commerce and the colonies of Great Britain demand the presence of our vessels in every sea; the greater part of that enormous carrying-power is now represented by steamers which have replaced the sailing-vessels of old: therefore in the event of war we must possess coaling-depots which in case of necessity could meet the demands of any of our ships, whether naval or commercial.
The attention of the usually far-seeing public is seldom directed to this important question of coaling-stations, but an examination of a recently constructed globe will discover the apparently insignificant red dots which represent the dominant power of England in every portion of the world. The smallest island may become the most impregnable and important coaling-depot. It is the fashion for some modern reformers (happily few) to suggest a curtailment of the British Empire, on the principle that "by pruning we should improve the strength of the national tree." If there are rotten boughs, or exhausting and useless shoots, the analogy might be practical; but if we examine carefully a map of the world it would puzzle the Royal Geographical Society to determine the point that we should abandon. An example of temporary insanity was displayed in the evacuation of Corfu; which would under our present foreign policy have become invaluable as a powerfully fortified coaling-station, commanding the entrance of the Adriatic and the neighbouring seas. It is this unfortunate precedent which is paralysing all the natural elasticity of commercial enterprise in Cyprus, as the inhabitants and English alike feel their insecurity, and hesitate before the uncertain future, which may depend upon a party vote in the distant House of Commons.
There can be no doubt that Cyprus or Crete was requisite to England as the missing link in the chain of our communications with Egypt. As a strategical point, Cyprus must be represented by Famagousta, without which it would be useless for the ostensible purpose of its occupation. Many persons of great practical experience would have preferred Crete, as already possessing a safe harbour in Suda Bay, with a climate superior to that of Cyprus, while according to our assumed defensive alliance with Turkey in the event of a renewed attack by Russia, we should have acquired the advantage of Cyprus whenever required, without the expense or responsibility, and we should in addition have established a station on the coast of Asia Minor at the secure harbour afforded by the Gulf of Ayas at Alexandretta.