"SAFVET."
It was eventually agreed between the contracting Powers:-
"That England will pay to the Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the island; this excess to be calculated and determined by the average of the last five years."
and:—
"That if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the Convention of the fourth June, 1878, will be at an end."
I knew nothing of Cyprus, but I felt sure that the Turks had the best of the bargain, as they would receive the usual surplus revenue from our hands, and be saved the trouble and onus of the collection; they would also be certain of a fixed annual sum, without any of those risks of droughts, famine, and locusts, to which the island is exposed, and which seriously affect the income.
Although there would only be a wildly remote chance of Russia ever relinquishing her Asiatic prey, the bare mention of the words "will be evacuated by England" was a possible contingency and risk, that would effectually exclude all British capital from investment in the island. I could not discover any possible good that could accrue to England by the terms of the Convention. If Cyprus had been presented as a "bonus" by the Porte to counterbalance the risk we should incur in a defensive alliance for the protection of Asia Minor, I could have seen an addition to our Colonial Empire of a valuable island, that would not only have been of strategical value, but such that in a few years, money and British settlers would have entirely changed its present aspect, and have created for it a new era of prosperity.
If England had purchased Cyprus, I could have understood the plain, straightforward, business-like transaction, which would have at once established confidence, both among the inhabitants, who would have become British subjects; and through the outer world, that would have acknowledged the commencement of a great future.
But, if we were actually bound in defensive alliance with Turkey in case of a war with Russia, why should we occupy Cyprus upon such one-sided and anomalous conditions, that would frustrate all hopes of commercial development, for the sake of obtaining a strategical position that would have been opened to our occupation AS AN ALLY at any moment? On the other hand, if we distrusted Turkey, and feared that she might coquet with Russia at some future period, I could see a paramount necessity for the occupation of Cyprus, and even Egypt; but we were supposed to be, and I believe were, acting in absolute and mutual good faith as the protector of Asiatic Turkey, in defensive alliance with the Sultan. In that position, should we have entered into a war with Russia, there was no necessity for the occupation and responsibility of any new position, as every port of the Ottoman dominions, even to the Golden Horn of Constantinople, would have welcomed our troops and boats with enthusiasm.
Turkey is a suspicious Power, and the British government may have had to contend with difficulties that are unknown to the criticising public; it may have been impossible to have obtained her sanction for the occupation under other conditions. The possibility of future complications that might terminate in a close alliance between the conquered and the victor, may have suggested the necessity for securing this most important strategical position without delay, upon first conditions that might subsequently receive modifications. At first sight the political situation appeared vague, but I determined to examine the physical geography of Cyprus, and to form my own opinion of its capabilities.