"Even if it be certain that Batoum and Ardahan and Kars will not become the base from which emissaries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due time followed by invading armies, the mere retention of them by Russia will exercise a powerful influence in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte."
In the same lengthy despatch the conditions are described which Turkey must fulfil in reforming the abuses of the present administration, &c. &c., and there can be no doubt that the British government contemplated the necessity of supplanting a considerable number of the peculant Turkish officials by experienced English officers, whose supervision would ensure the necessary reforms. If such a course should have been accepted by the Porte there could be no question of the salutary effect, as the presence of British officials in actual authority throughout the provinces of Asia Minor would have proved to the various races our positive determination to uphold their rights, and to defend them from the oppression and extortion to which they had been subjected. Such a position would have given England the control that is absolutely necessary to effect the reforms in the administration of Asia Minor, without which the result will be anarchy and revolution within a few years, fostered by Russia precisely in accordance with the policy that has terminated in the disruption of Turkey in Europe.
In the same despatch of 30th May, 1878, Lord Salisbury continues:—
"Her Majesty's Government intimated to the Porte on the occasion of the Conference at Constantinople that they were not prepared to sanction misgovernment and oppression, and it will be requisite before they can enter into any agreement for the defence of the Asiatic territories of the Porte in certain eventualities, that they should be formally assured of the intention of the Porte to introduce the necessary reforms into the government of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those regions. IT IS NOT DESIRABLE TO REQUIRE MORE THAN AN ENGAGEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS, FOR THE SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE TAKEN COULD ONLY BE DEFINED AFTER A MORE CAREFUL INQUIRY AND DELIBERATION THAN COULD BE SECURED AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE."
The italics are my own, for the weak point of the Convention is exhibited by this sentence.
No "general terms" should ever be mentioned in a communication with Orientals, and no convention should have been concluded with the Porte, unless every detail had been previously considered and specially agreed upon between the contracting parties. When this Convention was made public, I concluded that the British government contemplated the official employment of a certain number of their own officers to carry out the spirit of the agreement, without which the Convention would be a farce; at the same time I was convinced that the suspicions of the Turkish government and the stubborn pride of the race would resist any such direct interference upon the part of England. Under these conditions Asia Minor would remain exactly where it was. A grand scheme which would have had immense political results, had the Turks accepted our interference in the honourable spirit of our intentions, has been frustrated by their want of confidence, and the Convention remains, containing an agreement of stupendous importance, by which England is committed to a military undertaking of the first magnitude, while Turkey risks nothing except her "PROMISES OF REFORM in the administration of her Asiatic provinces."
"British interests" in this transaction are represented by Cyprus, which we occupy as tenants—paying 96,000 pounds a year for the ruined house, and leaving ourselves no balance from the revenue for the necessary repairs.
There is no more difficult political associate than the Turk; his defensive weapon is delay, and in moments of the greatest emergency his peculiar apathy or patience never forsakes him. Proud and haughty to a superlative degree, in his heart he detests all extraneous counsel and interference, and would rather glide onward to destruction than grasp the hand stretched out to save him. Turkey has expected much from England, and has made a poor return for our sacrifice of blood and treasure during the Crimean war. She obtained an ephemeral financial reputation through the aid of France and England in becoming guarantees for a public loan; upon this false position she traded until the inevitable bankruptcy plunged her into ruin, and opened the gate for the entrance of her enemies, at the same time that dishonesty entailed the severance of friends. England has from mutual interests endeavoured to preserve her from absolute dissolution, and the Protectorate of Asia Minor was a step of political audacity in her favour that surprised the world. This extraordinary offer of material aid has been met by the same want of confidence that has marked the decline of the Turkish Empire; the only extra interference in Asia Minor has been the appointment of a few additional British consuls. These gentlemen will report long lists of abuses, and the general mal-administration of the Turkish officials; they will be hated accordingly, and being absolutely powerless for good, they will simply keep the Foreign Office informed of what was thoroughly well known before. Remonstrances upon our part will be made to the Porte, who will deny the accuracy of the consular reports, and ultimately a special commission will be sent out, which will prove their correctness; the Porte will again promise amendment, but will not sanction the appointment of British officials. In this old-fashioned course, so thoroughly understood by all who have any knowledge of Turkey, the affairs of Asia Minor will be conducted, until revolution shall bring Russia upon the scene at the most favourable opportunity; and England, who has been thwarted by the Power she has endeavoured to save, will, by the terms of the Convention, be compelled to appear in arms as the defender of the remnant of the Turkish Empire.
Common sense would suggest the absolute necessity of special and clearly defined conditions in concluding an alliance with Turkey which may at any moment demand our military interference. If we are bound to assist by force of arms in the defence of Asia Minor, it is equally necessary that Turkey should be bound to qualify herself for resistance to an attack from Russia. It should have been distinctly agreed that Turkey should raise a territorial army of an estimated strength for the protection of Asia Minor, and that a certain number of British officers should hold important commands, to ensure the regular payment of the troops and to maintain the necessary discipline. Had such conditions been defined, and the civil courts been placed under the supervision of British officials, the Protectorate of Asia Minor would have become a practical combination that would have been an effectual check to Russian encroachments; but as the affair now stands, the alliance is fraught with extreme danger to ourselves. I cannot conceive the possibility of a credulity that would induce experienced statesmen to believe in the assurances given either by Turkey or by Russia. The history of the past is sufficient to prove the utter fallacy of assertions, promises, and treaties; Turkey will persist in mal-administration; Russia, who is now marching upon Merv in spite of former assurances, as she advanced on Khiva under similar pretexts, will at the moment of her own selection assuredly break through her boundaries in Asia Minor. The position of England will be contemptible. We have thrown down the gauntlet to Russia by an ostentatious alliance with Turkey, but we hesitate to insist upon the overwhelming necessity of British official and military officers to organise the civil administration and an army of defence; thus, when the sudden emergency shall arise, Turkey will be totally unprepared; the various races that comprise her Asiatic dominions will already have been poisoned by intrigue, and the only defence that can be offered to a Russian advance will be afforded by Turkish neglect, which has left the country devoid of roads.
Under these inevitable circumstances, England will probably accuse Turkey of neglecting to fulfil the conditions of the defensive alliance, and the "back-door" will offer a convenient exit from the difficulty; in which case, Turkey will be compelled to make terms with Russia that will probably terminate in a Russo-Turkish alliance AGAINST England, who will be accused of having treacherously deserted her after breaking a solemn engagement—and obtaining Cyprus.