Some days later, my party arrived at Fatiko that had left Masindi on the 23rd May with the post, together with the prisoner Suleiman.
These people had suffered terribly, and had lost eleven men killed, exclusive of one who had died on the way from fatigue.
The treacherous plan arranged by Kabba Rega had failed, and the natives had attacked them before the time appointed. This will be described hereafter.
Suleiman was no longer a prisoner, but he commanded the Fabbo station for Abou Saood.
Wat-el-Mek had received my letter, and he wished to serve the government; but Abou Saood had prevented him; and now that I was supposed to be dead, it would be impossible.
This man, Wat-el-Mek, had nevertheless behaved well, as he had immediately demanded 100 men from Abou Saood, and fifty men from Abdullah, in order to march to Unyoro, join Rionga, and with a native army he would have searched for us throughout the country.
Abou Saood had refused to give the 100 men, therefore we had been left to our fate.
The result of the story was that I must hurry on to Fatiko; Rot Jarma had sent his messengers to discover me whether dead or alive, and should I not march quickly, Abdullah might be attacked and overpowered, and the slave-hunters would possess themselves of all the ammunition and stores.
. . . This was not very refreshing news, after all the troubles we had gone through.
Had I received this important intelligence during my stay with Rionga, I should not have left Colonel Abd-el-Kader with sixty men behind me. It would not do to waste time by halting: and should I send to recall Abd-el-Kader immediately after my departure, the effect upon Rionga would create suspicion. The withdrawal of the troops would destroy all confidence on the part of his native allies.