"SAMUEL W. BAKER."
The only error that I can acknowledge throughout the expedition was my present leniency. I should at once have placed Abou Saood in irons, and have sent him to Khartoum, instead of leaving him at large to carry on his intrigues against the government.
I intended on the first opportunity to send notice to the Shir tribe of the safety of their cattle, but an incident shortly occurred that altered my determination. (These cattle were kept in a separate pen or zareeba, and were guarded when at pasturage by special soldiers for some weeks, in order that they should be returned to the Shir tribe upon the first opportunity.)
At the same time that Abou Saood was in disgrace, he was a bosom friend of the colonel, Raouf Bey, who commanded my troops. They dined together constantly in the house of the latter officer, and their friendship had originally commenced in Khartoum during the long interval that the regiments were awaiting my arrival from Cairo. It was during that interval that the officers of the expedition had fraternized with the White Nile traders who resided at Khartoum.
The result of such intimacy might be imagined.
The object of the expedition had always been distasteful to both officers and men. The traders had already seen by the, examples made at Tewfikeeyah that I should actually destroy their cherished slave-trade. It was therefore natural that Abou Saood should exert himself to ruin the expedition. Having friend in Raouf Bey, he was in a position to create division of opinion. He constantly associated with this officer, in order that it should be generally known that he was supported by an influential person in the government service. The scandal of the camp quickly assumed that the opinions concerning the slave-traders between myself and Raouf Bey were at variance.
The officers of the expedition had, contrary to my express orders, purchased 126 slaves from the stations of the traders during the White Nile voyage! I had only learnt this on arrival at Gondokoro; thus when corn was so scarce that the rations were reduced, while those of meat were increased, we had an addition of 126 mouths!
The policy of the slave-traders was identical with the feelings of the officers and men, all of whom wished to abandon the expedition and return to Khartoum. Abou Saood worked molelike in his intrigues. He fraternized secretly with Allorron and his Baris. Many of his men purchased tobacco from the natives in exchange for ammunition. The natives from Belinian were in daily communication with Abou Saood's camp, and their spies obtained information of our proceedings, and carried the news throughout the country that "they would be supported by Abou Saood against my authority."
I learnt everything that occurred through trustworthy agents. It quickly became known that Raouf Bey was desirous to terminate the expedition. The contagion spread rapidly, and the men worked languidly and without the slightest interest: they had made up their minds that the expedition was a failure, and that a scarcity of corn would be their excuse for a return to Khartoum. Abou Saood fanned the flame among the officers, and discontent became general.
In the mean time the Baris were very active in annoying the camp at night. Although these natives could not stand against the troops in the open, they harassed them by necessitating a perpetual vigilance both by night and day. It was necessary to have strong patrols in two parties at all hours; and I regret to say the Egyptian officers and men did not appear to enjoy a state of war where activity and good discipline were absolutely necessary. The Soudani officers and men, although ignorant, were far superior to the Egyptians in activity and courage.