Sultan Masud Mirza, better known as the Zil-es-Sultan, the eldest son of the late Shah, has generally been regarded as likely to challenge the right of his younger brother to the throne. His ambition and overweening self-confidence combined to make him imprudent in permitting his partisans to speak aloud of his superior qualifications as a successor to his father. The late Shah's considerate treatment of him on all occasions also led him to make ill-judged requests for such extended rule in the South that his father said Persia was not large enough for two Shahs. I think his idea of a viceroyalty in the South came from foolish vanity, and not from any serious thought of semi-independence, as some who heard him speak on this subject supposed.
His father always wrote to him as 'my well-beloved first-born,' and up to 1888 he allowed him great power and freedom of action. He was fond of 'playing at soldiers,' and he went to work at this amusement with such energy and will that he formed a numerous and very efficient army under well-trained officers, too good, the Shah thought, to be quite safe. Nasr-ed-Din sent an officer whom he could trust to Isfahan to bring back a true report on the army there; and such was the Zil's self-assurance, that he went out of his way to show him everything, and to make the most of his force.
The Shah, on learning all, became jealous or suspicious, and ordered the reduction of the troops to the moderate limits really required for provincial purposes. As affairs then stood, the Zil, with his well-appointed army, was master of the situation, but he was constrained to submit. He singled out the Amin-es-Sultan (now the Sadr Azem) as his enemy at Court, and regarded him as the strong adviser who influenced the Shah. His relations with Tehran then became so strained that the Shah summoned him to his presence to have his wishes clearly explained to him. The meeting of father and son did not tend to smooth matters, and the latter, allowing his temper to carry him to extreme lengths, tendered his resignation of the various governments he held, asking only to retain the governorship of Isfahan. His request was granted, and from that time he made no secret of his enmity to the Prime Minister.
Two or three years later the Shah restored to him some of the provinces which he had resigned in 1888, and this enabled, him to carry out more successfully the task which he had set himself, viz., that of amassing money, after his army was broken up. The warlike Bakhtiari tribe form the most important part of the military strength under the nominal command of the Zil-es-Sultan, but he alienated them entirely by his cruel and treacherous murder of their popular chief, Hussein Kuli Khan, in 1882, and the long imprisonment of his son, the equally popular Isfendiar Khan. Now that he has promised allegiance to his brother, Mozuffer-ed-Din Shah, we may regard the peace of the South as assured.
The Naib-es-Sultaneh, Kamran Mirza, as Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief, and Governor of Tehran, who was in constant attendance on his father, was also regarded by foolish partisans as a likely successor to the throne, but he himself never entertained the idea. His position as head of the army gives him no real power—in fact, it rather takes from his influence as Governor of Tehran; for the soldiers look upon him as a costly appendage, for whose pleasures and palaces their pay is clipped.
There is really no standing army, in Persia as we understand such, except the royal guard and the weak Persian Cossack brigade at Tehran. The artillery and infantry which do all the garrison work are militia regiments, embodied for two years at a time. The conditions are one year's service to two years' leave, and that they serve under their own local chiefs and officers. The administration of regiments is given to Ministers, high officials, and others for purposes of emolument or distinction, as the case may be. This system gives the influence over the troops to those who deal with their pay, and not to the Commander-in-Chief, who is regarded merely as the keeper of the great gate through which the pay passes after toll is taken. The Naib-es-Sultaneh, equally with his brother, the Zil-es-Sultan, appears to have a great dislike to the Prime Minister, whose loyalty to the Sovereign and his heir could not fail to create strong jealousy in high places.
I shall now finish with a few remarks on the able and sagacious Sadr Azem, the Prime Minister, who, by his strong character, resolute will, and prompt action, has proved his loyalty to the Crown and his fidelity to the Shah. He became Prime Minister at an unusually early age for such a high position, and this preferment drew upon him the jealousy and envy of many in such a manner as often to cause him great embarrassment. There can be no doubt of his conspicuous energy and talent. His pleasing manner and happy disposition attract adherents and gain for him their best services. In addition to his personal qualities, he has an astonishing knowledge of public affairs, which makes him a most valuable Minister. With the people he is deservedly popular, for not only is he liberal and kind, but he understands their feelings and can interpret their minds.
[Illustration: MIRZA ALI ASGHAR KHAN, SADR AZEM (From a Photograph by
Messrs. W. and D. Downey)]
He was beside Nasr-ed-Din Shah in the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim when the assassination took place, and at once brought his Majesty back to the palace in Tehran. This happened about two o'clock in the afternoon, and the Shah breathed his last within four hours afterwards. It appears that the Sadr Azem immediately grasped the situation, and put himself in telegraphic communication with the Vali Ahd at Tabriz, four hundred miles distant. He then summoned all the Ministers, State officials, military commanders, and the most influential people of the city, to the palace, and announced the death of the Shah. Under his able guidance, the prompt recognition of Mozuffer-ed-Din Mirza as Shah, in accordance with the will of his father, was effected.
The English and Russian Legations, as representing the two strongest and chiefly interested European Powers, were immediately informed, and the Minister of the former, and the Charge d'Affaires of the latter, were invited to the palace. On their arrival, the Sadr Azem wired to the Vali Ahd in their presence the allegiance of the whole party who were there assembled. This was done about four or five hours after the death of Nasr-ed-Din Shah, and the following morning, in consequence of this decisive action, Mozuffer-ed-Din was publicly proclaimed Shah of Persia.