The History of Java, v. 1-2

by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles

The law of custom is chiefly handed down by oral tradition, but has in part been committed to writing in the following performances.

The earliest work relating to jurisprudence which is now referred to, is that of Júgul Múda Páteh, or minister of Sri Ma Púng'gung (of Méndang Kamúlan), now Wirosári: it is computed to be about six hundred years old. The second bears the name of Rája Kápa, said to have been the son of Júgul Múda, and like him minister of his sovereign Kandiáwan, also prince of Méndang Kamúlan.

By the authority of the Sultan of Demák, the first Mahomedan prince, a compilation of the Javan laws was made, in which they were in some measure blended with the Mahomedan jurisprudence. Probably this was intended to pave the way to an entire introduction of Mahomedan law. The body of regulations, &c. compressed in these codes is curious, from the laborious refinement of their distinctions, from the mixture of moral maxims and illustrations with positive law, from the most incongruous combinations, and from their casuistical spirit. In the Appendix will be found the translation of a modern version of the Súria Alem, a work of this description in high repute, as well an abstract of the laws and regulations said to have been in force in the earliest periods to which Java tradition refers[81].

The proclamations (úndang-úndang), and the laws and regulations (ánger ángeran) of the sovereign, form another source of deviation from the Mahomedan law. Collections of these have been committed to writing.

The prince, by himself or his officers, is always supposed vested with a discretionary power of adapting the Mahomedan law to the circumstances of society, a prerogative liberally exercised. This power, which sanctions every deviation from the letter of Musselman law, the Javans also express by the term of yúdha nagára. The krising of criminals instead of beheading them, the combat of criminals with tigers, the severe penalties for infractions of the sumptuary laws of the Javans, the constant commutation of corporeal punishment for a pecuniary fine, and in the case of persons of rank found guilty of murder, the commutation of the strict law of retaliation for a fine, without regard to the wishes of the relations of the deceased, if the latter be of no consideration, were among the deviations from the Mahomedan law sanctioned by the Yúdha nagára.

Such was the composition of the courts, and the code of laws that existed on Java before the arrival of the Dutch, and remained unchanged at the conquest of the island by the British. The Dutch legislated for the colonists, but took little interest in the system by which the judicial proceedings of their native subjects were guided, excepting in so far as their own advantage or security was concerned in them. The following statement contains the changes introduced by the Dutch.

Besides the colonial laws and regulations, enacted from time to time by the Governors and Council at Batavia; besides some standing orders of the Court of Directors, and some rules and provisions contained in the successive charters of the Company, and in what was called the article brief; the Dutch law, which was always considered the foundation of the colonial law, was of authority, as far as it remained unaffected by these institutions.

A collection of the colonial statutes and regulations, called the Placart Book of Batavia, and an abstract of them, entitled the Statutes of Batavia, were made under the authority of the colonial government; but as the latter never underwent a regular promulgation, the rules contained in it were not considered as possessing the force of law, except in so far as they might be found to be conformable to the orders, proclamations, and regulations of the Indian government, or of the Directors of the East India Company.

The power of the Directors and of the Council of Batavia to enact local laws and regulations, seems not to have been very circumspectly defined in the first charters of the Company, those charters conferring on them, in general terms only, authority to provide for the administration of justice and establishment of police.

But from the nature of the occasion it seems evident, that this power of making colonial laws, as far at least as related to the Council of Batavia, could only have been a limited one, to be exercised with considerable discretion, and only upon points requiring an immediate provision, subject always to the approbation of the authorities at home; and even the Directors could hardly be considered to have possessed a greater extent of legislative power, than was necessary for the security of their new territories, and of their rights and privileges, or to have been authorised to deviate wantonly from the established law of the country, or neglect the dictates of justice and equity.