On the north-east of Borneo proper lies a very considerable territory, the sovereignty of which has been long claimed by the Súlu government; a very considerable part of this, together with the islands off the coast, have been for upwards of forty years regularly ceded to the English by the Súlus, and has also at different periods been assumed by them, without any objection on the part of the government of Borneo proper. This ceded district, extending from the river Ki-manis on the north-west, which forms the boundary of Borneo proper, to the great bay on the north-east, is undoubtedly a rich and fertile country, though in a rude and uncultivated state, and it is admirably situated for commerce, notwithstanding the different failures of Balambángan may seem to indicate the contrary. Balambángan is one of the small islands off the northern extremity of the island of Borneo, and included in the Súlu grant to the English. It would be foreign to the present object to enter into any details concerning the history of the settlement of Balambángan, but it may be proper to mention, that all the gentlemen who were engaged in the last attempt were convinced that the bottom of the great Malúdu Bay would have been infinitely preferable as a settlement on every account. Balambángan is exactly analogous, in every respect, to Pinang; it does not admit of territorial extension, and must exist, if at all, by commerce solely. Malúdu, on the other hand, is a dependency on the island of Borneo, which admits of any degree of territorial extension, may always subsist any number of inhabitants by its own produce, and is said to communicate, by a land carriage of little more than forty miles, with the central lakes in the vicinity of the gold countries.

From every inquiry, however, and the result of some experience, and much reflection, it may be stated, that no settlement which is founded on a commercial, instead of a territorial basis, is likely to succeed in that quarter. We have already acquired territorial rights, and therefore the only question seems to be, whether these cannot be turned to advantage, as well by cultivation as by commerce. The Dáyaks, or original inhabitants of Borneo, are said to be not only industrious, but particularly disposed to agriculture, and so manageable, that a handful of Maláyus have, in numerous places, reduced many thousands of them to the condition of peaceful cultivators of the ground. Indeed nothing seems wanting but a government strong enough to afford efficient protection to person and property. In the case of the Dáyaks, it must be considered as an advantage, that they have not hitherto adopted the religion of Islam, and would consequently be more ready from the first to regard us as their friends. It ought to be calculated among the inducements to form a settlement on Borneo, that in that quarter our territorial arrangement would interfere with the claims or the rights of no European nation. To recommend, however, the immediate establishment of a settlement at this particular spot, and on a basis so new, would obviously be premature, as notwithstanding the length of time we occupied Balambángan, not only the interior of Borneo was almost unknown, but until lately, even a great part of its coasts. This supineness in the government of Balambángan is perhaps not unexampled. The want of local information has, indeed, often proved fatal to the infant settlements of the English. "Colonies and settlements of every kind," says the author of the Letter on the Nagrais Expedition, "must at first be attended with many difficulties, which however a judicious perseverance will surmount, if there be not some original fault in the establishment. It must be obvious to every one, that the English never made a settlement, in which they were not impeded by some unforeseen difficulties, so as at least frequently to make abandoning the infant establishment appear the most prudent step, without even hoping any return for the prodigious expense which may have been incurred by the undertaking."​—"Various reasons," adds that author, "may be ascribed for this event; but incapacity in the person entrusted with the management, and the want of previous examination of the place, seem to me the most common and the most considerable." Without stopping to inquire how far the want of success in our several attempts to settle Balambángan may have been fairly attributable to either of these causes, it may be confidently asserted, that the last establishment failed chiefly from its being solely of a military nature, without either professional merchants or mercantile adventurers being attached to it.

These observations respecting Balambángan apply to it chiefly as a territorial establishment; but there is no doubt that it would speedily attain commercial importance. Many of the commercial advantages which recommended its selection still exist, to an equal or greater extent; especially those which related to Cochin China, Champa, and Cambodia. But this digression has already exceeded its reasonable limits, and it is necessary to revert to the more immediate point under consideration, the commerce of Java. Any account of this commerce would be imperfect, which after stating the extent to which it is carried, and the mode in which it is conducted with the adjacent islands in the same Archipelago, should omit to mention the advantages of an intercourse with Japan, and some notices on the Japan trade.

The history of the Dutch connexion with that country is well known, and can never be forgotten. Perhaps there is not such an instance in the annals of commerce, of the disgraceful arts to which mercantile cupidity will resort, and the degradation to which it will submit for the attainment of its object, as in the Dutch proceedings at Japan; nor is there, perhaps, a more remarkable example of the triumphant success, and complete disappointment of commercial enterprize. As it may be interesting to many readers to see an authentic history of the origin, fluctuations, and decline of the Dutch Japan trade, and as even a very succinct statement of it would swell this chapter to a disproportioned size, I have placed a short history of it in the Appendix to this work, to which I beg leave to refer those who have any curiosity for such details[72]. From the year 1611, when the Dutch established commercial relations with Japan, till 1671 (a period of sixty years), their speculations were unrestricted and their profits were enormous. This was the golden age of their trade: they opened a mine of wealth, and they fondly thought it inexhaustible, as well as rich and easily wrought. In 1640, the Company obtained a return in gold, that yielded a profit of upwards of a million of guilders. They had been accustomed to procure, for some time previous to 1663, a return of silver to the extent of two hundred chests of one hundred pounds each, and it was suggested that it would be desirable for as many chests of gold of the same weight to be sent in future. The golden and silver ages of Japan commerce being past, the latter half of the seventeenth century began with what the Dutch called its brazen age, that is its export of copper, which has ever since continued the staple of the Japan market. The trade was on the decline during the whole of the last century, and had become of so little importance about 1740, that the Company deliberated upon the expediency of its total abandonment. From employing, as at one time, eight or nine ships, and exporting copper alone to the amount of more than thirty thousand píkuls, of one hundred and twenty-five pounds each, it diminished to the use of two vessels, and the purchase of cargoes of five or six thousand píkuls. The Appendix contains an account of the nature of the trade, and the result of the Dutch adventures of 1804-5 and 1806, and of our own in 1813.

FOOTNOTES:

[54] Great Britain.

[55] It is said that when the Dutch first established themselves in Java, three hundred vessels of not less than two hundred tons each, were accustomed to sail to and from the port of Japára, in Java, if not belonging to that port.

[56] The greatest part, or rather nearly the whole of these exports and imports, consisted of colonial produce, of articles of subsistence, or native manufactures, mutually exchanged between the two islands of Madúra and Java. Not a tenth part of the imports came from beyond Java.

[57] "The bazars," observes Mr. Hogendorp, "now produce a large, and even an incredible amount, which however is melted away in the hands of the native regents and also some European authorities; but the Chinese, to whom they are mostly farmed out, derive the greatest profits from them, both by the money which they extort from the Javans, and by the monopolies in all kinds of produce, and particularly of rice, which by these means they are enabled to secure to themselves. The abuses on this point are horrible, and almost induce me to recommend that the markets should be made free and open."

[58] See account of Chéribon.