The utmost quiet was preserved, and the Chinese were made to understand that, deserted by their own authorities, and left without means of protecting themselves, they might be assured of protection through the generosity of British soldiers. Never indeed was there a more peaceable victory.
The capture of Chinhae and Ningpo, so soon after the loss of Chusan, seems to have inflicted so severe a blow upon the Chinese, as to have alarmed the whole province, and spread consternation even as far as the capital itself. Reports were soon brought from every quarter that the inhabitants even of Hang-chow-foo, famed for its luxury and refinement throughout China, were moving away from it in large numbers, and that places nearer to the scene of action were already almost abandoned. In fact, it was admitted that a panic prevailed on every side; and it was feared that "treacherous natives would seize the opportunity to rob and plunder, and would form themselves into organized bands for the purpose of creating internal disorders." There was also great apprehension that our forces might proceed to capture Chapoo, one of their most valuable ports, having the exclusive right of trade with Japan, and situated in the vicinity of Hang-chow-foo.
It could not be doubted, therefore, that had the General possessed a sufficient force to have been able to leave a garrison at Ningpo, and at once to take possession of Chapoo, which is, in fact, the seaport of Hang-chow-foo, and only twenty miles distant from it, he might have marched to the provincial capital while the Chinese were unprepared to offer any serious opposition; and it is not improbable that the war might have been brought to a termination in that campaign. With the very small force, however, which Sir Hugh Gough had at his disposal, such a movement was manifestly impossible. The whole force which he could muster at Ningpo amounted to no more than seven hundred and fifty bayonets; and, as the city was not less than five miles in circumference, containing a dense population, it evidently required a considerable garrison to occupy the place, and to afford security to the peaceable and well-disposed inhabitants. It was therefore resolved to make Ningpo the head-quarters for the winter, and to wait for reinforcements from England and from India before opening the next campaign.
The province of Che-keang, which was now the seat of our operation, is intersected by large rivers, and is traversed by the great Imperial Canal, which, taking its commencement from the city of Hang-chow-foo, and passing through the most fertile and densely-populated provinces, crossing in its course the two great rivers, the Yangtze Keang and the Yellow River, runs northward nearly as far as the imperial capital, which is dependent upon it not only for its wealth, but even for its means of daily subsistence. A blow inflicted upon its immense traffic at one extremity must necessarily vibrate along its whole course, and be painfully felt at the other end; and the great internal trade of China, through all its endless ramifications, upon which perhaps the bulk of the population depend for their subsistence, must suffer a universal and dangerous derangement. What was of quite as much importance, also, the imperial revenues would, in a great measure, cease to flow into the imperial treasury.
The city of Ningpo, therefore, the largest in the province next to Hang-chow-foo, wealthy from its great trade, easily accessible by water, and formerly the site of an English factory, was admirably adapted for winter quarters. The troops were placed, in the first instance, in two large public buildings, and the greatest forbearance was exercised towards the persons and property of the inhabitants. Proclamations were likewise issued, calling upon the people to return to their ordinary avocations without fear of molestation; and some of the principal inhabitants were requested to assemble, in order that it might be explained to them that it was the wish of our high officers to afford them all possible protection, and to restore order to the city; that the hostility of the English was to be directed against the government, and not against the people.
All this sounded well at first, and was received with great thankfulness by the Chinese, who seemed very well disposed to be taken under British protection. But the announcement which was afterwards made to them, that they were to pay a heavy sum as ransom for the city, and as an equivalent for the value of our "protection," was received with very great disfavour and reluctance. Very little of the sum demanded was ever forthcoming; and the substitution of a tax, or contribution, of ten per cent upon the estimated value of the property, was the cause of much subsequent ill-will, and some injustice. In fact, notwithstanding the promises and hopes which were held out, a very small portion of it was ever collected, and it was at all times a subject of much bitterness to the people.
A tax of ten per cent upon the value of the cargoes of all vessels passing up the river, which was afterwards enforced, was much more successful; in fact, it was little else than the collection of the imperial revenues, which the Chinese were always liable to pay. It was, however, in a great degree evaded, by an increase of smuggling along the coast, which the disorganized state of the local government of the province greatly favoured.
Generally speaking, the collecting of any considerable body of troops together in any particular province or locality in China, so far from strengthening the hands of the authorities, is more likely to occasion disturbance among the inhabitants. Their raw, ill-disciplined levies are under little restraint, and repeated complaints are always made against the lawlessness of the troops. Little confidence being placed in their regular soldiers, who had been so recently defeated, the people were now called upon by the authorities to collect their brave men from all the villages and hamlets along the coast, and to organize them into bands, for mutual "defence against the proud rebels;" but, in most instances, these bodies of uncontrolled patriots became a scourge to their own neighbourhood, and perfectly useless for any purpose of defence against the enemy.
Ningpo is situated upon the extremity of a tongue of land at the point of junction of two rivers, or two branches of the same river, which unite just below the town, and form the Tahea, or Ningpo river. Both of these branches are extremely tortuous, and have numerous villages along their banks, which are in some parts picturesque and well cultivated. One of them leads up, in a north-easterly direction, to the district town of Yuyow, whence there is a canal, supposed to lead to Hang-Chow-foo: the distance is about forty miles; and nearly halfway up this branch, situated about four miles from the river's bank, is the town of Tsekee. Both of these towns shortly became, as we shall see, the scene of our operations, our object being to disperse the Chinese forces, which were being collected at various points for a threatened attack upon us at Ningpo. The other, or south-western branch of the Ningpo river, leads up, at the distance of about thirty miles, to the town of Fungway, which we also designed to attack, if necessary.
At Ningpo itself, one of the most interesting objects is the bridge of boats, connecting the town with the suburbs. It is apparently well contrived to answer the purpose for which it is intended. The boats are all connected together by two chains running across, and resting upon them, extending from one side of the river to the other. This serves to keep the boats in their places, without their being moored, and a regular bridge of planks is carried from one to the other, but only destined for foot-passengers, as carts for draught are unknown.