Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840 to 1843 / And of the Combined Naval and Military Operations in China: Comprising a Complete Account of the Colony of Hong-Kong and Remarks on the Character & Habits of the Chinese. Second Edition

by Sir W. H. Hall; W. D. Bernard

After deducting the garrison left at Chin-keang, and the sick which remained on board the transports, the actual force at Sir Hugh Gough's disposal for the attack of the city amounted to about three thousand four hundred men, exclusive of the officers; a force sufficient for the easy attainment of the object itself, but very small indeed for the duties likely to be required of it, when once in possession of the city. Sickness would very soon have greatly reduced the number of effective men; and although they would, in case of need, have received accessions, by the addition of the marines and seamen of the squadron, still there were even at that time so many sick on board the ships, that it would have been very difficult to make any calculation as to the number which would have remained fit for service at the end of a couple of months. The waters of the river were exceedingly high; in many parts the banks were overflowed in the neighbourhood of the city, and fever and cholera were the most dangerous enemies to be apprehended. In every point of view, it is a matter of the greatest congratulation, not only that the war was so soon brought to a close, but even that our forces were not detained for any great length of time at Nankin.

The position of Nankin is evidently well chosen for that of a great capital; but the city is greatly fallen from its ancient importance and extent. There are remains of an ancient or outer wall, which can be traced over hill and dale for a distance of not less than thirty-five miles. The Chinese have a saying, that if two horsemen start at daybreak from any given point of the walls, in opposite directions, and gallop round the walls of the city, they will not meet until sunset. But this must be a regular Chinese gallop, and not exactly that of an English hunter. How much of this immense space was in ancient times occupied by houses, it would be difficult to determine. The walls of the present city are not nearly of so great an extent; and of the actual space enclosed within them, a very small portion indeed, perhaps not exceeding an eighth part, is occupied by the actual town.

Here again, as at Chin-keang and Chapoo, the Tartar city is separated from the Chinese part of it by a wall and gates running across it;—so carefully have the conquerors preserved their broad line of distinction, in person, habits, mode of life, and privileges, even in the ancient capital of the empire.

The great extent of the walls, even in the present day, rendered the city ill calculated for defence, independently even of its being commanded by hills, particularly on its eastern side. The principal of these was called the Chungshan hill, the base of which commanded the ramparts, and from the summit of which there was a magnificent prospect over the whole surrounding country, including the city itself. It was principally from this, the eastern side, that the chief attack was to have been made, had it been necessary to resort to extremities. There were three gates in that face of the walls, which run very irregularly, and towards the river are almost inaccessible, owing to the swampy nature of the ground; a considerable lake occupies the space between two of the gates. The latter are, however, approached by good causeways, by which they might easily have been threatened, while the real attack would have been made higher up, under cover of the guns planted upon the slope of the Chungshan hill.

The greater part of the troops were landed at a village about four or five miles up the creek or short cut before described, because there were good causeways leading directly from that point towards the city. The Nemesis was able to land at one time not less than a thousand men, and, in case of absolute necessity, could have contrived to carry at least a hundred and fifty more.

On the opposite or western side of the city, there was a large canal running from the river directly up under the walls, and serving to strengthen the approaches to them on that side. The mouth of this canal was completely stopped up by very strong rafts, firmly secured. They were, moreover, constructed in such a manner that there were, in fact, a succession of rafts, one above the other. On removing the upper tier, another lower one immediately rose to the surface; and, as they were made of stout timbers, well secured together, they effectually prevented our boats from getting up the canal. Upon the top of the rafts, little huts had even been erected, in which a few poor fellows were living, but apparently not with any purpose of defence.

At daylight, on the 14th, the attack was ordered to be made upon the city, all being now in readiness, and the guns in position. Due warning was finally given to the commissioners, that nothing could delay or suspend the attack except the production of the actual document itself, of the contents of which they had hitherto only given a very partial account. It was not until past midnight, scarcely more than three hours before the artillery would have opened, and the assault have taken place, that the commissioners at length yielded, and sent a letter, addressed to Sir Henry Pottinger, promising the production of the all-important document at a meeting to be arranged for the morning, and entreating that hostilities might at least be delayed until that time.

This was a moment of intense excitement to all who were acquainted with the circumstances. The attack was of course delayed, but it was doubted by many whether some new pretext would not still be found to delay or to break off the negotiations, and render the capture of the city inevitable. However, the proposed meeting did take place at a temple on shore, in the southern suburbs of the city, near the canal; and at length, with great form and ceremony, the emperor's commission was produced, and carefully examined by Mr. Morrison, in the presence of Major Malcolm; and, at the same time, Sir Henry Pottinger's patent was likewise produced, and translated to the deputies who attended for the purpose on the part of the imperial commissioners.

As yet, no personal interview had taken place between Sir Henry and the commissioners. Matters now proceeded satisfactorily. It was evident that the Chinese were at length prepared to yield anything we might demand; their anxiety to put an end to the blockade of the river and the canal was not concealed, and it was said to be freely admitted that the people were in the greatest distress.

Three days afterwards—viz., on the 17th, it was announced by Sir Henry Pottinger to the naval and military commanders-in-chief, that the negotiations had arrived at that stage which authorized him to beg that hostilities might be considered suspended. Some little delay was necessarily occasioned, by the time required, and the difficulty experienced, in translating the lengthened correspondence which took place. The distance, moreover, of the city from the ships, and the time necessary to receive and transmit the communications and their replies, tended to prolong the proceedings. Even in three days, however, the treaty was actually drafted in English and Chinese, (the latter a task of extreme difficulty, from the precision of terms necessary,) and the commissioners acceded to the whole tenour and forms of a document of incalculable importance, not only to England and the other nations of Europe, but to the whole future welfare and progress of the Chinese empire.