Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840 to 1843 / And of the Combined Naval and Military Operations in China: Comprising a Complete Account of the Colony of Hong-Kong and Remarks on the Character & Habits of the Chinese. Second Edition

by Sir W. H. Hall; W. D. Bernard

Keshen arrived at Canton on the 29th of November, and sent an official notification to that effect to the plenipotentiaries; and it is remarkable that, almost at the same moment, Admiral Elliot was compelled to resign the command of the fleet, and also his duties as joint-plenipotentiary, through sudden and severe illness. A few days afterwards he embarked for England in the Volage, leaving Commodore Sir Gordon Bremer as commander-in-chief, and Captain Elliot for the time as again the sole plenipotentiary.

In order to render complete the general sketch of passing events to the close of 1840, I must not omit to mention the gallant affair at Macao under Captain Smith, commanding the Druid, which happened in the month of August, at the period when the main body of the expedition was engaged in the operations to the northward, already alluded to. It will be remembered that Captain Smith had once before thought it necessary to sail into the Inner Harbour, for the protection of British subjects, but had retired upon a representation being made to him by the Portuguese government.

In the month of August, however, strange rumours of a rather threatening character began to prevail, but not of a very definite kind. One of the principal Chinese officers of Macao had been absent for some time at Canton, and, on his return, accompanied, or rather followed, by a body of troops, it became very evident that some hostile measure was in contemplation. A number of war-junks were likewise collected in the Inner Harbour, having troops on board. A considerable body of men were also encamped upon the narrow neck of land which separates Macao from the mainland, and across which there is a so-called Barrier, which forms the line of demarcation, beyond which the Portuguese have no jurisdiction.

This Barrier is composed of a wall, with parapets and a ditch running across the isthmus, and having a gateway, with a guard-house over it, in the centre. Beyond the Barrier the Chinese had very recently thrown up a flanking field-work, mounting about twelve guns, with a view of protecting the rear of the Barrier from the attack of an enemy attempting to land in boats. The war-junks were also placed so close in shore, in the Inner Harbour, as to be able to protect the Barrier on that side.

These movements were quite sufficient to prove that some attack was actually contemplated upon Macao itself, and the result of it, if successful, cannot be thought of without horror. But the promptitude and energy of Captain Smith anticipated the designs of the Chinese, and, by a most decisive and admirably combined movement, he soon scattered the whole Chinese forces like chaff before the wind. Taking with him the Larne and Hyacinth, with the Enterprise steamer and the Louisa cutter, he sailed boldly up towards the Barrier, and ran in as close as the shallowness of the water would permit. He then opened a spirited fire upon the whole of the Chinese works and barracks, which the Chinese returned. Their soldiers were seen mustering from different points, for the defence of the position.

In the course of an hour, the firing of the Chinese was almost silenced, and then a single gun was landed upon the beach, which raked the Chinese position, while a small body of marines, under Lieutenant Maxwell, with some small-arm men from the Druid, under Lieutenant Goldsmith, and about two companies of Bengal volunteers, under Captain Mee, altogether about three hundred and eighty men, landed, and drove the Chinese, with considerable loss, from every one of their positions. On the British side, four men only were wounded. The Chinese guns were spiked, but none were carried away, and the whole of their troops were dispersed, nor did they afterwards approach the Barrier, except to carry off the spiked guns. The barracks and other buildings were burned; and all our men having re-embarked late in the evening, the vessels returned to their former anchorage in Macao roads.

Seldom has a more signal service been rendered in so short a space of time, than this well-timed and energetic measure adopted by Captain Smith.

There still remain one or two points worth noticing, in order to complete the series of events which happened in the year 1840. Among these, one of the most important was the issuing of an Order in Council, for the establishment of courts of admiralty in China, for the adjudication of prizes, &c. It was to the effect that, "in consideration of the late injurious proceedings of certain officers of the Emperor of China towards certain of our officers and subjects, and, whereas, orders had been given that satisfaction and reparation for the same should be demanded from the Chinese government, it was necessary, for the purpose of enforcing those orders, that all vessels and goods belonging to the Emperor of China or his subjects should be detained and brought into port; and that, in the event of reparation and satisfaction being refused by the Chinese government, a court of admiralty should be formed for the purpose of adjudging and condemning them as prizes."

This order in council was not acted upon, except on a very limited scale, and for a very brief period. It was afterwards considered more equitable that the burden of the war should be made to fall as much as possible upon the government of China, and as little as possible upon the people; and this highly judicious and humane determination was carried out as much as possible, and with the best results, during all the latter part of the war, much to the credit of all concerned.

During the year 1840, very little progress was made in our endeavours to gain over the Chinese people to our interests, or to conciliate their forbearance, in any of the places in which we were brought into contact with them. At Chusan, in particular, they evinced the most hostile spirit towards us, and lost no opportunity of exhibiting their hatred of the foreigner. It was not without great difficulty even that provisions could be obtained for our men; there was evidently some secret influence which operated to prevent the people from meeting us amicably, and made them, for some time, resist even the temptation of gain, so difficult for a Chinaman to withstand. Nothing tended to exhibit their hostile spirit so much as their persevering attempts to carry off our men by stealth, whenever they could find an opportunity; and indeed the kidnapping system was followed up with many circumstances of barbarity, to the very close of the war.