Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840 to 1843 / And of the Combined Naval and Military Operations in China: Comprising a Complete Account of the Colony of Hong-Kong and Remarks on the Character & Habits of the Chinese. Second Edition

by Sir W. H. Hall; W. D. Bernard

It was reported that the Chinese were staking it across; and, from the bustle which had been previously observed there, when the boat of the Nemesis ventured into it, there was reason to believe that hostile preparations were being made. Moreover, it was thought advisable, if possible, to examine the channel which had been found to lead round in the rear of Anunghoy; for upon this fortress, as the most extensive of the defences of the Bogue, it was thought the principal attack of the squadron would be made. Suspicion was also excited by the contents of the intercepted despatch of Keshen to Admiral Kwan.

On entering the river, it was no longer to be doubted that preparations for defence had been commenced. A great number of boats were observed busily employed in driving stakes or piles into the bed of the river, across which others were trying to moor a strong raft. No sooner was the steamer discovered approaching, than the boats all pulled away, and the Chinese were seen scampering off as fast as possible. However, when it came to the point of pulling up the stakes, in order to make a passage between them for the boats which were in tow, all on a sudden a heavy discharge from a masked battery, close abreast of the spot, was poured upon them, and at once betrayed the cause of the secret preparations before observed.

The steamer immediately poured in a volley of grape and canister from her bow and stern guns, while the boats pulled away towards the shore, to carry the works by storm, opening their fire from their bow-guns as they advanced. The Chinese fled, after some resistance; and the battery, which was of very recent construction, was at once taken possession of by the crews of the boats, the colours being taken by Lieutenant Bowers. It was found to mount twenty guns of various calibre, which were immediately destroyed. There were also lying on the ground a vast number of guns dismounted, probably not less than sixty, which appeared to have been landed out of their junks, or recovered after the destruction of their fleet in the bay. These were all rendered useless, with the exception of a few brass ones, which were carried away as trophies. Their magazines and buildings were also totally destroyed. The number of killed among the Chinese were about thirty, but no wounded were found, as they had probably been carried off by their companions in arms. On our side no casualties happened.

Content, for the present, with this successful feat, Captain Herbert returned in the Nemesis, and rejoined the squadron, at its anchorage, a little to the southward of South Wantung. On the following morning they all returned to the scene of the previous exploit, and set about pulling up the piles, to clear a passage. This time, likewise, they were fired at, but from a different quarter. The Chinese troops, posted on the hills above, commenced firing at the working party, but it was soon returned from the thirty-two-pounders, by which they were speedily dispersed. A passage having at length been cleared, the Nemesis steamed up the river for some distance, until she had nearly reached the large town at the back of Anunghoy; but, as there appeared to be no further hostile preparations going on, Captain Herbert thought it better to return and complete the destruction of the fort, raft, &c., which had been only partially done the day before; after which they returned to the squadron, which the commodore himself had now joined, with the three line-of-battle ships and the Druid.

The next day, the 25th of February, was the great day of preparation for the combined and resolute attack of all the Bogue forts. The batteries which were to be reduced were as follows:—The geographical positions of the Bogue have already been described. Beginning from the south end of the promontory of Anunghoy, which of course you approach first, there were several strong works along the shore, the ridges on the hill's side above being also armed with guns wherever they could be conveniently placed; and upon the top, which was pretty steep, an entrenched camp had been formed, calculated for about twelve hundred men. On this side were two considerable sand-batteries, not long erected, mounting, as was afterwards found, thirty guns of small calibre.

Proceeding on along the front was the old battery of Anunghoy, which, in a manner, seemed to have given place to a new and extremely well built one, partly of granite and partly of chunam, and reaching down almost to high-water mark. The rear of this battery, running up the steep hill-side, was enclosed by a high wall, on which were steps or platforms for firing musketry.

Continuing our survey of the walls parallel with the passage through the Bogue, and passing out of the southern fort by its northern gate, you found a line of steep rocky beach, about two to three hundred yards long, and unprotected, which led to the northern Anunghoy fort. Upon this beach was erected a sort of platform, made of wood, serving merely as a line of communication between the forts, for the passage of troops. Having traversed this causeway, you arrive at the northern fort. This was a less formidable one than its fellow lower down, but still it presented an extensive line of works. The whole together completely defended the river front of the promontory of Anunghoy. The number of guns mounted upon all these works was afterwards found to be very great, and the long line of embrasures certainly looked very formidable.

The island of North Wantung, which is opposite to these forts, was thickly studded with cannon all over. Its eastern side presented a formidable line of guns, and was considered by the Chinese to be its most important side of defence, for it fronted Anunghoy, commanding the passage between them; here they had planted some of their largest guns. An object upon which they had placed great reliance was the large chain cable which they had carried across the passage from Anunghoy to a rock close to Wantung, and which they had secured into the solid rock on either side, something after the manner of the chains of a suspension bridge. The rafts which supported it were strongly moored, and the Chinese had adopted a curious contrivance for raising or lowering the chain, for the purpose of letting their own junks pass through, by means of a kind of windlass.

A passage was not forced through this chain and rafts until after the forts were taken; and the Chinese appeared to forget that there was another channel round the west side of Wantung, and that even had that been impassable, we could have sent our light steamers, rocket-boats, and gun-boats, round the back of Anunghoy itself. They, moreover, made little calculation of the great power of the rising and falling of the tide, the weight and strength of a line-of-battle ship, or the terrific power of her broadside.

The little island of South Wantung had been unaccountably left unoccupied by the Chinese; but, in reality, it was within range, and well commanded by the strong batteries and Hill Fort upon North Wantung. The oversight rendered their positions much less tenable, and soon decided the plan of attack which was adopted by Sir Gordon Bremer. It was as follows: a battery of two 8-inch iron and one 24-pounder brass howitzers was to be erected during the night, in a hollow, upon the top of this little island of South Wantung, which was very favourably situated for the object required. This battery would not only greatly annoy the Chinese in the northern island, and probably shell them out, but also distract their attention from the attack upon Anunghoy.