Nearly all our merchant-ships used to anchor towards the bottom of Whampoa Island, in what has been called Whampoa Reach; but smaller ones could proceed up as far as the village of that name, beyond which the channel has become known by the name of Fiddler's Reach. Some, however, of our largest ships were formerly accustomed to take in their outward cargoes as low down as the "Second Bar," which occasioned an additional charge for lighters or cargo boats, and other inconveniences; but these now anchor in what has lately been called the Blenheim Reach, to the southward of Danes' Island. (See map and plan of Canton.)
It is not a little remarkable, that the Chinese authorities should have been able to keep foreigners so long in complete ignorance of some of the most important branches of their magnificent river, which for two centuries had witnessed the yearly increase of foreign commerce. This no doubt was effected by the jealous orders which were issued to their pilots, who dared not follow any other than the old prescribed track. Yet it is also remarkable that, among so many ships which have annually visited the river, none should have been found whose commanders were led by curiosity, or stimulated by the tiresome sameness of an everyday life during the dull season, to explore in open boats some of those large and tempting passages, the openings of which could be seen. Had not the war stimulated our exertions, or awakened our curiosity, we should, without doubt, have remained as ignorant as ever of the capabilities of the river, the extent of which was scarcely even surmised.[32]
No wonder that smuggling in every form has been long carried on to such a notorious extent by the Chinese at Whampoa, and in other parts of the river. The communications by water from one point to another, and with the interior of the country, are so numerous, and so interwoven with each other, that it would be impossible for any system of fiscal regulations which the Chinese could adopt to act efficiently against the complicated machinery of evasion which could so easily be put in operation. This, among other reasons, may have contributed (always secondary, however, to their jealousy of foreigners) to the strictness of their orders respecting the anchorage for our ships.
The light squadron proceeded up the river early on the morning of the 27th of February. It was not yet perfectly ascertained what obstacles were to be met with, although it was well known that the Chinese had been making extensive preparations to impede the advance of our forces. The wind was light throughout the day, and the Sulphur, which was to have been the leading vessel, fell behind; the Nemesis, therefore, now took the lead, and proceeded with caution, giving the soundings by signal to the squadron, by means of flags fastened to the ends of long bamboos; by which contrivance the signals could be made with the greatest rapidity.[33]
No new defences or hostile preparations on the part of the enemy were discovered, until the squadron had passed up a considerable distance beyond the second bar shoals. The Nemesis being still ahead, it could now be made out distinctly with the telescope that a large ship, probably the Cambridge, (a late British ship, purchased by the Chinese,) was at anchor near the first bar. This was immediately signalized to the squadron, which came to anchor about three miles from the position indicated; but the Nemesis, having previously taken the plenipotentiary and Captain Herbert on board, proceeded to reconnoitre, and to ascertain if a clear passage existed for the ships, as the channel was supposed to have been partially obstructed by sunken junks.
On arriving sufficiently near to observe accurately the dispositions of the enemy, it was discovered that a considerable mud battery had been constructed on the left bank of the river (the right in ascending) above the first bar, near the Brunswick rock, below Whampoa; and that in order to obstruct the advance of the squadron beyond it, a very strong and broad raft, formed by large masses of timber secured well together, had been carried quite across the river, from one side to the other, precisely opposite the battery. Behind the raft lay the ship Cambridge, (previously known as the Chesapeake,) with an admiral's flag at the main, moored head and stern in such a way that only her bow guns could be brought to bear for the defence of the raft. A number of war-junks were also under weigh not far from her. It was evident that the Chinese were quite prepared for resistance; and, had the Cambridge been anchored with springs on her cable, so as to enable them to bring her broadsides to bear alternately upon the raft, she might have fired with very great effect upon any of our ships as they approached. But the Chinese are not sufficiently acquainted with naval tactics to be able to make the best use even of the resources at their command.
The war-junks looked much more formidable in the distance than when more nearly viewed, and there was much more probability of their making their escape after the first shots were fired, than that they would offer any serious opposition. The fort itself consisted of a strong line of mud batteries along the river front, and was afterwards found to mount no less than forty-seven guns, which were principally intended to protect the raft. On the left flank of the battery were also mounted several guns, which bore directly upon the ships as they advanced up the river; and beyond this, further on the flank, was a small battery or field-work, mounting four or five guns, and connected with the former by an embankment, with a small ditch before it, upon which were planted a great number of ginjals, or wall-pieces. These latter, from being more easily managed, and more accurately pointed, were often calculated to do more injury than the great guns.
Within the fort, or line of field-works, was a double Chinese encampment, containing about two thousand men. The rear of the position was protected by a deep creek twenty-five yards wide, and by paddy-fields, which were partially flooded. These impediments proved very injurious to the Chinese themselves, when they were driven out of the fort, and attempted to escape in the rear; and they suffered great loss there in consequence. It must not be forgotten that the Cambridge was heavily armed, although she proved of no service whatever to her new masters.