Taking a calm view of the retrospect, and the gigantic and unique task with which the Government has been faced, they have accomplished their work with fewer blunders than might have been expected. After all, freights have not bulked largely in the increased cost of produce; a freight of £10 per ton is only 1d per pound. If we are to find the true cause of our high cost of living we must look at the inflation and consequent depreciation of our currency, the high rate of wages, and increased spending power of our working classes, and the indifferent harvests of last year in all parts of the world.
The high freights earned by our shipping in 1914, 1915, and part of 1916 naturally caused the value of shipping to rapidly advance. Very few new merchant ships were being constructed; ships were being destroyed, and shipowners possessing established lines were forced to buy to maintain their services, and thus the value of secondhand steamers advanced to two, three, and even four times their pre-war values. Many holders, especially of tramp steamers, sold out and realised great fortunes, and these unexpected and unprecedented profits unfortunately escaped taxation, on the ground that they represented a return of capital; and it is these profits that have appeared unduly large in the public eye.
The shipowners who remained in business, and this comprised the great majority, were deprived of 80 per cent. of all their profits above their pre-war datum, and afterwards this tax on their excess profits was relinquished, and the Government requisitioned all tonnage on what are known as Blue Book rates—which on the basis of the present value of shipping yield only a poor return.
It is difficult to understand why the Government should have placed shipping on a basis of taxation differing from all other industries—it is the industry which beyond all others is essential to the conduct of the war, and which is exceptionally subject to depreciation. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law) was undoubtedly carried away by his own amateur experience as a shipowner, and thought there was no limit to the extent he might filch away the shipowner’s earnings, little recking that if the shipowner is unable to put on one side a reserve to replace the tonnage he loses, he is forced to go out of the trade; and also utterly disregarding the rapid headway being made by neutral countries, who are profiting by the high freights and using their profits to greatly extend their mercantile fleets.
In estimating the financial results of our shipowning industry during the early period of the war, allowance must be made for the increased cost of working a steamer. Coals, wages, insurance, port charges, and cost of repairs, and upkeep were all very high; indeed, it may be said that the nett results to the shipowner of the high freights which prevailed in 1915 and 1916 were not very excessive when all these things are considered, for in addition to the increased cost of working, there was heavy depreciation to provide for, the shipowner suffered a complete dislocation of his trade, and in many cases lost his entire fleet, the creation of long years of toil, and with this his means of making a livelihood.
2.—Difficulties of Restoration
We have considered the position of shipping as the paramount industry of the country—its great services in the conduct of the war, and what it is suffering in consequence of the diffusion of fairy tales of the excessive profits made by shipowners. We can now turn our attention to the extraordinary difficulties which stand in the way of the restoration of the shipping industry, which are fraught with considerable peril to the future of our Empire.
Shipping may be divided into two classes, both of which are of national importance. The liners, which comprise fixed services of passenger and cargo ships. These services must be maintained, and new tonnage built at whatever cost to replace lost ships. The other class is our cargo ships. Many of these conduct regular services; others are what are known as “tramps,” and go where the best freights offer. It is the owners of the tramp steamers who have realised large profits by selling their ships. The Government in their shipping policy have entirely failed to discriminate between these classes, not recognising that the liner services involve a complete and costly system of organisation both at home and abroad, which, once dislocated, is difficult to restore. The urgency for additional cargo ships prevents the building of liners, and there must be a considerable shortage of this description of vessel when the war ends.
Probably the cause which has been most detrimental and disastrous to shipping was the obstinacy of the Admiralty in declining to recognise the urgent necessity for building more merchant ships. They filled all the yards with Admiralty work, and when the violence of the submarine attack aroused the nation to a sense of the danger before it, and the cry went up throughout the land “Ships, ships, and still more ships,” the Government then—only then—responded, and decided that further merchant ships must be built at once. There was great delay in giving effect to their decision to build “standard” ships—plans had to be submitted and obtain the approval of so many officials that many months elapsed before the keel of the first standard ship was laid, and in the meanwhile the losses through the submarine attack continued.
The destruction of tonnage by submarine attack in 1917 assumed very serious proportions, but latterly the number of vessels sunk has been gradually reduced, and we have the recent assurance of the Secretary to the Admiralty that our methods of dealing with submarines have improved, and that we are now achieving considerable success in destroying them. The following statement gives the position to-day in gross tonnage:—