Now we must compare the simplicity of the use of the Rocket, with the expensive apparatus of artillery, to see what this trifling difference of first cost in the Rocket has to weigh against it. In the first place, we have seen, that in many situations the Rocket requires no apparatus at all to use it, and that, where it does require any, it is of the simplest kind: we have seen also, that both infantry and cavalry can, in a variety of instances, combine this weapon with their other powers; so that it is not, in such cases, even to be charged with the pay of the men. These, however, are circumstances that can in no case happen with respect to ordinary artillery ammunition; the use of which never can be divested of the expense of the construction, transport, and maintenance of the necessary ordnance to project it, or of the men exclusively required to work that ordnance. What proportion, therefore, will the trifling difference of first cost, and the average facile and unexpensive application of the Rocket bear to the heavy contingent charges involved in the use of field artillery? It is a fact, that, in the famous Egyptian campaign, those charges did not amount to less than £20 per round, one with another, exclusive of the pay of the men; nor can they for any campaign be put at less than from £2 to £3 per round. It must be obvious, therefore, although it is not perhaps practicable actually to clothe the calculation in figures, that the saving must be very great indeed in favour of the Rocket, in the field as well as in bombardment.
Thus far, however, the calculation is limited merely as to the bare question of expense; but on the score of general advantage, how is not the balance augmented in favour of the Rocket, when all the exclusive facilities of its use are taken into the account—the universality of the application, the unlimited quantity of instantaneous fire to be produced by it for particular occasions—of fire not to be by any possibility approached in quantity by means of ordnance? Now to all these points of excellence one only drawback is attempted to be stated—this is, the difference of accuracy: but the value of the objection vanishes when fairly considered; for in the first place, it must be admitted, that the general business of action is not that of target-firing; and the more especially with a weapon like the Rocket, which possesses the facility of bringing such quantities of fire on any point: thus, if the difference of accuracy were as ten to one against the Rocket, as the facility of using it is at least as ten to one in its favour, the ratio would be that of equality. The truth is, however, that the difference of accuracy, for actual application against troops, instead of ten to one, cannot be stated even as two to one; and, consequently, the compound ratio as to effect, the same shot or shell being projected, would be, even with this admission of comparative inaccuracy, greatly in favour of the Rocket System. But it must still further be borne in mind, that this system is yet in its infancy, that much has been accomplished in a short time, and that there is every reason to believe, that the accuracy of the Rocket may be actually brought upon a par with that of other artillery ammunition for all the important purposes of field service.
W. CONGREVE.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences of inconsistent hyphenation have not been changed.
The original book did not contain page numbers, so the ones used here are just for easier navigation.
Transcriber attempted to mute some unusually prominent checkered moire-like patterns in the background portions of the available illustrations, while preserving the important details of those illustrations.
In the [table of Ranges]: