Canada; its Defences, Condition, and Resources / Being a third and concluding volume of "My Diary, North and South"

by Sir William Howard Russell

The citadel is of no mean extent, but covers about forty acres of ground, and necessarily requires a very strong garrison; if they were exposed to shell or vertical fire from the opposite side of the river, or from the western side of the place, as there is no defence provided, they would certainly suffer great loss. It is obvious that a permanent work must be built at Point Levi, to sweep the approaches and prevent the establishment of hostile batteries on the river. A regular bastion with outworks should be constructed on the heights above the point, in order to make Quebec safe.

There are also dangers to be apprehended from the occupation of the railway terminus at Rivière du Loup which do not affect Quebec immediately, but are, nevertheless, to be carefully guarded against. In the event of war appearing imminent, a temporary work to cover the terminus on the land side, and sweep the river, would be necessary.

There exist the remains of some outworks in advance of the citadel, which are so well placed that it would be very desirable to reconstruct defences on their sites. They are called the French works, and their position does credit to the skill of the engineer who chose it.

The British flag has waved for just 102 years from Cape Diamond, but the Fleur-de-lys had fluttered on the same point for 220 years, with the exception of the three years from 1629 to 1632, when Sir David Kirke placed Quebec in our hands.

Nothing proves the inaccuracy of artillery in those days more strikingly than the inability of the French, on Cape Diamond, to prevent the British transports landing their men at Point Levi, although the St. Lawrence is little more than 1000 yards broad opposite the citadel. By our bombardment, however, we nearly laid Quebec in the dust before the action.

On account of the very natural remembrance of the glory of Wolfe’s attack, his death and victory, it has almost been forgotten that our first attempt to land at Montmorenci was repulsed by Montcalm with the loss of 500 men; and it was only when the original scheme failed, that Wolfe conceived the plan of re-embarking his troops, and landing above the town. He had 8000 regular troops; the French had 10,000 men, but of these only five battalions were regular French soldiers. Montcalm believed no doubt that he could drive the British into the river, or force them to surrender, and he threw the force of his attack on the British right, which rested on the river. The French right, consisting of Indians and Canadians, was easily routed; the French left, deprived of the services of its general and of his second in command, was ultimately broken, and fled towards the town, covered in some degree by the centre battalions, which fell back steadily; nor was it till five days after the battle that Quebec fell into our hands. The fire must have been exceedingly close and desperate; and its effects speak well for the efficiency of old Brown Bess at close quarters, for out of the force engaged, the British lost over 630, and the French 1500, of whom 1000 were wounded or taken prisoners. There was little artillery engaged; for we had but one, and the French but two or three pieces on the heights. A very few months afterwards we had nigh lost that which we had so gallantly and fortunately gained.

On the 28th April next year, General Murray, following the example of Montcalm, and depriving himself of the advantages which a position inside the walls of Quebec would have given him, moved out on the heights of Abraham, with 3000 men and twenty guns, to oppose the French under the Chevalier de Levi, who were moving down upon the city. In an ill-conceived attack on the enemy, Murray lost no less than 1000 men and all his guns, and had to retreat to the city. He was only relieved by the arrival of a British squadron in the river, which compelled the French to retire with the loss of all their artillery.

Looking down upon the narrow path below the parapet, one must do credit to the daring of Arnold, Montgomery, and the Americans in their disastrous attempt to carry the citadel by an escalade. Arnold, after his astonishing march and desperate perils by the Kennebeck and Chaudière—which has been well styled by General Carmichael Smyth one of the most wonderful instances of perseverance and spirit of enterprise upon record—followed the course pursued by Wolfe; and embarking at Point Levi, occupied the heights of Abraham, but when Montgomery joined him from Montreal, it was found they had no heavy artillery. Thus they were forced either to march back again, or to try to carry the place by storm. Two columns, led by Arnold and Montgomery, endeavoured to push through the street at the foot of the citadel, one from the east and another from the west.

The Canadians say, that after Montgomery carried the entrenchment, which extended from the foot of the cliff to the river, he rushed at the head of his column, followed by a group of officers, towards a second work, on which was mounted a small field-piece. The Americans were just within twenty yards when a Canadian fired the gun, which was loaded with grape. Montgomery and the officers who followed him were swept down in a heap of killed and wounded, and the column at once fled in confusion. Arnold, who had forced his way into the houses under the citadel, was carried back wounded soon after his gallant advance: and the Canadians again claim for one of their own countrymen, named Dambourges, the honour of having led the sortie from the citadel which charged the Americans, and forced those who were not slain to surrender.

Certainly the Canadians showed upon that occasion, as no doubt they would again, a strong indisposition to fraternise with the American apostles of liberty, equality, and fraternity; they harassed their communications, and, under their seigneurs, cut off several detachments. The attempt on Quebec was never repeated; and the Americans fared but ill in both their Canadian campaigns.