Canada; its Defences, Condition, and Resources / Being a third and concluding volume of "My Diary, North and South"

by Sir William Howard Russell

Had it not been for political and civil complications, the progress of Canada would have been still more rapid; but truth to say, progress encountered a considerable obstacle in the character of the people of Lower Canada. Probably not less than 35,000 of the whole population were of French descent, strongly attached to their institutions, and therefore indisposed to change—influenced by traditions of a most conservative character, and by territorial arrangements which perpetuated the very essence of feudalism. Nevertheless, emigration was encouraged, free passages were given to some immigrants, food to others, one hundred acres of land to all. Banks were established; but through all the extent of the upper province in 1817, there were not quite seven persons to the square mile. In some instances injudicious governors exercised their power to counteract the good disposition of the House of Parliament, and occasionally Parliament marred the excellent intentions of the representatives of the Crown. Impeachment of judges, imprisonment of journalists, questions of privilege and the like arose, which interrupted the good feeling so necessary to the progress of colonial life. Constant fears of sedition, privy conspiracy, and rebellion, haunted the minds of governors, whilst the colonists and the habitans struggled for greater freedom of action. Although the Canadians had resisted the Americans with the greatest energy, they were suspected of a desire to coalesce with, or to imitate the institutions of, the enemy. England at this time was agitated by aspirations for reform, and those who led the masses certainly justified the suspicion with which their designs were regarded, by intemperance of language. Among the emigrants who flocked to Canada were men who were tinged deeply with the dye of dangerous democratic doctrine, and notwithstanding the great gulf fixed between the new comers and the French habitans, it was feared that the two parties would unite in founding a government which could not be congenial to one or the other. When Lord Dalhousie came out in 1820, he found however a tolerably prosperous community. The dissensions respecting the civil list which had occurred for several years previously, inaugurated Lord Dalhousie’s administration. The Assembly would not grant a permanent civil list, and took the extraordinary step of appointing an agent, who was a member of the British Parliament, to represent them in England. The impolicy of dividing the country into two provinces became more apparent as questions connected with revenue arose, and the discussion of these questions was embittered by deficient harvests and commercial distress. Now it was seen how injuriously the want of a port open all the year affected the interests of Canada, which for five or six months was denied all access to the sea, unless through the United States. The union of the two provinces was agitated, but the French population did not support the project. They believed they would lose by amalgamation; that they would forfeit their privileges, and be deprived of the advantages they enjoyed in the free import of American produce. When it became known that the Government really had a project for the union of the provinces, Mr. Papineau, the Speaker of the Assembly, was dispatched to England with a petition against the proposed amalgamation, and it was deferred for a time. Financial difficulties increased the ill-temper of the governed, and the harshness and resolution of the Government widened the breach between them. Squabbles and ill-blood sprang up with greater vehemence and animosity every day, and the seeds of the evil which came to maturity in 1837, if not then first planted, were certainly invigorated. The energies of the English, Scotch, and Irish emigrants who flocked into the north were not to be repressed by these malign influences. The citizens of the old world pushed their way into Upper Canada, and finding lakes and rivers unfit for navigation, projected and carried out canals, and already grasped the probability of landing cargoes of Canadian wheat in Liverpool, from vessels loaded at Kingston and Montreal.

The Imperial negotiators who renounced all the claims which they might have preferred in behalf of Canada on the peace of 1815, would probably have failed to secure for the province a port on the sea, although the British, who held so large a portion of the State of Maine, might have fairly sought some equivalent for it. At all events no strenuous effort was made to obtain such an advantage—nor was there any attempt on our part to ascertain what the precise boundaries were which the Americans claimed. We will just see how a British negotiator many years later consented to draw a line which placed the land communications of the mother country with the provinces in war time at the mercy of an enemy for many miles of its course—Canadian interests and Imperial considerations being alike neglected—peace and war alike hampered, by want of foresight, prudence, or statesmanlike consideration. The increasing prosperity of Canada forced her to enter into closer relations with the United States, and to accede to arrangements with the Federal Government, which were of course regulated by Imperial agency, and which were not always characterised by wisdom. But there was no alternative—at least not one which could then be adopted. The idea of a great confederation of the British Provinces, which would enable Canada to avail herself of the ports of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, if it presented itself at all, was seen to be surrounded by embarrassing obstacles and conflicting sentiments. The skill in the conception, and the energy displayed in the execution, of the canal system, which is the grandest and most extensive in the world, have made a practicable passage of more than 2000 miles from Anticosti up to Superior City; and works proposed or in progress by land and water attest the enterprise and resolution with which the Canadians contended against the only impediments in the way of their prosperity and greatness. The claims of Canada to Imperial aid against invasion are strengthened by concessions made by the Imperial agents, which clear away the path of the invaders. Although all the border States had their representatives and champions, the voice of Canada was not heard in the deliberations of the Commission. It was British territory which was in debate—there are some who hold that Canada is alone called upon to defend it. Although the land may be invaded because it belongs to Great Britain, so far that Great Britain is actually attacked by aggression upon it, Canada, involved in war because of its dependency on the British Crown, must bear the brunt of defending that which British diplomacy has rendered peculiarly liable to invasion. It is plain that those who insist on leaving Canada to defend herself, are advocating a policy which tends to separate Canada from the British Crown. The provinces are ruled by a British viceroy, and are under the British flag, which would be the cause of an American attack. Canada can do nothing to provoke hostility, but the English may be struck with effect as long as the provinces are ruled by the Crown, and contain a company of British soldiers.

It would be interesting to inquire whether the Canadians would be better off by themselves than they are at present, supposing always that the new theories are likely to prevail, in case of war. Notwithstanding the violence and exaggerated language of the American press, it is only right to conclude that Canada is far less liable to insult and aggression under British protection than she would be without it. But that remark can only hold good in cases where the Americans do not feel more than usual irritation against Great Britain. The Canadians must feel that if they stood alone, pretexts would not long be wanting to treat the provinces as Texas was served. Canada has at present the power of England at her back, and the threat to deprive her of it by no means implies that she will be left to fight single-handed in the day of need. On the whole, balancing the chances of aggression on account of England against the chances of aggression if she stood alone, it is certain that Canada gains more than she loses by her present connection. The growth of great states along her frontier, and the excessive weakness of a water boundary in face of a maritime power, have caused us at home to insist on the engineering impossibility of defending the whole of the land and lake boundaries, but it by no means follows that the conquest of the country would be equally easy. With the full command of the sea and all its advantages—with commerce free—with a wonderful unanimity in the object of the war—with immense exaltation of spirit, and unparalleled expenditure of money, the Northern Americans have not yet subdued the Southern States, though they have more than tested the quality of their inner armour. Canada, with its narrow belt of inhabited territory, flanked by inland seas and vast rivers, offers no resemblance, it is true, to the South, but aided by Great Britain and her army, her fleet, and her purse, she might defy subjugation if she could not escape invasion. It must be noted that the Americans frequently dwell on ideas for a long time ere they attempt to carry them out, but that generally they do make an effort to give practical effect to those theories which have taken hold of the popular mind. For many years before the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico took place, the people were prepared for both by the constant inculcation of their necessity. It is only justice to the Government of the United States to declare that their action has been generally restrictive, and that it has acted as a drag on the wheels of the popular chariot. There is in fact a great people standing between the fringe of the noisy democracy and the highlands of Federal authority, which breaks the force of the popular wave, and hears unmovedly the beatings of the turbulent press, and raging voices of the Cleons of the hour. Shame it is indeed to them that they so often permit the worth, and sense, and honour of the nation to be represented by the worthless, foolish, degraded scum that simmers in its noisy ebullitions on the surface of the social system. We cannot be sure how far the Americans are actuated by the feelings which find expression in the most scandalous public paper of New York, but we do know that the paper in question is largely read, and that its favourite topic, when there is a lack of subjects for abuse or menace, is the forthcoming doom of Canada, “When this weary war is over.”

In case of an invasion caused by any quarrel with Great Britain, or by any policy for which the Canadians are not responsible, what ought they to expect from us? Everything but impossibilities. Among the greatest of impossibilities would be protection of the whole of the frontier, with all the aid they could give us. The greatest would be the defence of their territories without all the aid they could afford. The Canadians tell us that in the hour of danger they will be ready, but as yet they have fallen short of that degree of preparation which we have a right to expect. If the blow falls at all it will come swift and strong, but if they do their duty to us there can be no fear of our failing them in the time of peril.

The Honourable Joseph Howe has vindicated the claims of the colonies to the care, protection, and assistance of the mother country. He has pointed out the defects in our system, from which the inevitable necessity arises, that the colony shall become detached from the mother country, to become its rival, or probably its enemy at some future stage of its existence. Though California—3000 miles away—is represented at Washington; “though Algeria is represented at Paris;” the provinces of North America have no representation in London.

“Our columns of gold,” he exclaims, “and our pyramids of timber, may rise in your Crystal Palaces, but our statesmen in the great council of the empire never. Saxony or Wirtemberg are treated with a deference never accorded to Canada, though they are peopled by foreigners. The war of 1812-15 was neither sought nor provoked by the British Americans. It grew out of the continental wars, with which we certainly had as little to do. Whether a Bourbon or a Bonaparte sat upon the throne of France, was a matter of perfect indifference to us. We were pursuing our lawful avocations—clearing up our country, opening roads into the wilderness, bridging the streams, and organising society as we best could, trading with our neighbours, and wishing them no harm. In the meantime British cruisers were visiting and searching American vessels on the sea. Then shots were fired, and, before we had time to recall our vessels engaged in foreign commerce, or to make the slightest preparation for defence, our coasts were infested by American cruisers and privateers, and our whole frontier was in a blaze.

“You count the cost of war by the army and navy estimates, but who can ever count the cost of that war to us? A war, let it be borne in mind, into which we were precipitated without our knowledge or consent. Let the coasts of England be invaded by powerful armies for three summers in succession; let the whole Channel from Falmouth to the Nore be menaced, let Southampton be taken and burnt, let the South-downs be swept from the Hampshire hills, and the rich pastures of Devonshire supply fat beeves to the enemy encamped in the western counties, or marching on Manchester and London; let the youth of England be drawn from profitable labour to defend these great centres of industry, the extremities of the island being given up to rapine and to plunder; fancy the women of England living for three years with the sound of artillery occasionally in their ears, and the thoughts of something worse than death ever present to their imaginations; fancy the children of England, with wonder and alarm on their pretty faces, asking for three years when their fathers would come home; fancy, in fact, the wars of the Roses or the civil wars back again, and then you can understand what we suffered from 1812 to 1815. Talk of the cost of war at a distance; let your country be made its theatre, and then you will understand how unfair is your mode of calculation when you charge us with the army estimates, and give us no credit for what we have done and suffered in your wars.

“Though involved in the war of 1812 by no interest or fault of our own; though our population was scattered, and our coasts and frontiers almost defenceless; the moment it came, we prepared for combat without a murmur. I am just old enough to remember that war. The commerce of the Maritime Provinces was not a twentieth part of what it is now, but what we had was almost annihilated. Our mariners, debarred from lawful trade, took to privateering, and made reprisals on the enemy. Our Liverpool ‘clippers’ fought some gallant actions, and did some service in those days. The war expenditure gave to Halifax an unhealthy excitement, but improvement was stopped in all other parts of the province; and, when peace came, the collapse was fearful even in that city. Ten years elapsed before it recovered from the derangement of industry, and the extravagant habits fostered by the war.

“A few regiments were raised in the Maritime Provinces, their militia was organised, and some drafts from the interior were brought in to defend Halifax, whence the expeditions against the French Islands and the State of Maine were fitted out. Canada alone was invaded in force.

“General Smith describes the conduct of the Canadian militia in the few but weighty words that become a sagacious military chieftain pronouncing a judgment on the facts of history.