Canada; its Defences, Condition, and Resources / Being a third and concluding volume of "My Diary, North and South"

by Sir William Howard Russell

CHAPTER XII.

The Militia—American Intentions—Instability of the Volunteer Principle—The Drilling of Militia—The Commission of 1862—The Duke of Newcastle’s Views—Militia Schemes—Volunteer Force—Apathy of the French Canadians—The First Summons.

In a country situated as Canada is, without well-defined obligations as regards the sovereign power, there can be but two kinds of military force available for defence—a militia and an organisation of volunteers. The first is essentially the proper constitutional force on which Canada must mainly rely in case of invasion. The second, notwithstanding its enormous importance and value, is but accidental. Unless Canada assumed towards us the relations of a protected state, like India, and raised an army officered by the British such as was that of Oude, or as that, to a certain extent, of some states at the present day, her volunteers could have no fixed and adequate value in a general scheme of defence. The Canadian militia must constitute the chief strength of Canada in operations on her territory. It would be impossible for Great Britain to do more than provide officers, money, arms, artillery, and ammunition—perhaps the head and backbone of the force which would be needed for a large system of campaigns. The only enemy Canada has to fear is the Northern Republic. I am quite willing to do every justice to the moderation of Mr. Seward, and to the pacific policy of Mr. Lincoln, but it cannot be disputed that the strength of the central Government will be much diminished on the cessation of the present conflict, and that whatever way it ends the Cabinet of Washington will be little able to oppose the passions of the people in the crisis which peace, whether it be one of humiliation or of triumph, will bring with it. Passion, the passion wrought of pride, love of dominion, national feeling, and the like, is far stronger than the silken bond of commerce. There is danger of war with Great Britain as soon as this war in America is over; and the question is, how far Canada will be able to aid herself? Because if she does not contribute largely to her own defence, it seems certain that British statesmen will not strive very strenuously to avert her doom. At the moment I write there is not, in a state of organised efficiency, one regiment of militia in the length, which is great, and the breadth, which is small, of Canada. Party violence has set at nought all warnings and all solicitations. The Canadians appear to rely on the traditions of the past, and on the result of the small campaigns in the war with America, without any appreciation of the vast changes which have taken place since. Northern Americans, reaching their boundaries with pain and many a toilsome march, filtered small corps upon their soil—far inferior in numbers and equipment to those which now represent the quota of the smallest state in the Union. In my letters from America I called attention to the significant fact that the northernmost point of the territory claimed by the Southern Confederacy was within 120 miles of the lake which forms the southern boundary of Canada. It may not be likely that the Confederacy will ever make good its claim to Western Virginia, and fix its standard in undisturbed supremacy at Wheeling, but it is nevertheless true that a strong passionate instinct urges the people of the North to consolidate the states of the West and those of the East by the absorption of Canada, which, with its lakes and its St. Lawrence, would be ample recompense for the loss of the South; and, with the South in the Union, would be the consummation of the dream of empire in which Americans wide-awake pass their busy restless lives. The Americans are well aware of the vast advantage of striking a sudden blow. The whole subject of Canadian invasion lies developed in well-considered papers in the bureau drawers of Washington. At the time of the Trent affair I was assured by an officer high in rank in the government that General Winfield Scott had come back from France solely to give the State the benefit of his counsels and experience in conducting an invasion of Canada; and I cannot think it doubtful that the Federal Government would, in four or five weeks after a declaration of war with England, be prepared to pour 120,000 or 150,000 men across the British frontier. What has Canada done to meet the danger? In May, 1862, the Honourable John Macdonald proposed that a minimum of 30,000 men or a maximum of 50,000 men should be enrolled and drilled for one month every year for three or for five years, but it was considered that Canada could not spare so large a number of men from the pursuits of trade, and above all of agriculture, during the open season when drill would be practicable. The measure was rejected. Mr. Sandfield Macdonald, after the failure of this proposal, introduced and carried a measure which gave the Government a permissive power to call out the unmarried militiamen for six days’ drill in every year, and which provided that militia officers might be attached to the regular regiments serving in Canada for two months every year in order to learn their duties. By the fundamental law of Canada the Government has the power of calling out in time of war, first, all eligible unmarried men between 18 and 45 years of age; secondly, married men between 18 and 45; and finally, those males fit to carry arms between 45 and 60 years of age. Under these laws Canada should have a force of 470,000 men available for service, and of these there are actually on the muster rolls of the militia 197,000 unmarried men between 18 and 31 years of age, whose service would be compulsory in case of need. The Canadian Parliament voted half a million of dollars in each of the years 1863 and 1864 for military purposes, but the greater proportion of these sums was expended on the volunteers and on the staff of the militia. There has been no adequate return for the heavy drain such a sum causes on the Provincial exchequer. The best commentary on the voluntary system in militia drills is to be found in the fact that less than 10,000 men have been in attendance on them.

With the experience we have had of the unstable character of volunteer forces in the field, it is not prudent for Canada to rely on her volunteers so much as she does. They have within their very body the seeds of dissolution. Some corps can decree their disbandment at two months’, others at six months’ notice—in other words, they may melt away at the very crisis of the war. Does American volunteering teach us nothing? In all human probability the South would have been struck to the earth at the first Battle of Bull Bun, if the Pennsylvania volunteers had not presented to the world the extraordinary and disgraceful spectacle of whole battalions under arms marching off from the field, as their unfortunate General McDowell expressed it, “to the sound of the enemy’s guns.” That was no isolated case. The desertion, at the same time, of other volunteer battalions under the equally unfortunate General Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley, left him unable to prevent the Confederate General Johnston marching with all his men to the aid of Beauregard. Over and over again the Federal leaders have been paralysed by similar defections, and it was not till they became strong enough to hold the volunteers by force, as Meade did before he made his attempt against Richmond, that the evil was cured. Had the Federals gained Bull Bun, they were ready to have marched on Richmond at once—they would have found the city defenceless, and the South disorganised. Such a proof of Federal power as a decisive victory would, I believe, from what I saw in the South, have crushed the Secession party, and have strengthened the adherents of the Union, who were then numerous in many of the States. It might not have stopped the civil war, but it would have certainly given the most enormous preponderance to the North. The defeat mainly caused by McDowell’s weakness in men, and the reinforcements received by the enemy in consequence of Patterson’s inability to hinder their arrival, which was caused by the wholesale disbandment of volunteers, gave such an impetus to the Confederates, that their principle was carried triumphantly over the States, and crushed all opposition. We have seen what that defeat has cost the Federals since. In Canada the volunteers belong almost exclusively to the urban population—only a fifth come from rural districts; and as the towns in Canada are very small, it is plain that the volunteer system would operate very injuriously on the trade of the cities, and would in all likelihood break down, without any imputation on the courage and patriotism of the townsmen. It is, of course, beyond the power of Canada to cope with the people of the United States single-handed, but the agencies which England could bring to bear against the enemy on the American seaboard, and on all the seas furrowed by her ships, would damp the ardour which the Northerners would exhibit at the first onslaught. It would be, no doubt, a very deplorable and a very disgraceful contest, but Great Britain would not be responsible for the beginning of hostilities.

Just in proportion to the celerity and magnitude of their first successes would be the efforts of the Americans to secure their conquest. It is far easier to repel than to expel. A handful of militia, ill-drilled, supported by a similar force of volunteers of similar inefficiency, could offer no resistance to the swarms of invaders, and would but increase the stress to which the little army of Queen’s troops in garrison here and there would be subjected at the outbreak of war. To all argument and entreaty, to insinuations and menace, Canada opposes the grand simplicity of her non possumus. She is burthened with debt, and even without any expenditure for the militia her outlay is considerably more than her income. A party in Canada called for a regular agreement with the Government at home to regulate the amount to be paid by Canada, and the troops to be furnished by her, as a part of the British Empire. These troops were to consist of militia of the first class, to be drilled by detachments in each succeeding year, till the whole number, whether it were 50,000 or 100,000, should be properly disciplined. It was proposed by some advocates of this scheme that each body of militia should be called out for six months; and that when that period expired the men should be entitled to immunity from further drills till war broke out, when they would become liable for ten years’ service, after which they would go into a reserve only to be used in great emergencies.

Many modes of raising, maintaining, and drilling this force have been suggested; but as the principle was not adopted they are scarcely worth discussing. Drills for short periods are certainly of little or no avail; and if money cannot be borrowed to put 100,000 men in a state of readiness, the organisation of 50,000 men to be drilled for three months in each year in bodies of 12,000 or 15,000 does not seem at all unreasonable. The rate of wages in Canada is very high, and the lowest estimate for the support, pay, and clothing of a militiaman for six months comes to about £20 per man. It is, therefore, a simple sum in multiplication to arrive at the ultimate figure of Canadian possumus in regard to the paying power of the Provinces. It is not true that if one man can be kept for £20 for six months two men can be kept for the same sum for three months. The levy of 50,000 militiamen for six months would cost Canada, if she were alone, one million sterling. Mr. Cartwright has pointed out that Canada could discipline 100,000 militia, with half a year’s instruction each, for as much as would support a standing army of 2,000 men for the same period. We may be very angry with the Canadians for their happy security. It is not so very long ago since the Duke’s letters to Sir John Burgoyne startled us out of a similar insouciance. We may feel that the sudden development of the United States has placed us in a very doubtful military position. It is not so easy to shake off the obligations incurred by conquest and by emigration under the flag of Great Britain. In the face of very frigid warnings from the press, and very lukewarm enunciations of policy from her best friends, Canada had some reason to fear that there is a secret desire “to let her slide,” and that nothing would please England so much as a happy chance which placed the Provinces beyond our care without humiliation or war.

The duty of Canadians to their own country is very plain indeed if the people of England refuse to give them distinct guarantees that under certain conditions they will give them the whole aid of money, men, and ships that is required; but these guarantees are implied in the very fact of suzerainty of the Crown. It must, however, be made known—if it be not plain to every Englishman—that the abandonment of Canada implies a surrender of British Columbia, of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward’s, Newfoundland, if not also the West India Islands. Many bitter words written and spoken here rankle in the breasts of the Canadians, and I have quoted the words in which a Canadian statesman has placed before Englishmen the terrible consequences which Canada may suffer from war, because she is a part of the British empire, engaged in a quarrel on imperial grounds with the Government of the United States. We do undoubtedly owe something to Canada, from the bare fact that for many years she resisted temptation, and remained under our flag unmoved by the blandishments and threats of the United States. In my poor judgment the abandonment of Canada would be the most signal triumph of the principle of democracy, and the most pregnant sign of the decadence of the British empire which could be desired by our enemies. No matter by what sophistry or by what expediency justified, the truth would crop out through the fact itself that we were retiring as the Romans did from Britain, Gaul, and Dacia, but that the retreat would be made in the face of united and civilised enemies, and that the sound of our recall would animate every nation in the world to come forth and despoil us.

As yet there is no reason for such a pusillanimous policy.

The Commission of 1862 laid it down as their opinion that an active force of 50,000, with a reserve of the same number, would be required for Canada; but as the bill founded on their report did not become law, the Canadian Government had no power to borrow arms from the home Government for the whole number, as would have been the case had they passed the bill. Lord Monck, however, procured from the home Government a considerable augmentation of the supplies in store of artillery, small arms, ammunition and accoutrements. But the rejection of the Militia Bill of 1862 filled the home Government with apprehension. The Duke of Newcastle, on the 20th of August of that year, wrote as follows:—