Before Sebastopol, June 19, 1855.
My Lord,—I informed your Lordship on the 16th that new batteries had been completed, and that in consequence the Allies would be enabled to resume the offensive against Sebastopol with the utmost vigour.
Accordingly, on the 17th, at daylight, a very heavy fire was opened from all the batteries in the English and French trenches, and maintained throughout the day, and the effect produced appeared so satisfactory that it was determined that the French should attack the Malakoff works the next morning, and that the English should assail the Redan as soon after as I might consider it desirable.
It was at first proposed that the artillery fire should be resumed on the morning of the 18th, and should be kept up for about two hours, for the purpose of destroying any works the enemy might have thrown up in the night, and of opening passages through the abattis that covered the Redan; but on the evening of the 17th it was intimated to me by General Pelissier that he had determined, upon further consideration, that the attack by his troops should take place at three the following morning.
The French, therefore, commenced their operations as day broke, and, as their several columns came within range of the enemy's fire, they encountered the most serious opposition, both from musketry and the guns in the works, which had been silenced the previous evening; and observing this, I was induced at once to order our columns to move out of the trenches upon the Redan.
It had been arranged that detachments from the Light, 2nd, and 4th Divisions, which I placed for the occasion under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir G. Brown, should be formed into three columns; that the right one should attack the left face of the Redan between the flanking batteries; that the centre should advance upon the salient angle; and that the left should move upon the re-entering angle formed by the right face and flank of the work; the first and last preceding the centre column.
The flank columns at once obeyed the signal to advance, preceded by covering parties of the Rifle Brigade, and by sailors carrying ladders and soldiers carrying wool-bags; but they had no sooner shown themselves beyond the trenches than they were assailed by a most murderous fire of grape and musketry. Those in advance were either killed or wounded, and the remainder found it impossible to proceed. I never before witnessed such a continued and heavy fire of grape combined with musketry from the enemy's works, which appeared to be fully manned; and the long list of killed and wounded in the Light and 4th Divisions, and the seamen of the Naval Brigade, under Captain Peel, who was unfortunately wounded, though not severely, will show that a very large proportion of those that went forward fell. Major-General Sir John Campbell, who led the left attack, and Colonel Shadforth, of the 57th, who commanded the storming party under his direction, were both killed, as was also Colonel Yea, of the Royal Fusiliers, who led the right column.
I cannot say too much in praise of these officers. Major-General Sir J. Campbell had commanded the 4th Division from the period of the battle of Inkerman, till the arrival very recently of Lieutenant-General Bentinck. He had devoted himself to his duty without any intermission, and had acquired the confidence and respect of all; I most deeply lament his loss.
Colonel Shadforth had maintained the efficiency of his regiment by constant attention to all the details of his command, and Colonel Yea was not only distinguished for his gallantry, but had exercised his control of the Royal Fusiliers in such a manner as to win the affections of the soldiers under his orders, and to secure to them every comfort and accommodation which his personal exertions could procure for them.
I shall not be able to send your Lordship correct lists of the killed and wounded by this opportunity, but I will forward them by telegraph as soon as they are made out.