A DISORDERLY MARCH.
As it had been ascertained by reconnaissance that the enemy had batteries along the north-west of the harbour of Sebastopol, in conjunction with the Star Fort and Fort Constantine, which would cause loss in an attempt to invest the town on that face, it occurred to Sir John Burgoyne that a flank movement on Balaklava would turn and neutralize the batteries, secure a new base of operations (of which, we were in want, having abandoned that of the Katcha), and distract the enemy, who would find the weakest part of Sebastopol exposed to the fire of our batteries, and our attacks directed against a point where they had least reason to expect it, and which they might have imagined free from all assault. The whole army marched towards the south-east, on the Black River, and as they were obliged to pass through a thickly-wooded country, intersected by narrow lanes winding up and down the hills, the troops were in some disorder, and had the enemy possessed the smallest enterprise they might have inflicted severe loss and annoyance by a spirited attack on our flank. This operation they at one time contemplated, but they dreaded the result of a second defeat.
At times, from the top of the hills, the town, with its white houses shining in the sun, could plainly be seen. All the afternoon the steamers effected a diversion by shelling the Star Fort and Fort Constantine, but at such a long range they could do but little execution; however, the fire had the effect of engaging the attention of the Russians. They did not make the smallest attempt to interrupt our progress. In the course of our march the baggage was sent too far to the left, and became involved in the line of the French and Turkish troops, who were marching on our flanks. Lord Raglan and his staff rode on (as was their wont) in advance, and reconnoitred Sebastopol. They were close to the north-east fort; but no shot was fired at them, notwithstanding that they were within range.
The works which commanded the mouth of the Belbek were inconsiderable, and could easily have been silenced by the fleet. An eyewitness, who served in the Russian army, states that all the troops, as they arrived in at the south side on the 20th and 21st, crossed to the south-west, except the Taioutine regiment. Such a movement would make it appear that the Russians expected a descent upon the south side, or were prepared to hold that side against the north, in case the Allies seized upon the Sievernaya and the northern forts. The only preparation made for the defence of the Sievernaya on the 22nd was as follows:—The Taioutine regiment, four battalions; the four depôt battalions of the 13th Division, and one battalion of sailors, in all about 6,000 men, were placed to garrison the work, which was in a very bad state and badly armed. They received orders to retire by a subterranean passage 4,000 feet long to the sea-side, in case the enemy should attack with vigour. On the 23rd, finding they were not pressed or pursued, the Russians pushed twelve battalions, two field batteries, and a regiment of cavalry, to the Belbek, and at one time seemed to have contemplated a demonstration against our flank. This, however, they abandoned; and on the 24th they turned their attention to the defence of the bridge across the Tchernaya, at Inkerman, on which they brought to bear four field and four siege guns, and the troops which had been on the Belbek, and the 16th Division, the cavalry part of the 14th Division, &c., moved across the Tchernaya by the Traktir bridge, and ascended to Mackenzie's farm, whence on the morning of the 25th they descended to Otoukoi, on the Belbek, and marched to Bakschiserai to await the course of events, being joined there by Prince Gortschakoff, with the rest of the Russian army of the Alma. The troops left in Sebastopol, exclusive of the equipages of the fleet, were four battalions of the reserve of the 13th Division, which had suffered severely at the Alma, four depôt battalions of the 13th Division, and third battalion of the Taioutine regiment, in all nine weak battalions.
All the Russian officers with whom I have conversed—all the testimony I have heard or read, coincide on these two points—first, that if on the 25th we had moved to Bakschiserai in pursuit of the Russians, we should have found their army in a state of the most complete demoralisation, and might have forced the great majority of them to surrender as prisoners of war in a sort of cul de sac, from which but few could have escaped. Secondly, that had we advanced directly against Sebastopol, the town would have surrendered after some slight show of resistance to save the honour of the officers. The deduction from these propositions is that the flank march was the certain precursor of a long siege, of bloody battles and great losses; was an evidence of diffidence, and at the same time of boldness which, though favoured by fortune in its execution, was scarcely justifiable in a military sense, and was an abandonment of the original character of the expedition.
And here I may be permitted to remark, that the statement in the letters (of a Staff-officer) "from Head-quarters," page 224, to the effect that Lord Lyons could not have disapproved of the flank march because he was not present when Sir John Burgoyne proposed it, and that his manner, when he received Lord Raglan at Balaklava, "proved he highly admired" that movement, is calculated to lead to very erroneous impressions in the minds of those who attach any weight to the assertions of that officer. Lord Lyons, when he heard of the flank march, expressed his disapproval of it, and when he met Lord Raglan, he (as I heard from his own lips) told his lordship that he conceived the flank march to be a departure from the spirit in which the expedition was undertaken, and said, "This is strategy, but we are in no condition for strategical operation. We came here for a coup-de-main, but this is strategy!" The effects of that march are now matters beyond argument, and we can only weigh probable results against events—a very difficult equation. Whatever may be the opinions of civilians or military men respecting the flank march, it is certain that to Sir John Burgoyne belongs the credit of originating the idea at the conference which took place between the generals on the Belbek.
A DANGEROUS EXAMPLE.