[478] The men of Kûfa pitched at Al Awas; the Bussorah party at Dzu Khashab; the Egyptians at Dzu Marwa—all places in the close neighbourhood of the city.
[479] They marched off, we are told, expecting that the citizens would break up their armed gathering as soon as they were gone, and concerting to return again each from their separate road.
[480] The history of the document is obscure. On the one hand, it certainly was sealed with the Caliph’s signet; but who affixed the seal, and whether it was surreptitiously obtained, cannot be told. Nobody alleges Othmân’s complicity. Most traditions attribute the writing and sealing of the order to Merwân, the Caliph’s unpopular cousin, who, throughout the narrative, receives constant abuse as the author of Othmân’s troubles; but all this is manifestly tinged by Abbasside and anti-Omeyyad prejudice. Aly’s objection of collusion between the three insurgent bodies appears unanswerable. There must have been some preconcerted scheme as to the simultaneous return of the three camps; and there is a strong presumption of something unfair as regards the document also. Amidst conflicting evidence, it is beyond the historian’s power to offer any conclusive explanation. It is, of course, possible that Merwân may have taken upon himself the issue and despatch of the rescript; and, indeed, there was not wanting ground for his venturing on such a course (and something perhaps also to be said for his doing it unknown to Othmân), excepting only the deception of the insurgents by false promises. The insurgents may also have got scent of the document before they started ostensibly with the purpose of returning home. But these are all mere assumptions.
The Persian version of Tabari has a different story, namely, that the Egyptian band, on seizing the document, turned their faces back again towards Medîna, despatching at the same time messengers to apprise the Kûfa and Bussorah bands of Othmân’s treachery, and to recall them, so that all should reach Medîna and join in the attack together. Neither Ibn al Athîr nor Ibn Khallicân have anything to this effect, and it is hardly consistent with Aly’s speech, noticed above. The Arabic original of Tabari, now being published, may possibly throw further light on this chapter.
[481] Mohammed ibn Maslama, a Companion (as we have seen) highly trusted both by Mahomet and his successors; and Zeid ibn Thâbit, the collector of the Corân, tried to speak in confirmation of what Othmân had said, but were violently silenced and abused by the rebels Hakam ibn Jabala and Mohammed ibn Coteira.
[482] There are traditions, but of an entirely Abbasside stamp, of other interviews between Aly and the Caliph, with repeated promises of the latter to amend; Aly recriminating that these promises were no sooner made, even from the pulpit and before the congregation, than under the baneful influence of Merwân they were broken. Even Nâila, his wife, is represented as blaming her weak-minded husband for his fickleness. But were all this true, it would go but a little way to relieve Aly, Zobeir, and Talha from the charge of desertion, or, worse, of treasonable collusion with rebels against the rightful monarch—a short-sighted policy even in their own interest.
[483] He is called Al Ghâficky, the ‘Ameer,’ or Commander of the insurgents.
[484] According to some traditions, we are told, that Othmân prevailed on Aly to procure for him a three days’ truce, under the pretence of issuing orders to the governors for a reform of the administration; and that he treacherously employed the time instead in strengthening the defences, and excused himself by saying that the time was too short to carry out the promised reforms. But the story is altogether of the Abbasside type.
[485] The authorities are conflicting as to the length of the siege, though the several stages of the attack and investment are sufficiently well defined. After the first uproar Othmân still presided at the daily prayers for thirty days, after which he was besieged for forty days—that is ten weeks in all. Another tradition is that after the blockade had lasted eight and forty days, tidings of coming succour reached the city, and then the investment became severe. But this would leave too long an interval—namely, three weeks—between the report of help being on its way and the final issue, before which the columns, hurrying from Syria and Bussorah, should have had ample time to arrive at Medîna. The Syrian column, we are told, reached as far as Wâdy al Cora, and that from Bussorah as far as Rabadza, when they heard that all was over, and accordingly turned back.
[486] The talk among the courtiers of Al Mâmûn, in the third century, as reflected in the Apology of Al Kindy, was that Aly, even at a much earlier period, contemplated the putting of Othmân to death (Apology, p. 25). There seems to be no proof or presumption of this; but anyhow, one cannot but feel indignant at the attitude of Aly, who would do so much and no more; who sent his son to join the Caliph’s guard at the palace gate, and was scandalised at his being denied water to drink; and yet would not so much as raise a finger to save his life.