Hdqrs., Thomar, April 27, 1809.
My Dear Father,
Many thanks for your very affectionate letters of the 10th, 7th, 5th April, which I received all together, and which were most pleasing to me, whose happiness so much depends upon your approval of my conduct.
You will long before this arrives have heard of the melancholy fate of Oporto. It did not in the least surprise me. I was sure it would be taken the moment it was attacked in earnest; the inevitable consequence of insubordination and anarchy. I hope you had ensured your property.
I was of course delighted to use every exertion in my power, and am very much indebted to Mr Villiers for his friendly assistance. Long before the crisis he offered me a transport or more to go round and bring away the property, which I refused in consequence of letters from Pedro Alvez stating that one ship was arrived, and another daily expected, and fearing that the expense of chartering them would be lost. At the same time I was unaware of how little resistance would be made at Braga, and the Passes of Salamonde, etc. Since that Mr Villiers wrote, as did also Noble, very strong letters to Capt. Loring of the Niobe to render every assistance, but these were too late and have since been returned to me, as also one you wrote to Chiappe with some accounts, which I opened, and have ready to deliver when an opportunity, I trust not very remote, shall enable me, as also those you send me now.
We expect to march immediately to drive that miscreant Soult out of Porto. The General went two days ago to Lisbon to meet Sir A. Wellesley, and as soon as he returns this evening or to-morrow, we shall all advance. I was left here to continue to form the Algarve Brigade, the finest in the service, and who march to-morrow morning.
I have every hope that Soult has committed himself by his rapid advance, and since detached Corps, one of which 7 to 8000 have attacked Silveira at Amarante two days successively. He has defended himself bravely as did the Regt. No. 9 (Peña Macor) commanded by Major Patrick, who came over with us, and who is, poor fellow, I fear, badly wounded, after distinguishing himself very much. Silveira expected to be attacked next morning, and will, I fear, not be able to resist, as the Militias and Ordenança had abandoned him.
Victor has called everything to him near Merida, from Salamanca, and even Zamora, which looks as if he was close pressed, and leaves our Eastern frontier unmenaced for the present.
Cuesta has certainly reassembled 20,000 Infantry and 5500 horse and has pushed forward his advanced guards. If the Spaniards can reassemble their armies in so short a time after being dispersed they must in the end destroy the French, unless they receive great succours, which I believe impossible.
My friend Col. D’Urban, who was in the battle of Medellin, assures me he never saw any troops behave better than the Infantry, or worse than the Cavalry, of Cuesta’s army. And I think this was, as well as the loss of the army, in a great measure owing to Cuesta’s bad order of battle, in the extended line without any reserve whatever, his Cavalry in the first line advancing with the Infantry at their pace, and his having allowed the enemy to pass the Bridge of Medellin and deploy before he attacked them. He committed the same fault at Rio Seco, and suffered for it. It appears an infatuation, and as unaccountable as Victor’s not attempting to pursue the Spaniards, who fled in confusion, even with his Cavalry, which leads me to suppose he must have suffered more than we are aware of.