And from the more purely intellectual operations, from memory, comparison, analysis, combination, classification, induction, how still nobler the pleasure! Not to speak of the happiness of him who, by his study of natural phenomena, at length arrived at the stupendous discovery that the earth and all the stars of the firmament move, and that the feather falls to the ground, by the operation of one and the same physical law; nor of the happiness of him who sent his kite into the cloud, and brought down from its quiet bed the lightning which he suspected was slumbering there; nor of the happiness of him who concentrated, directed, and controlled that mighty power which has enabled the feeble hand of man to accomplish works greater than have been feigned of fabled giant; which has annihilated distance; created, by economizing time; changed in the short space in which it has been in operation the surface of the habitable globe; and is destined to work upon it more and greater changes than have been effected by all other causes combined; nor of the happiness of him who devoted a longer life with equal success to a nobler labour, that of REARING THE FABRIC OF FELICITY BY THE HAND OF REASON AND OF LAW. The intellectual pleasures of such men as Newton, Franklin, Watt, and Bentham, can be equalled only by those who possess equal intellectual power, and who put forth equal intellectual energy: to be greatly happy as they were, it were necessary to be as highly endowed; but to be happy, it is not necessary to be so endowed. In the ordinary intellectual operations of ordinary men, in their ordinary occupations, there is happiness. Every human being whose moments have passed with winged speed, whose day has been short, whose year is gone almost as soon as it seemed commenced, has derived from the exercise of his intellectual faculties pleasures countless in number and inestimable in value.
But the sympathetic pleasures, out of which grow the social, are of a still higher order even than the intellectual. The pleasures that result from the action of the organic organs, from the exercise of the several senses, and from the operation of the intellectual faculties, like the sensations in which they arise, belong exclusively to the individual being that experiences them, and cannot be communicated to another. Similar sensations and pleasures may be felt by beings similarly constituted; but the actual sensations and pleasures afforded by the exercise of a person's own organs and faculties are no more capable of becoming another's than his existence. These, then, are strictly the selfish pleasures; and the provision that has been made for securing them has been shown.
But there are pleasures of another class, pleasures having no relation whatever to a person's own sensation or happiness; pleasures springing from the perception of the enjoyment of others. The sight of pleasure not its own affects the human heart, provided its state of feeling be natural and sound, just as it would be affected were it its own. Not more real is the pleasure arising from the gratification of appetite, the exercise of sense, and the operation of intellect, than that arising from the consciousness that another sentient being is happy. Pleasures of this class are called sympathetic, in contradistinction to those of the former class, which are termed selfish.
There are then two principles in continual operation in the human being, the selfish and the sympathetic. The selfish is productive of pleasure of a certain kind; the sympathetic is productive of pleasure of another kind. The selfish is primary and essential; the sympathetic, arising out of the selfish, is superadded to it. And so precisely what the animal life is to the organic, the sympathetic principle is to the selfish; and just what the organic life gains by its union with the animal, the mental constitution gains by the addition of the sympathetic to the selfish affection. The analogy between the combination in both cases is in every respect complete. As the organic life produces and sustains the animal, so the sympathetic principle is produced and sustained by the selfish. As the organic life is conservative of the entire organization of the body, so the selfish principle is conservative of the entire being. As the animal life is superadded to the organic, extending, exalting, and perfecting it, so the sympathetic principle is superadded to the selfish, equally extending, exalting, and perfecting it. The animal life is nobler than the organic, whence the organic is subservient to the animal; but there is not only no opposition, hostility, or antagonism between them, but the strictest possible connexion, dependence, and subservience. The sympathetic principle is nobler than the selfish, whence the selfish is subservient to the sympathetic; but there is not only no opposition, hostility, or antagonism between them, but the strictest possible connexion, dependence, and subservience. Whatever is conducive to the perfection of the organic, is equally conducive to the perfection of the animal life; and whatever is conducive to the attainment of the true end of the selfish is equally conducive to the attainment of the true end of the sympathetic principle. The perfection of the animal life cannot be promoted at the expense of the organic, nor that of the organic at the expense of the animal; neither can the ultimate end of the selfish principle be secured by the sacrifice of the sympathetic, nor that of the sympathetic by the sacrifice of the selfish. Any attempt to exalt the animal life beyond what is compatible with the healthy state of the organic, instead of accomplishing that end, only produces bodily disease. Any attempt to extend the selfish principle beyond what is compatible with the perfection of the sympathetic, or the sympathetic beyond what is compatible with the perfection of the selfish, instead of accomplishing the end in view, only produces mental disease. Opposing and jarring actions, antagonizing and mutually destructive powers, are combined in no other work of nature; and it would be wonderful indeed were the only instance of it found in man, the noblest of her works, and in the mind of man, the noblest part of her noblest work.
No one supposes that there is any such inharmonious combination in the organization of his physical frame, and the notion that it exists in his mental constitution, as it is founded in the grossest ignorance, so it is productive of incalculable mischief. In both, indeed, are manifest two great powers, each distinct; each having its own peculiar operation; and the one being subservient to the other, but both conducing alike to one common end. By the addition of the apparatus of the animal to that of the organic life, a nobler structure is built up than could have been framed by the organic alone: by the addition of the sympathetic to the selfish part of the mental constitution, a happier being is formed than could have been produced by the selfish alone. And as the organic might have existed without the animal life, but by the addition of the animal a new and superior being is formed, so might the selfish part of the mental constitution, and the pleasures that flow from it, have existed alone; but by the addition of the sympathetic, a sum is added to enjoyment, of the amount of which some conception may be formed by considering what human life would be, with every selfish appetite and faculty gratified in the fullest conceivable degree, but without any admixture whatever of sympathetic or social pleasure. Selfish enjoyment is not common. If any one set himself to examine what at first view might seem a purely selfish pleasure, he will soon be sensible that, of the elements composing any given state of mind to which he would be willing to affix the term pleasurable, a vast preponderance consists of sympathetic associations. The more accurately he examine, and the farther he carry his analysis, the stronger will become his conviction, that a purely selfish enjoyment, that is, a truly pleasurable state of mind, in no degree, mediately or immediately, connected with the pleasurable state of another mind, is exceedingly rare.
But if the constitution of human nature and the structure of human society alike render it difficult for the human heart to be affected with a pleasure in no degree derived from—absolutely and totally unconnected with sympathetic association, of that complex pleasure which arises out of social intercourse, partly selfish and partly sympathetic, how far sweeter the sympathetic than the selfish part; and as the sympathetic preponderates over the selfish, how vast the increase of the pleasure! And when matured, exalted into affection—affection, that holy emotion which exerts a transforming influence over the selfish part of human nature, turning it into the sympathetic; affection, which renders the happiness of the beloved object inexpressibly dearer to the heart than its own; affection, among the benignant feelings of which as there is none sweeter so there is none stronger than that of self-devotion, nay, sometimes even of self-sacrifice; affection, which is sympathy pure, concentrated, intense—Oh how beautiful is the constitution of this part of our nature, by which the most transporting pleasures the heart receives are the direct reflection of those it gives!
Nor ought it to be overlooked, that, while nearly all the selfish, like all the sensual pleasures, cannot be increased beyond a fixed limit, cannot be protracted beyond a given time, are short-lived in proportion as they are intense, and satiate the appetite they gratify, the sympathetic pleasures are capable of indefinite augmentation; are absolutely inexhaustible; no limit can be set to their number, and no bound to their growth; they excite the appetite they gratify; they multiply with and by participation, and the more is taken from the fountain from which they flow, the deeper, the broader, and the fuller the fountain itself becomes.
But not only is the mental state of affection in all its forms and degrees highly pleasurable, but the very consciousness of being the object of affection is another pleasure perfectly distinct from that arising immediately from the affection itself. It has been said of charity, that it is twice blessed, that it blesses alike him that gives and him that receives; but love has in it a threefold blessing: first, in the mental state itself; secondly, in the like mental state which the manifestation of it produces in another; and thirdly, in the mental state inseparable from the consciousness of being the object of affection. And this reflex happiness, this happiness arising from the consciousness of being the object, is even sweeter than any connected with being the subject of affection.
In like manner there is pleasure in the performance of beneficent actions; in energetic, constant, and therefore ultimately successful exertions to advance the great interests of human kind, in art, in science, in philosophy, in education, in morals, in legislation, in government; whether those exertions are put forth in the study, the school, the senate, or any less observed though perhaps not less arduous nor less important field of labour. Exertions of this kind beget in those for whom, towards those by whom, they are made, benignant feelings—respect, veneration, gratitude, love. With such feelings the philosopher, the instructor, the legislator, the statesman, the philanthropist, knows that he is, or that, sooner or later, he will be regarded by his fellow men; and in this consciousness there is happiness: but this is another source of happiness perfectly distinct from that arising from the performance of beneficent actions; it is a new happiness superadded to the former, and, if possible, still more exquisite. Thus manifold is the beneficent operation of the sympathetic affection: thus admirable is the provision made in the constitution of our nature for the excitement and extension of this affection, and, through its instrumentality, for the multiplication and exaltation of enjoyment!
In affections and actions of the class just referred to, and in the pleasures that result from them, there is much of the nature which is commonly termed moral. And the power to which the moral affections and actions are referred is usually and justly considered as the supreme faculty of the mind; for it is the regulator and guide of all the others; it is that by which they attain their proper and ultimate object. Of whatever pleasure human nature is capable in sensation, in idea, in appetite, in passion, in emotion, in affection, in action; whatever is productive of real pleasure, in contradistinction to what only cheats with the false hope of pleasure; whatever is productive of pure pleasure, in contradistinction to what is productive partly of pleasure and partly of pain, and consequently productive not of pure, but of mixed pleasure; whatever is productive of a great degree of pleasure in contradistinction to what is productive of a small degree of pleasure; whatever is productive of lasting pleasure, in contradistinction to what is productive of temporary pleasure; whatever is productive of ultimate pleasure, in contradistinction to what is productive of immediate pleasure, but ultimate pain; this greatest and most perfect pleasure it is the part of the moral faculty to discover. In the degree in which the operation of this faculty is correct and complete, it enables the human being to derive from every faculty of his nature the greatest, the purest, the most enduring pleasure; that is, the maximum of felicity. This is the proper scope and aim of the moral faculty; to this its right exercise is uniformly conducive; and this, as it is better cultivated and directed, it will accomplish in a higher degree, in a continual progression, to which no limit can be assigned. But if the operation of this faculty be to render every other in the highest degree conducive to happiness, conformity to the course of conduct required by it, must of course be that highest happiness. Conformity to the course of conduct pointed out by the moral faculty as conducive in the highest degree to happiness is moral excellence, or, in the definite and exact sense of the word, virtue. And in this sense it is that virtue is happiness. It is because it discriminates the true sources of happiness, that is, directs every other faculty into its proper course, and guides it in that course to the attainment of its ultimate object, that the moral faculty is ranked as the highest faculty of the mind. Supposing the operation of this faculty to be perfect, it is but an identical expression to say, that to follow its guidance implicitly is to follow the road that leads to the most perfect happiness. But, over and above the happiness thus directly and necessarily resulting from yielding uniform and implicit obedience to the moral faculty, there is, in the very consciousness of such conformity, a new happiness, as pure as it is exalted. Thus, in a twofold manner, is the moral the highest faculty of the mind, the source of its highest happiness; and thus manifest it is, from every view that can be taken of the constitution of human nature, that every faculty with which it is endowed, from the highest to the lowest, not only affords its own proper and peculiar pleasure, but that each, as it successively rises in the scale, is proportionately the source of a nobler kind, and a larger amount of enjoyment.