Britain at Bay

by Spenser Wilkinson

After 1878 Russia became estranged from Germany, whereupon Germany, in 1879, made a defensive alliance with Austria, to which at a later date Italy became a party. This triple alliance served for a quarter of a century to maintain the peace against the danger of a Franco-Russian combination until the defeat of Russia in Manchuria and consequent collapse of Russia's military power removed that danger.

Shortly before this event the British agreement with the French Government had been negotiated by Lord Lansdowne. The French were very anxious to bring Morocco into the sphere of French influence, and to this the British Government saw no objection, but in the preamble to the agreement, as well as in its text, by way of declaration that Great Britain had no objection to this portion of the policy of France, words were used which might seem to imply that Great Britain had some special rights in regard to Morocco.

The second article of the Declaration of April 8, 1904, contains the following clause:

"The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require."

This clause seems to be open to the interpretation that Great Britain assumes a right to determine what nation of Europe is best entitled to exercise a protectorate over Morocco. That would involve some British superiority over other Powers, or at any rate that Great Britain had a special right over Morocco, a sort of suzerainty of which she could dispose at will. Germany disliked both this claim and the idea that France was to obtain special influence in Morocco. She was herself anxious for oversea possessions and spheres of influence, and appears to have thought that if Morocco was to become a European protectorate she ought to have a voice in any settlement. The terms in which the English consent to the French design was expressed were construed by the German's as involving, on the part of Great Britain, just that kind of supremacy in regard to oversea affairs which they had for so many years been learning to dislike. At any rate, when the moment convenient to her came, Germany put her veto upon the arrangements which had been made and required that they should be submitted to a European Conference. France was not prepared to renew the struggle for existence over Morocco, while Germany appeared not unwilling to assert her will even by force. Accordingly Germany had her way.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary again afforded an opportunity for the exercise of Germany's preponderance. In 1878 the Treaty of Berlin had authorised Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer the two provinces without limitation of time, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have since then practically been Austrian provinces, for the male population has been subject to compulsory service in the Austrian army and the soldiers have taken the oath of allegiance to the Emperor. It is not clear that any of the great Powers had other than a formal objection to the annexation, the objection, namely, that it was not consistent with the letter of the Treaty of Berlin. The British Government pointed out that, by international agreement to which Austria-Hungary is a party, a European Treaty is not to be modified without the consent of all the signatory Powers, and that this consent had not been asked by Austria-Hungary. The British view was endorsed both by France and Russia, and these three Powers were in favour of a European Conference for the purpose of revising the clause of the Treaty of Berlin, and apparently also of giving some concessions to Servia and Montenegro, the two small States which, for reasons altogether disconnected with the formal aspect of the case, resented the annexation. Neither of the Western Powers had any such interest in the matter as to make it in the least probable that they would in any case be prepared to support their view by force, while Austria, by mobilising her army, showed that she was ready to do so, and there was no doubt that she was assured, in case of need, of Germany's support. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly explained to his countrymen that Russia was not in a condition to carry on a war. Accordingly in the moment of crisis the Russian Government withdrew its opposition to Austro-Hungarian policy, and thus once more was revealed the effect upon a political decision of the military strength, readiness, and determination of the two central Powers.

A good deal of feeling was aroused, at any rate in Great Britain, by the disclosure in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the earlier case of Morocco, of Germany's policy, and in the later negotiation of her determination to support Austria-Hungary by force. Yet he would be a rash man who, on now looking back, would assert that in either case a British Government would have been justified in armed opposition to Germany's policy.

The bearing of Germany and Austria-Hungary in these negotiations, ending as they did at the time when the debate on the Navy Estimates disclosed to the British public the serious nature of the competition in naval shipbuilding between Germany and Great Britain, was to a large class in this country a startling revelation of the too easily forgotten fact that a nation does not get its way by asking for it, but by being able and ready to assert its will by force of arms in case of need. There is no reason to believe that the German Government has any intention to enter into a war except for the maintenance of rights or interests held to be vital for Germany, but it is always possible that Germany may hold vital some right or interest which another nation may be not quite ready to admit. In that case it behoves the other nation very carefully to scrutinise the German claims and its own way of regarding them, and to be quite sure, before entering into a dispute, that its own views are right and Germany's views wrong, as well as that it has the means, in case of conflict, of carrying on with success a war against the German Empire.

If then England is to enter into a quarrel with Germany or any other State, let her people take care that it arises from no obscure issue about which they may disagree among themselves, but from some palpable wrong done by the other Power, some wrong which calls upon them to resist it with all their might.

The case alleged against Germany is that she is too strong, so strong in herself that no Power in Europe can stand up against her, and so sure of the assistance of her ally, Austria, to say nothing of the other ally, Italy, that there is at this moment no combination that will venture to oppose the Triple Alliance. In other words, Germany is thought to have acquired an ascendency in Europe which she may at any moment attempt to convert into supremacy. Great Britain is thought of, at any rate by her own people, as the traditional opponent of any such supremacy on the Continent, so that if she were strong enough it might be her function to be the chief antagonist of a German ascendency or supremacy, though the doubt whether she is strong enough prevents her from fulfilling this role.