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Bulgaria’s relations with Serbia have varied quite as much as those with Russia, but with the difference that in these ups and downs the nation has always been undivided. Bulgarian distrust of Serbia dates from the beginning of the political independence of the former. Instead of trying to settle their differences in a brotherly spirit, and to eliminate the Macedonian bone of contention by fixing the spheres of interests, both parties—especially Bulgaria—worked themselves up into a fever of enmity which could only be mutually detrimental. Actual frontier collisions added fuel to the fire, and the situation grew steadily worse. It is safe to say that there was never any love lost between the Serbs and the Bulgarians, even if political opportunism at times dictated a more friendly attitude. Many discerning Bulgarian politicians have often tried to promote a more cordial and neighbourly understanding between the two states for the sake of the Slav cause and the common good, and their Serbian colleagues loyally supported them in this. But their work was always undone by the distrustful attitude of Bulgaria, which was even increased by foreign influence. In 1885 the nation entered into the war with Serbia with unanimous enthusiasm and a bloodthirsty spite almost inconceivable between brother nations. The war was fierce, and fate favoured Bulgaria; but, instead of being content with their success, and exhibiting a victor’s finest quality—humanity, the Bulgarians only grew increasingly bitter in their hatred towards Serbia, and showed it in offensive taunts. After their defeat the Serbs obviously could not feel very friendly towards their neighbours, but I do not believe they hated them in their souls. But from one cause or another it was impossible to find the way to friendship. The Bulgarians declared that their differences with Serbia were by no means settled in this war, and that the Macedonian question would have to be decided beyond dispute. Thus the war was continued, unfortunately not only with the pen, but also with arms, for the Serbian and Bulgarian bands in Macedonia waged war upon each other more fiercely than upon the Turks. Matters went from bad to worse for both nations, and especially for the Slav cause in the Balkans. Russia exerted all her influence to reconcile the two, but with no result beyond promises of amendment. Several influential Slav personages were equally unsuccessful until the youth of the Southern Slavs entered the lists with a new plan of campaign, and attacked the problem from the standpoint of Southern Slav Culture. The authors and artists of Croatia and Slavonia, who had long stood in friendly relations with Serbia, made it their business to include the Bulgarians in the cause of Southern Slav Culture. As the intellectual youth of Bulgaria was at that time passing through a phase of national regeneration and desired to widen their horizon, these efforts fell on fruitful soil. Soon afterwards joint exhibitions of Southern Slav artists were arranged in Belgrade, Sofia, and Zagreb, and in each case an Authors’ Congress was held simultaneously. By these meetings and mutual intercourse many sharp corners were smoothed away, and many points of difference were abolished, chiefly by the help of the Croats. Serbs and Bulgarians meeting eye to eye at last realized that they were brothers, sharing a common future. The Exhibition in Belgrade coincided with the coronation of King Peter, and we witnessed the unexpected spectacle of Bulgarians acclaiming the King with as much enthusiasm as the Serbs. Those were the days of brotherhood and fellowship. The representatives of Bulgarian art and literature took their mission seriously and sincerely, proving true apostles of peace and friendship between the two peoples. They reaped considerable success, for the tide of mutual enmity subsided, and when King Peter came to Sofia on an official visit he met with a reception that expressed not merely the pomp and circumstance of a Court but the heartfelt cordiality of a friendly people. It must not be forgotten that in this rapprochement good service was rendered by those politicians of both countries who persistently did their best to improve mutual relations. Chief among these is the Serbian statesman, Nikola Pašić. He cultivated this mutual friendship so successfully that it culminated in the Balkan Alliance, which would have proved a lasting blessing to the whole of the Balkans if it had not been broken by the attack of Bregalnica. Yet the collapse of the Alliance was not due to Bulgaria, but to other extraneous influences.

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I have briefly touched upon Bulgarian relations with Russia and Serbia in order to give a brief sketch of the only too frequent mistakes made by Bulgaria’s official Government. The Bulgarians possess many excellent qualities, and, as a nation, have a distinct claim on our respect; but they have one drawback: they are not independent in politics, and their policy is not the outcome of the requirements of the times,—as a rule it is not even suited to them, but is merely the mouthpiece of foreign influences. Whenever these influences were Russian they at least did not clash with the interests of the people or do any particular harm. But, unfortunately, Bulgarian policy has to a great extent followed in Germany’s footsteps, and for a long time German influence—especially in recent years—has made alarming progress in Bulgaria. The first to fall a victim to this influence were Stambuloff and his followers who had made so free with the motto “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians.” And, in proportion to the vehemence with which they pursued their corrupt policy, they imported the German element into Bulgaria. Intellectually it would be quite impossible to Germanize the Bulgarians, but, as regards their political economy and foreign policy they fell more and more under German ascendancy. The Eastern expansive policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary, finding the doors fast closed in Serbia, was content for the moment to ignore an obdurate opponent, and insinuated itself into Bulgaria as being free from the infection of “fantastic Slav ideals.” In King Ferdinand, as a German prince, German propaganda found a distinct well-wisher. The Bulgarian stock market was controlled by German trade, Austria-Hungary and Germany founded branch banks and business houses in Bulgaria. German and Austrian Ambassadors could always command the ear of the Foreign Office. And Germany bestowed her favour or disfavour in proportion to the pro-German or pro-Russian sympathies of the Government. In face of this tide of Germanism all honest Bulgarian politicians are confronted with a herculean task, if the country is to be saved from becoming simply a vassal state to Germany. In the events which preceded the second Balkan War their labours appeared to have borne fruit, and Germany and Austria were suddenly confronted with a fact they had never even contemplated—an alliance between Bulgarians and the detested Serbs, and even a military convention between these two against Austria. But their amazement was only a thing of the moment—German influence redoubled its efforts, and the second Balkan War was due to its machinations.

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Bulgaria’s defeat in the second Balkan War has filled the nation with a burning, unquenchable hatred against Serbia. The realization of their Macedonian ambition, which had been almost within their grasp, had vanished in a bitter disappointment and plunged the heroic victors of Kirkilisse into an agony of sullen despair. When the first stupefying shock was over, the thought of revenge came uppermost, and everyone foresaw that at the next opportunity the brother nations would again fly at each other’s throats.

It would be unreasonable to deny the Bulgarian claim to part of Macedonia. If a great national problem is to be permanently and satisfactorily solved, the principal of nationality cannot be ignored. But Bulgaria exceeded the principles of nationality in her demands and aimed at a position of supremacy in the Balkans. By her acquisition of Thrace it became necessary to revise the stipulations of the Alliance Treaty, and, if the Allies could have arrived at any conclusion, or accepted the arbitration of the Tsar, to-day the position of the Balkans in the present crisis would be more favourable.

The Bulgarian nation cannot be held responsible for the crime of Bregalnica. It merely played a passive part. The official perpetrator, supposed to have remained undiscovered to this day, was guided not by the will of the nation, but by orders from Vienna and Berlin, who desired to be revenged for the affront they had suffered through the Balkan Alliance. Nothing short of a despicably devastating blow aimed at all the Balkan States would suffice, and unfortunately they found a ready tool in the wild ambitions of certain Bulgarian circles. Of course, the blow was aimed at the detested Serbians, but with the relentlessness of fate it fell upon those who had hoped to profit by the Austro-German intrigue. Though Bulgaria alone suffered material loss through the war, the whole of the Balkan States have suffered morally. For their deadly enemy achieved his main object—the breaking up of the Balkan union. Such was the lamentable state of affairs in the Balkans when the present European crisis came to a head. The Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia caused a positively insane joy in Bulgaria. It was balm to the Bulgarian wounds that the great monarchy should devour their small neighbor—their brother nation—and not one of the heroes who had helped in the conquest of Adrianople be left alive! All this time they overlooked the fact that, when Serbia had been disposed of, their own country would have been the next dish in the menu! It was a sordid triumph, neither manly, nor Slav.

In their satisfaction they even forgot Russia. No one dreamt that Russia would raise her mighty hand and cry Halt! to the Austrian devourer. But when the inevitable occurred, Bulgaria suddenly found herself face to face with a problem. Russia’s word—“Serbia’s enemies are my enemies”—staggered the honest Bulgarian people, who are attached to Russia, and they began to ask themselves very seriously, “What next?” The first upshot of this was the perceptible cooling of the anti-Slav agitation; then the nation began to reflect. The people and the patriotic Slavophile circles sent their best wishes, and their finest General—Ratko Dimitrieff—to fight for Russia, and the official Government proclaimed a strict neutrality. Both these facts bode well for the future. But the anti-Slav agitation has by no means lost all its power, and the Stambulovist circles, in conjunction with Austro-German emissaries, have not ceased to stir up the people and the masses against Serbia and against Russia. Which will prevail? It is difficult to make any forecast, especially if one remembers the personal régime of King Ferdinand, who, in spite of the constitution of the country, reigns supreme. At the same time it would be wrong to lose hope and we must trust that in the decisive hour the Slav instinct will dominate all other instincts, and thus not only assist the Slav cause, but also prove of the greatest service to civilized Europe, and above all things to Bulgaria herself.