After the conclusion of peace between Hungary and the Crown the Croats were rewarded in a truly Austrian fashion for their assistance in putting down the rebellion: once more they were handed over to the tender mercies of Hungary. This ingratitude roused a perfect tempest of indignation, but at the same time the Southern Slavs finally learnt their lesson. Henceforth they would look for help to no one but themselves, and they resolved that the coming struggle must be fought to a finish. The Southern Slav leaders knew very well that nothing could be done by revolutionary propaganda, but that their first task must be to establish a footing from which they could conduct a constitutional campaign. They formed a strong Nationalist party in Croatia, which co-operated with the Dalmatine and Slovene parties, laid down their programme on a broad national basis, and organized a campaign of passive resistance among the people. Of course the success of these labours was largely due to the fact that Hungary was weakened by the revolution and inclined to be somewhat less aggressive. Croatia, on the other hand, was fresh, strong, and self-reliant. Of course the results were not apparent at once, but the agreement of 1867 was a consequence of Croatia’s united stand. This agreement by no means satisfied all the aspirations of the Southern Slavs, but it gave them the required footing against Magyar oligarchy. Upon the conclusion of the agreement, Croatia received her first constitutional Ban, who was henceforth to be responsible to the Croatian Parliament. Unfortunately the King made this appointment upon the recommendation of Hungary, who saw to it that the first Ban, Baron Levin Rauch, should be a mere exponent of the Hungarian Government. Contempt of the constitution, and corruption, were the first-fruits of the agreement under Hungarian influence in Croatia, with the result that all Croatian patriots—including those who had helped to conclude the agreement—passed over to the Opposition. This Opposition worked on rigidly constitutional lines, and, as more radical parties arose, they formed the constitutionally correct, though barren, Croatian Constitutional party. Space forbids me to enumerate all the means by which the first “constitutional Ban” strove to carry out his orders from Budapest. By suddenly imposing a new election law he secured a large and obsequious majority in Parliament, which effectively barred the co-operation of the Opposition in national affairs. But the Opposition attacked the Government outside Parliament, through the press. When this systematic corruption and disregard of the agreement had gone too far, M. Mrazović, the leader of the Opposition, published a sensational indictment against Baron Rauch, accusing him of underhand dealings. Baron Rauch took proceedings against Mrazović for libel in the military courts, but Mrazović substantiated his accusations and was acquitted. Baron Rauch resigned, and the Nationalist Party scored its first victory. He was succeeded by Ban Bedeković, another Hungarian nominee, who was, however, unable to prevent a triumphant Nationalist victory in the election of 1871. The Hungarians asserted that this victory had been subsidized by funds from Russia and Serbia, and this accusation contains the substance of all subsequent charges of high treason. The Opposition replied with a manifesto, in which they clearly set forth the gravity of the numerous infringements of the constitution. Because of this manifesto, the Government wished to take proceedings against the leaders of the Opposition for high treason, but they refrained through fear of offending European public opinion. At this time the Constitutionalist Kvaternik, a good patriot but wholly unpractical, started an armed rebellion among the peasantry in the Rakovica district. It was put down by a strong military force, and Kvaternik lost his life. The October manifesto, in conjunction with the rebellion in Rakovica, afforded Andrassy (then Minister of Foreign Affairs) a pretext for opposing every form of Slavophile policy and ascribing both the manifesto and the rebellion to Russian influence.
The policy then inaugurated remains in force to this day. Brutal Imperialism is rampant in Croatia, and the Agreement has become a mere “scrap of paper.” But oppression begets opposition, and during these critical times the Southern Slavs found not only their greatest tyrant but their greatest patriot. From 1883 to 1903 Count Carl Khuen-Hedervary was Ban of Croatia, and the twenty years of his administration have been the blackest period as regards political, economic and personal thraldom. Countless Magyar schools were scattered throughout the country to promote the denationalization of the people; espionage and Secret Police flourished as in Darkest Russia. The archives of the State, with the Constitutional Charters of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, were incorporated with the State archives in Budapest, and, last but not least, the Agreement itself was falsified by the pasting of a slip of paper over the specification of Fiume as a “Corpus separatum adnexæ rex” converting it into a “corpus separatum adnexæ Hungariam,” whereby this important Croatian seaport became exclusively Hungarian property. But this same period also witnessed the labours of the greatest of all Southern Slavs, the benefactor and father of his people, Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer.
II.
Bishop Strossmayer (1815-1905) was the most generous benefactor of his people, their greatest patron of science and art, and the very incarnation of their political programme. He was the first to break down the local artificial barriers between Serb and Croat—the first to preach the gospel of united Yougoslavia. Labouring in a period when all national effort was suppressed in every possible way, when Slav sympathies were accounted high treason, he rose to a position of unassailable eminence, which enabled him to set the mark of his powerful personality like a leitmotive on the whole nineteenth-century history of the Southern Slavs. Born of peasant stock and, like all gifted Slav boys, destined for the church, Strossmayer began his patriotic activity, while he was still a student and youthful priest, by joining the Illyrist movement. His exceptional abilities were soon noticed in connection with the national movement, and Vienna and Budapest awoke to the dangerous possibilities of his personality. Determined to put an end to his patriotic labours they appointed him court chaplain, and trusted that the society of the court with all its splendour and gaiety would dazzle the handsome young priest, and wile him away from the service of his country. But Strossmayer made a most unexpected and highly diplomatic use of his position. He brilliantly succeeded in deceiving his surroundings as to his sympathies, and when barely over thirty he secured his appointment to the Episcopal See of Djakovo. Hereby he also became Vladika of Bosnia and Syrmia, and shortly afterwards was created governor of the Virovitica district.
At this point Strossmayer’s life-work for his people began in earnest. Holding a most distinguished position, and with the vast revenues of his bishopric at his disposal, he opened the flood-gates of his activities, and Vienna and Budapest saw with horror and amazement the mistake they had made. Strossmayer assumed the leadership of the Nationalist party; and in Parliament, where he took his seat in the double capacity of bishop and elected deputy, he showed himself a brilliant orator, a subtle politician, and an astute diplomat. He was the incarnation of a keen, but determined and wise Opposition. He also became an intellectual leader of his people and accomplished more than anyone else before him. He founded the Southern Slav Academy of Science and Art, which in the very terms of its foundation embodies the intellectual unity of the Southern Slavs. He also founded the Croatian University; and, being a great art connoisseur, he spent years in accumulating an exceedingly fine private collection, which he presented to the nation. He built the Cathedral at Djakovo, and at his own expense sent hundreds of young Serbs and Croats to foreign art schools and universities. Every intellectual enterprise, whether literary, artistic or scientific, found in him a munificent patron. His entire income was devoted to the welfare of the nation, and the sums that Strossmayer spent in adding to the greatness and fame of his country amounted to many millions during the long years of his office. But his dearest wish was the realization of the Yougoslav ideal, the breaking down of all local barriers between Serbs and Croats, and the creation of a united people. With this end in view, and in spite of his position in the Roman Catholic Church, Strossmayer went so far as to advocate that the Serbian Græco-Orthodox, and the Croatian Catholic, Churches should unite and become one National Church. He knew that the future of his people could never be realized within the confines of the Monarchy, but that it must be identified with that of all the other Southern Slav nations, and founded upon a purely Slav basis. Strossmayer did not confine his efforts to winning converts among his own people for this idea. He knew too well, that at the decisive moment the nation would require strong support from without, and, at the risk of being accused of high treason, he entered into friendly relations with Russia, which should bring the big and powerful brother of the North nearer to his down-trodden little brother in the South. He succeeded in finding influential friends in Russia as in other countries, and his nation is still proud of his friendship with the Tsar Alexander III., Leo XIII., Gladstone, Crispi and Gambetta. Before Strossmayer entered the lists no one in Europe had taken the slightest interest in the Southern Slav problem. The slippery diplomacy of Vienna—which is only equalled in duplicity by that of Turkey—had for centuries successfully diverted the attention of Europe from the Southern Slav peoples in the Monarchy, and the general assumption about them was that they were a horde of uncivilized semi-barbarians, fed by Austria at great sacrifice and treated by her with the utmost forbearance. The spectacles through which Europe viewed these nations were made in Vienna and Budapest, and no one took the trouble to bring an independent, unbiassed mind to bear upon the problem. Many Southern Slav patriots made desperate though vain efforts to bring even a grain of truth before the European public; a Jesuit Vienna and a Judaized Budapest were too strong for them. The world thought more of the colourless anational Austrian culture, and the borrowed pseudo-culture of the Magyars than of the culture of the Slavs, which for a thousand years has been the spontaneous expression of their national individuality, with a literature worthy of the lyre of Homer. Not only Austro-Hungarian politics, but the age itself was unpropitious to the Southern Slavs. They possessed no importance for the European balance of power; and it is one of the bitterest ironies of history, that for a very long time the Southern Slavs fought less for their own advantage than for the interests of Europe. For, even as the Southern Slavs were for centuries the bulwark against the tide of Ottoman invasion from the East, they subsequently became an equally strong bulwark against the rising tide of Germanism towards the East. With every fibre of their being they kept the gate of the East fast closed against either foe—not only for themselves, but in the interests of European civilization.
Strossmayer was the first who succeeded in re-awakening the interest of Europe in this struggle, and, even if his efforts were not crowned with immediate practical success, he at least contrived to cast a doubt on the complacent assurances of Vienna and Budapest. Strossmayer was a man with a tremendous personality, and his word was invariably accepted. He was also past-master in the art of not saying too much—thus avoiding the appearance of exaggeration. Even in his world-famous speech in the Council of the Vatican (1871, under Pius IX.), when he spoke in Latin for sixteen consecutive hours against the doctrine of Papal infallibility, he left some things unsaid, for he was interrupted in “the midst of his speech” by the Archbishop of Paris, who embraced and kissed him, and assured him that what he had already said was amply convincing.
Strossmayer’s activity was pursued with ruthless enmity in Vienna and Budapest, and, even as he was the best-loved man among his own people, he was the best-hated enemy of the Germans and the Magyars. They tried by every possible means to minimize his power, and agitated in the Vatican for his recall to Rome. But Leo XIII. was not only the personal friend of Strossmayer, but also the friend of the Slavs, and Viennese diplomacy failed in its object. Then followed disgraceful intrigues, and endeavours to represent Strossmayer as a traitor. Among other accusations, it was alleged that he had exchanged incriminating telegrams with the Tsar, in which he was said to have advocated the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from Austria. Strossmayer’s reply to these insinuations was truly characteristic. Several years after this alleged exchange of telegrams the Emperor Francis Joseph came to Croatia for the grand manœuvres, and Bishop Strossmayer was one of the guests at the great reception in Belovar, where the Emperor had his headquarters. The Emperor took the opportunity to sharply reprimand the Bishop for his conduct. Strossmayer retorted with equal sharpness “My conscience is clear, your Majesty,” then brusquely turned his back and ostentatiously walked out of the hall. Circumstances made it impossible to celebrate Strossmayer’s courage, but the people rejoiced in this new proof that their champion feared no risk when it was a case of defending the freedom and interests of his people.
Strossmayer was no dreamer, but above all things a practical statesman. He knew that whoever hopes to win a final success must first carefully prepare the ground. Any attempt to detach the Southern Slav Kingdoms from the Monarchy by force would have been unadvisable, and moreover, a dangerous and futile enterprise. Therefore, the political party of which Strossmayer was the leader made it their business to see that the stipulations of the Agreement were scrupulously observed, knowing well that a strict observance of the Agreement—if only for a time—would give the nation the much-needed chance of economic improvement, and thus pave the way to future independence. In this policy they were supported by the entire nation, who by their very unanimity proved their political fitness. Twenty years’ martyrdom under Count Khuen-Hedervary had not enervated the nation; on the contrary, they grew strong through adversity; and, with their eyes fixed upon their spiritual guide and protector, they steadfastly went forward towards their goal. Khuen-Hedervary’s bribery, intimidation, everlasting trials for high treason, prison and the gallows, all these had only incited them to further resistance. When, bowed with age, Strossmayer finally had to resign his active part in politics, we saw the people whom his spirit had inspired suddenly turn upon their oppressors. In 1903, the whole country rose in rebellion as one man, and Khuen-Hedervary’s power was broken. Even he had to admit that his twenty years’ rule of ruthless oppression had merely defeated its own object, that it had united the people whom he had sought to weaken, and strengthened that which he had hoped to destroy.
Strossmayer lived to see Khuen’s resignation, and his last days were cheered by a gleam of light—which alas! proved only illusory—shed upon the path of his country; yet as he closed his eyes for ever, he realized that he had not given his all to Croatia in vain, and that the hour was not far off when his ideals should become realities.
He died in 1905, but his spirit lives on in his people and his memory shines among them like a guiding star to point the way.