(3) Particular Affirmative (I).
(4) Particular Negative (O).
§ 261. This is an exhaustive classification of propositions, and any proposition, no matter what its form may be, must fall under one or other of these four heads. For every proposition must be either universal or particular, in the sense that the subject must either be known to be used in its whole extent or not; and any proposition, whether universal or particular, must be either affirmative or negative, for by denying modality to the copula we have excluded everything intermediate between downright assertion and denial. This classification therefore may be regarded as a Procrustes' bed, into which every proposition is bound to fit at its proper peril.
§ 262. These four kinds of propositions are represented respectively by the symbols A, E, I, O.
§ 263. The vowels A and I, which denote the two affirmatives, occur in the Latin words 'affirmo' and 'aio;' E and O, which denote the two negatives, occur in the Latin word 'nego.'
Extensive and Intensive Propositions.
§ 264. It is important to notice the difference between Extensive and Intensive propositions; but this is not a division of propositions, but a distinction as to our way of regarding them. Propositions may be read either in extension or intension. Thus when we say 'All cows are ruminants,' we may mean that the class, cow, is contained in the larger class, ruminant. This is reading the proposition in extension. Or we may mean that the attribute of chewing the cud is contained in, or accompanies, the attributes which make up our idea of 'cow.' This is reading the proposition in intension. What, as a matter of fact, we do mean, is a mixture of the two, namely, that the class, cow, has the attribute of chewing the cud. For in the ordinary and natural form of proposition the subject is used in extension, and the predicate in intension, that is to say, when we use a subject, we are thinking of certain objects, whereas when we use a predicate, we indicate the possession of certain attributes. The predicate, however, need not always be used in intension, e.g. in the proposition 'His name is John' the predicate is not intended to convey the idea of any attributes at all. What is meant to be asserted is that the name of the person in question is that particular name, John, and not Zacharias or Abinadab or any other name that might be given him.
§ 265. Let it be noticed that when a proposition is read in extension, the predicate contains the subject, whereas, when it is read in intension, the subject contains the predicate.
Exclusive Propositions.
§ 266. An Exclusive Proposition is so called because in it all but a given subject is excluded from participation in a given predicate, e.g. 'The good alone are happy,' 'None but the brave deserve the fair,' 'No one except yourself would have done this.'