'The technical point which we argued was a narrow one. Had Cyprus been in Asia, our arguments would not have applied to Cyprus; and it is very likely that the Government thought Cyprus was in Asia, and did not like to say that they had made a mistake, and having first ordered the troops to Cyprus, and then ordered them to Malta (which was undoubtedly in Europe), had forgotten the distinction. The real objection to the bringing of the Sepoys was the same as the objection to the calling out of the reserves—that it was isolated action, and that these military measures and the expenditure which they involved were mere bunkum, and mere waste if the Government intended to give up, as they were secretly telling Russia they did intend to give up, the main points of dispute. Moreover, Russia could do us hurt in India, and Indian troops could not touch her at all….
'The Government were said to have only "conquered by giving way," for they agreed to put the number of men into the Estimate, and thus avoid making a precedent, according to our contention, absolutely unconstitutional. On the other hand, Lord Beaconsfield's speech in the House of Lords was defiant in the extreme, and Holker's [Footnote: The Attorney-General.] in the Lower House was an assertion of higher prerogative doctrine than had been heard in Parliament since the days of Elizabeth.'
'On May 30th I dined with Baron Ferdinand de Rothschild, and met Lord Northbrook (the former Viceroy of India) and his daughter, Lady Emma Baring, Lord Rosebery, Lord and Lady Napier (he a most distinguished man, the best of Ambassadors to Russia and the best of Governors of Madras, too little known),[Footnote: Baron Napier and Ettrick.] Lord Macduff (afterwards Duke of Fife), and Monty Corry, afterwards Lord Rowton, Lord Beaconsfield's private secretary.' Corry 'told me what was at the moment a startling secret—that Lord Beaconsfield was going to the Congress himself. "Can he speak French?" I asked with wonder, to which he shook his head.'
On the day after the meeting of the Congress a sensational disclosure revealed to the world that it met; only to register foregone conclusions.
'At the end of the month (May) the secret agreement was signed with Russia, and revealed to us by the Globe [Footnote: The Globe disclosure came from Mr. Marvin, a civil servant in temporary employ. Dilke noted: "Besides the 'Marvin Memorandum' and an annex, there was a curious stipulation insisted on by Russia, that the annex should never be published, even if No. 1—that is, the 'Marvin Memorandum'— should become public; and this looks very much as though Marvin was really the Russian Government, which I have always suspected. They had this to gain by publishing the Memorandum—that they showed themselves the real victors in the Congress of Berlin, in spite of all our bluster, and they damaged Lord Beaconsfield, who was their enemy. Marvin could never have got a copy, and always pretended that he had learned the whole document by heart, which, considering its length and the total absence in the copy published in the Globe of the slightest error, even of punctuation, is incredible. The annex, which was dated May 31st, only said that the Russians had no intention of extending their conquests in Asiatic Turkey: 'The Emperor of Russia … not having the intention of extending Ids conquests in Asia … the Imperial Government does not refuse to conclude with the British Government a secret engagement for the purpose of reassuring it upon this point.'">[ on June 14th; and it then appeared that the military preparations of the country must have been intended to keep up the spirits of the Jingoes while their cherished principles were being sacrificed behind their backs. The Daily Telegraph, which was the Jingo organ, said: "If such a compact has been concluded, this country has fatally descended from the lofty position occupied by the Salisbury despatch." Not only was the compact authentic, but there were two other secret compacts of the same date which did not come out. What the Government had done was to give up all the points for which they had made their enthusiastic followers believe that they would fight, and at the same time in the Anglo-Turkish Convention to declare that their successors should fight for what was left. This may have been a prudent policy, but it was not a policy which carried with it the necessity for bringing Indian troops to Europe or spending eight or nine millions sterling upon apparent preparations for immediate war. The third agreement, in addition to the Salisbury- Schouvalof agreement and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the first of which came out by chance and the second of which was ultimately published by the Government, was an Anglo-Austrian secret agreement which has never been printed, the character of which is revealed by the fact that the English plenipotentiaries themselves proposed at Berlin, in spite of the strong dissent of Turkey, to make to Austria the gift of Bosnia and Herzegovina.'
To this note, written in 1890, there is added in the margin of the manuscript: 'There was also a secret supplementary agreement with Russia, of which later.' And also this: "The compact giving Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria is now (1908) known to Lucien Wolf." [Footnote: See Thomas Erskine Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question, 292, 293.]
Before the Berlin Congress met, Sir Charles had pressed by way of questions to secure if possible a representation for Greece at the Congress, and failed; and the speech which he made in the debate (opened on July 29th) on the Treaty of Berlin was mainly a censure on Great Britain for having failed to support the Hellenic claims. He dwelt specially on Crete, the government of which by Turkey was, he said, "a perpetual menace to European peace."
Replying in the debate for the Liberal party to Mr. David Plunket (afterwards Lord Rathmore), he notes that he
'spoke, and spoke well, making the best of my debating speeches, but was overshadowed by one speech which would have caused better speeches than mine to have been easily forgotten. Mr. Gladstone's speech on this occasion, like all his speeches, does not read; but it was the finest that I ever heard him make with one exception—the Bradlaugh speech in the next Parliament.'