'Ollivier I found still full of burning hatred for the Empress, but he had forgiven Rouher and the Emperor for making him the scapegoat. I discussed with him once more the origin of the war of 1870, and he maintained most stoutly that France had been driven into it by Bismarck, and had only put herself in the wrong by herself declaring war, and had done this because her army system gave her a fortnight's start, the advantage of which was lost through the Emperor's hesitations. He thinks that in that fortnight the German Army could have been destroyed. It is on this point that he is wrong.'
CHAPTER XVIII
THE ZULU WAR AND THE GREEK COMMITTEE
The chronicle of the year 1879 begins with a visit paid by Sir Charles to Paris on his way back from his house near Toulon, to which he had returned after the brief Session of December, On February 2nd 'I breakfasted with Gambetta. His furniture was being packed up for removal to the Palais Bourbon, where he was about to take up residence as President of the Chamber,' and 'saw him again late at night at the office of his paper' (La République Française). 'Gambetta was then,' says a note added later, 'at the height of his power, and, in fact, Dictator. He was a patriot, but too big for the Republic.'
'On my return to London I found that Chamberlain was most anxious to see me,' and on February 5th Sir Charles went to Birmingham, to discuss their joint line of action in the coming Session. During this visit 'Chamberlain told me of Lord Beaconsfield's pleasant prophecies with regard to myself, of which I heard from all sides just after this time.'
The "pleasant prophecies" declared that Sir Charles would certainly be Prime Minister. Mr. Gladstone, it will be seen later, came to the conclusion in 1882 that Dilke would be his natural successor in the House of Commons; but this opinion was given only a little in advance of a widely received public estimate, and it came after the test of office had proved those qualities which Lord Beaconsfield discerned while the younger statesman was still only a private member of the Opposition, not promoted to the Front Bench.
But no one, even in 1879, doubted that Sir Charles was of Front Bench rank; and close upon this came a decisive opportunity in Parliament.
Trouble, which threatened to become acute, between the Zulu power under Cetewayo and his encroaching Boer neighbours had led the British Government to carry out the annexation of the Transvaal during the course of 1877. The Zulus were inclined to trust the British more than the Dutch; but the advent of Sir Bartle Frere as High Commissioner put a new complexion on matters. Frere had made up his mind that the Zulu power must be broken, and a pretext was soon found in a demand for the abolition of the Zulu military system. This ultimatum was presented on December 11th, 1878, by Frere, of his own motion, and without warning to the Home Government. The inevitable refusal followed, leading to invasion of the Zulu territory, with disastrous result. On January 23rd, 1879, Lord Chelmsford's force was cut to pieces at Isandhlwana; and it seemed possible that the whole colony of Natal might be overrun by Zulu impis.
This was the governing factor of the political situation at the moment when Parliament reopened in 1879. Sir Charles had not previously taken a prominent part in the discussion of South African affairs, and his attitude is indicated only by isolated passages in the Memoir.
In 1875, when Lord Carnarvon sent J. A. Froude to 'stump South Africa' in advocacy of a scheme of federation devised in Downing Street, Sir Charles condemned a mission which seemed to him to cast a slur on the local Colonial governments. In his opinion, this mission helped to create those disturbances which rent South Africa in the succeeding years. On May 27th, 1877, he noted that the Blue Book on the Transvaal, then published, was 'an indictment of the Republic intended to justify the annexation,' but that it did not 'show the existence of any overwhelming necessity for annexation, or, indeed, any necessity at all.' Yet he gave only a half- hearted support to Mr. Courtney's opposition to the South Africa Bill when those matters were debated in the House, for, as he wrote in a letter to the Spectator, he was opposed, "not to the policy of annexation, which, as leading up to confederation," he supported, "but to the manner in which that annexation had been carried out." It was said to have been done by the desire of the Dutch themselves. If so, why were three battalions of British troops still needed in the Transvaal? The Bill did not establish a self-governing federation; it only provided that federation might be established by an Order in Council. What guarantee had the Dutch, he asked, that such an order would ever be issued?