'I found his ambition to be to … succeed Lord Selborne as Lord Chancellor. In order to reach this goal, he would prefer to be Attorney-General rather than Home Secretary. James, however, cannot well be anything but Attorney-General. Harcourt would like James to be Home Secretary, for which James is not fit, but which he would like to be. If this combination should fail, then Harcourt would like to be Chancellor of the Exchequer…. He asked me what I should like, and I told him that I did not expect to be offered a great post, but that if there were any such chance the Navy was the only one that I should like.' [Footnote: Sir Charles's view that a Foreign Secretary had better be in the House of Lords, so long as there is a House of Lords to put him in, no doubt influenced his preference for the Admiralty.]
In regard to the events which have now to be narrated, it must be remembered that the Chamberlain of 1880 was not yet the author of any "unauthorized programme" or any "gospel of ransom." He was admittedly the controller of the Caucus. It was widely known that he, like Fawcett, had professed republican principles. But Queen Victoria's objection to Sir Charles Dilke—and it will be seen how strongly she maintained it—was based not merely on his avowal of abstract Republican theories, but also on his very concrete proposal to assert control over the Civil List. Chamberlain upon this matter was not committed to a personal view, and it had not yet been demonstrated that whatever position Dilke defended, Chamberlain would defend also.
A compact laying down the principle of mutual support between the two
Radicals was proposed in a letter written by Chamberlain to Dilke—then at
Toulon—immediately after the General Election had given the Liberals a
sweeping triumph. They came back 349 against 243 Conservatives. Irish
Nationalists were 60, of whom 35 followed Mr. Parnell.
Chamberlain's proposal was in these words:
"The time has come when we must have a full and frank explanation.
"What I should like—what I hope for with you—is a thorough offensive and defensive alliance, and in this case our position will be immensely strong.
"I am prepared to refuse all offers until and unless both of us are satisfied.
"Can you accept this position with perfect satisfaction? If you think I am asking more than I can give, I rely upon your saying so—and in this case you may depend on my loyalty and friendship—I shall support your claim cordially and just as warmly as if I were personally interested.
"But my own feeling is that if you are stronger than I am in the House, my influence is greater than yours out of it, and therefore that, together, we are much more powerful than separated; and that in a short time, if not now, we may make our own terms.
"To join a Government as subordinate members, to be silenced and to have no real influence on the policy, would be fatal to both of us. If we both remain outside, any Government will have to reckon with us, and, on the whole, this would be the position which on many grounds I should prefer.