'On June 11th there went out a despatch, which had been for several days on the stocks, as to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. It had come back on the 10th from the Queen, who had written by the side of our words: "The acquisition of Cyprus is, in their view, of no advantage to the country either in a military or political sense." "I do not in the least agree in this.—V.R.I." But we sent it, all the same.'
The King of Greece had come to London, and on June 4th Sir Charles went by his wish to Marlborough House, and had an hour's conversation, 'chiefly upon the question of personal union with Albania, but partly with regard to the past, as to which I received his thanks.' 'I thought him a very able man, an opinion which I have never changed.' All Europe confirmed this judgment when the King of the Hellenes was struck down more than thirty years later in the very achievement of his long-planned schemes. In 1880 the note of disparagement was widespread; but Sir Charles was not alone in his estimate:
'Dizzy was once, after this date, talking to me and the Duchess of Manchester about him, and the Duchess said to me: "How you Liberals have deceived that poor little King!" Whereupon Dizzy replied: "It would take a very clever Government to deceive that youth."'
Elsewhere Sir Charles wrote that the King was a "good talker, but academic," and, dining at Marlborough House on June 6th, he heard an estimate of him as the too industrious apprentice:
'A big aide-de-camp of the King of Greece took more champagne than was good for him, and was extremely funny. Pointing to his King, he said: "Now, there is my King. He is a good little King; but he is not what I call a fashionable King." And then, pointing to the Prince of Wales, he said: "Now, that is what I call a fashionable Prince—un Prince vraiment 'chic.' He goes to bed late, it is true, but he gets up— well, never. That is what I call a really fashionable Prince. My King gets up at six!"'
Sir Charles met the King repeatedly during the next fortnight, to follow out, with the maps, the military details of the proposed new frontier. As soon as the French and Austrian Governments had accepted the British proposal for a Conference at Berlin to settle the question of the frontiers, and Bismarck had consented to call it, Lord Odo Russell wrote that he would have to "act on the Greek Frontier Commission, in which Dilke was better versed than anyone," and begged Sir Charles to "lend him his lights," 'which,' says the Memoir, 'I had to proceed to do' by an exhaustive letter.
A naval demonstration in the Adriatic now followed, generally known as 'the Dulcigno demonstration,' carried out by ships of the concerted Powers, under command of the senior Admiral present, and acting under a protocole de désintéressement. It was imposing rather than formidable, since France and Italy both instructed their officers in no case to fire a shot. But it was powerfully reinforced by the threat of independent British action, on the lines which Sir Charles Dilke suggested, and, so helped, it did its work, so far as the Montenegrin question was concerned. The Greek question still remained for settlement.
Phases in the development of this situation are thus chronicled:
'On June 23rd I went to the State Ball, and had a good deal of talk with Musurus, to try and find out about a curious business which I noted in my diary as follows: "The Russians and Turks are working together. The Russians came yesterday to propose to send 20,000 Russian men in English ships to coerce Turkey, and the Turks tell us to-day that they will yield to an occupation by a European force, but not to a mere naval demonstration. Both want to raise the difficulties which this will cause, and to fish in troubled waters."
'On Wednesday, June 30th, at three o'clock, an interview took place between Lord Granville, Lord Northbrook' (First Lord of the Admiralty), 'Childers' (Secretary of State for War), 'Sir John Adye' (Childers' adviser), 'and myself at the Foreign Office as to the means of coercing Turkey. The War Office wished to place an army corps in Greece, which, if they were to send a full complement of guns, would take a month. I suggested the far cheaper plan of a naval occupation of the port of Smyrna, and the collection and stoppage of customs and dues. Mr. Gladstone came in a little late, and took up my idea. But, preferring his Montenegrins to my Greeks, he insisted that we should first deal by the fleet with the Montenegrin question at Dulcigno. Both ideas went forward. The Dulcigno demonstration took place, and produced the cession of territory to the Montenegrins; and we afterwards let out to the Turks our intentions with regard to Smyrna, and produced by this means the cession of territory to Greece. [Footnote: Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 231.]