'A collective note had now been presented by the Powers to the Porte, so that we had carried the Powers with us as fully in our Montenegrin policy, represented by the collective note, as in our Greek policy, represented by the previous Identic note—a most considerable success, contrasting strongly with the failure which our foreign policy met with two or three years later.'
These impressions were shared by Lord Ripon, who followed European and domestic affairs keenly, from India. He wrote on August 17th:
"I rejoice to see that the F.O. seems to be distancing all competitors in the race of success, … which" (he added) "in regard to some parliamentary proceedings is not very high praise, you will be perhaps inclined to say."
II.
Even after the collective note had been presented, the European situation remained delicate and difficult through the mutual distrust of the Powers. On August 9th Lord Granville, who through all these negotiations was exerting his greatest diplomatic skill in keeping Germany in the Concert, expressed to Sir Charles his conviction that 'Bismarck had spies in the Queen's household, and knew everything that went on.' On the side of France matters improved. [Footnote: See Life of Granville, vol. ii., chapter vi.]
'On the 8th I received, at last, a reply from Gambetta to my letters— a reply in which he showed that he fully agreed with me, but that he was not as a fact all-powerful with the Prime Minister (Freycinet). The same post, however, brought me a letter from Lord Houghton, who was at Vichy, and who complained that it was an unhealthy state of things that Gambetta (who had talked freely to him while in Paris) "should exercise so much irresponsible power." … The result of my attempts to stir up Gambetta upon our side was seen in the report by Bernhard Samuelson of Gambetta's conversation with him at Cherbourg on Monday, August 9th, and in an article which appeared on Wednesday, August 11th, and another on Friday, the 13th, in Gambetta's paper on the coercion of the Turks. These articles were from the pen of Barrère, who had been over in the previous week to see me, and were written at the personal direction of Gambetta; and Adams (Secretary to the Embassy) wrote from Paris on the 13th that the tone of the French Government had correspondingly improved.'
But even while France assisted in one direction, she introduced fresh complications in another by her quickly maturing designs on Tunis—which had been mentioned to Sir Charles by the French Ambassador, M. Léon Say, as early as June 8th. French diplomatists claimed an authorization from Lord Salisbury. [Footnote: See Crispi's Memoirs, vol. ii., pp. 98-109 and 121; Life of Granville, vol. ii., pp. 215, 270, 436, as to Tunis and Tripoli.] "How can you," he was reported to have said, during the conversations which attended the Congress of Berlin, "leave Carthage to the barbarians?"
'It was on this day (June 8th, 1880) that I became fully aware of the terms of Lord Salisbury's offer of Tunis to France, as to which he misled the public, Lord Salisbury having, when reminded of the statement, said privately that it was "a private conversation," and publicly that there was "no foundation for the statement."'
Later Sir Charles made inquiries of M. Say, who gave the dates of the two conversations as July 21st and 26th, 1878.
'Lord Salisbury made a denial which is on record at the Foreign Office in his own handwriting in red ink, but this denial is dated July 16th —i.e., before the conversations.'