Another subject produced open symptoms of a "split." On January 21st, 1881, during the debate on the Address, Mr. Rylands proposed a resolution condemning the annexation of the Transvaal as impolitic and unjustifiable, which was tantamount to declaring that the Boers had been justified in their revolt.
'After my dinner party on the 21st, I went down to the House of
Commons and deliberately walked out on the Transvaal division, as did
three other members of the Government—Bright, Chamberlain, and
Courtney. We had all along been opposed to the annexation.'
This was only the beginning. In South Africa difficulties accumulated for the British Government. General Colley was repulsed at Laing's Nek on January 28th, and on February 8th at the Ingogo River. But in this war there was a real anxiety on both sides to negotiate, and President Kruger despatched an offer to submit the whole dispute to an English Royal Commission if troops were withdrawn from the Transvaal. On Wednesday, February 16th, Sir Charles learnt from Mr. Chamberlain that there had been a special Cabinet that afternoon 'to consider proposals from President Kruger of the Transvaal, which Mr. Gladstone was most anxious to accept.'
On the 18th 'the Transvaal question came up again on a Dutch petition brought over by delegates, as to which Lord Granville wrote to me: "I suppose it would not be right for you or me to see them. We shall probably bear with fortitude the sacrifice."' But the Government were trying to meet Kruger's advances in a reasonable spirit, and they instructed Colley by telegram to suspend hostilities if the Boers abandoned armed opposition. Colley telegraphed back for more precise instructions. The Boers hold Laing's Nek, which was in Natal territory. Was he to insist on their evacuating it—and thus opening the pass into the Transvaal—before he suspended hostilities? The answer sent back on February 19th was that he should forward to the Boers the British proposal, and fix a reasonable time within which they must reply. During that time he was not to attempt to occupy Laing's Nek. Sir Charles's Memoir makes it plain that the decision to negotiate with the Boers was due to Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain:
'At the Cabinet of Saturday, February 19th, Mr. Gladstone and Chamberlain, for a wonder, were in the majority, and it was decided to drop the Arms Bill and to negotiate with the Boers; but at a further Cabinet on the 26th, Mr. Gladstone being in bed… the decision of the previous week was reversed, and it was decided to go forward with the Arms Bill.'
No reply came from the Boers within the time appointed, and on the night of February 26th Colley seized the height of Majuba, which commanded Laing's Nek. By noon on the 27th he was a dead man, and his force defeated. The stated time had expired, and Colley did his duty as a soldier. [Footnote: See an article in the Nineteenth Century (March, 1904) by Lady Pomeroy Colley (Lady Allendale) in reply to some points in the account of these events in the Life of Gladstone, iii., pp. 36-38.] But it is none the less true that the Boers, even after the action, still believed themselves to be in negotiation. On the 28th Kruger, ignorant of what had befallen, was writing a grateful acknowledgment of the proposal to suspend hostilities, and was suggesting a meeting of representatives from both sides.
It was urged, of course, that a disgrace to the British Army must be wiped out before there could be any further talk of parleying. Yet in Mr. Gladstone's Government there had been from the first an element which plainly thought the war unjustified, and with that element Mr. Gladstone had some sympathy. The Radicals now asserted themselves.
'On Wednesday, March 2nd, after a long interview between me and Chamberlain on the state of affairs, Chamberlain had an hour and a half with Bright, and got him to write a strong letter to Gladstone about the Transvaal, which we put forward as the ground for a proposed resignation, although of course the strength of the Coercion measures, the weakness of the Land measures, and the predominance of the Whigs in the Cabinet were the reasons which weighed chiefly with Chamberlain and myself. In the Transvaal matter, however, we should not be two, but four, for Bright and Courtney must go out with us, and Lefevre might do so. On the other hand, we had reason to think that if the Whigs yielded to us on the Transvaal, Kimberley would go. On the next day, Thursday the 3rd, Bright was sent for by Mr. Gladstone on his letter. Bright found him in entire harmony with our views. Kimberley at once gave in, and telegraphed what he was told; so the difficulty was over before the Cabinet was able to meet, and we as far from resignation as ever.
'On March 5th, I noted in my diary that the Land Bill was unsatisfactory. Chamberlain told me of a scene between Bright and Dodson which amused me much. Says Bright to Dodson: "You were put into the Cabinet to vote with Gladstone. Surely you ought not to oppose him." Says Dodson indignantly, "A man may have an opinion." "But why express it?" said the old Quaker.'
In the middle of March