At the Cabinet on May 4th

'there was a long debate upon nihilism. Lord Granville some time before had told the Russians that legislation was intended. That was so, for a Bill had been prepared. But it was clear that it would be foolish to introduce it. Kimberley and Chamberlain were against all proposals to meet the Russians. Then came before the Cabinet the question of Harcourt's reply to Cowen's question to be put on the next day, whether information was given by the English police to the Austrian police as to Socialist addresses in Vienna, which had led to arrests. Our police say that they only told the Austrians of a place where dynamite was stored. This seemed to me a cock and bull of Howard Vincent's. Harcourt had drafted a reply about Napoleon Bonaparte, which the Cabinet wanted him to alter, but when he is pleased with an answer it is not easy to make him alter it, as I noted. As our police virtually denied the charge, Harcourt might have given their denial, as theirs, in their own words, but nothing would induce him to do this.'

As regarded Russia, Lord Granville based himself on the fact that a similar arrangement existed between England and Germany, and he questioned whether political offenders would be much safer in a German than in a Russian court of law. To the promise of backing from France, he objected that M. Saint-Hilaire had already pledged himself to an extradition treaty with Russia. On the latter point Sir Charles answered that for this amongst other reasons M. Saint-Hilaire was about to be removed from the French Foreign Office. In the end of October, 1881, Sir Charles was seeing Gambetta frequently, and observes that he was

'much excited about the question of the extradition treaty with Russia….

'Curious though it seems to us (in 1890-1895), when we know how intensely pro-Russian Gambetta's friends now are, Gambetta was intensely anti-Russian and pro-Turk….

'There is the same difference of opinion in the French Cabinet as to the making of an extradition treaty with Russia as there is in ours, where Harcourt wants it and his colleagues do not. This was the only subject discussed at the interview of the Russian and German Emperors at Danzig' (September, 1881), 'and England and France are in their black books.'

Lord Granville constantly referred to Sir Charles for advice as to the temper of the House of Commons, though in this case he supported Sir William Harcourt, and might be excused for failing to see what was plain to Sir Charles as a practical House of Commons politician, that, apart from principles, a Liberal Ministry would be sadly embarrassed if it had to defend the handing over of political refugees to the Russian police, and that the Tories would probably support the Radical wing in a vote of censure.

The combination at the Foreign Office of the two Ministers, the old and the young, the Whig and the democrat, worked excellently, and Lord Granville, in telling Sir Charles that in his absence in France during the Session Hartington must answer his questions, said that 'picking out any of those who are not in the Cabinet is an indication of what would be done when that terrible moment may come to me of your leaving the P.O.' One matter had, however, caused Sir Charles uneasiness.

In the close of the year 1880 there was a proposal to give a charter to the North Borneo Company. No ordinary politician knew anything of this Company, but Sir Charles, while in Opposition, had grounds for asking questions hostile to it, and had stirred up Mr. Rylands to do the same. This fact Dilke mentioned to Lord Granville. But, finding Foreign Office opinion in favour of the concession, he promised that

'I would not take an active part in opposition to the Charter scheme if and providing the Cabinet approved of it…. On November 19th, 1880, the box, which had been round the Cabinet on the North Borneo business, having returned without any comment by Mr. Gladstone, I got it sent again to Mr. Gladstone, who finally decided, I was informed by Lord Granville, against Herbert of the Colonial Office, Harcourt, Chamberlain, Bright, Childers, and myself, and with Lord Kimberley, the Chancellor, and Lord Granville. So it was settled that the Charter was to be granted; but a little later Mr. Gladstone forgot the decision which he had given, insisted that he had never heard of the matter at all, went the other way and would have stopped the Charter, but for the fact that it was too late.'