On November 5th Sir Charles left Paris for London, nominally for purposes of consultation; but this was only a pretext to suspend operations till Gambetta came into office, which he did on November 10th. Sir Charles, being then in London, found the British Government of his own opinion, that they could hope for no more than most-favoured-nation treatment; but opinions differed as to how this should be obtained. Mr. Gladstone wanted to give a pledge that the low duty on the lighter wines—which favoured France, since no other country could produce them-should not be raised. Sir Charles, on the other hand, wanted to threaten the French with a change in the duties, which would favour Italy by letting in the slightly stronger Italian wines at the same rate as "Gladstone" clarets.
On November 19th he was back in Paris, seeing Rouvier and Gambetta, both of whom asked for time to prepare the way for a final meeting of the Commission, and Sir Charles went to his house near Toulon. On December 28th the detail of the French proposals was known, and they were held to be unsatisfactory. Gambetta still insisted that an agreement could and must be reached, but Dilke was of another opinion, and at the thirty- seventh sitting, held on the last day of the year, negotiations were really broken off. The last sitting, held on January 2nd, 1882, was merely formal, and that evening Sir Charles left for London. He had not expected to succeed in concluding a treaty, and he had not concluded one, but he had earned high credit from experts. Lord Granville wrote: "From all sides I hear praises of your knowledge, tact, and judgment." His secretary, Mr. Austin Lee, [Footnote: Now Sir Henry Austin Lee, K.C.M.G., C.B., Commercial attaché for France, Belgium, and Switzerland at the British Embassy in Paris.] showed him a letter from one of the Under-Secretaries of State in the Foreign Office, who
'said that it was a blessing to have had me at Paris, because any other negotiator would have sent yards of cipher telegram to the Office asking to be allowed to give the French all that they demanded from us, and proving that we must take whatever we could get from them.'
The British members of the Commission were unanimous in support of their chairman, and when Gambetta fell and M. de Freycinet became Prime Minister, they refused to hold any further sittings. Lord Lyons was uneasy, and in February, 1882, wrote that the most-favoured-nation treaty was a very forlorn hope." Mr. Gladstone thereupon wished to give his pledge against any raising of the duties.
'I succeeded in stopping this, for I felt sure that we should get it for nothing, as, in fact, we did.
'That we obtained most-favoured-nation treatment without giving way upon our wine duties and sacrificing revenue was a triumph, as we got all the reductions (which on yarns were very large) which we had obtained in the course of the negotiations. These had, after being won by us, been given to the Swiss and Belgians—who were "behind" us, and signed treaties. The result was that there was an increase, not a falling off, in our trade with France.' [Footnote: Full information with regard to the negotiations of a new commercial treaty between France and Great Britain, will be found in Commercial No. 37, 1881, and Commercial No. 9, 1882.]
"The foresight shown by Sir Charles Dilke in proposing this arrangement is brought out by the fact that it has been maintained, and given entire satisfaction, during the thirty years and more which have elapsed from its conclusion," says Sir Henry Austin Lee.
M. Hanotaux, in his France Contemporaine, observes that Dilke was often a précurseur. He certainly was so in an important matter of Imperial policy which connects itself with these negotiations. Leave was granted, through Sir Charles at the Foreign Office, to the Canadian High Commissioner, Sir A. Galt, 'to negotiate upon his own account, provided that he concluded no stipulations unfavourable to the mother country. In this, I made a precedent which has been followed,' and which was not made without opposition. The Colonial Office, while unable to prevent Canada from acting for herself, prevented Sir Charles at the Foreign Office from acting conjointly with Canada. The matter developed in 'the following spring':
'On March 1st (1882) Sir A. Galt asked me to let Kennedy' (Sir C. M. Kennedy) 'of the Foreign Office go to Paris as Second Commissioner for Canada to help make a Franco-Canadian treaty. On the 2nd I agreed, and got Lord Granville's consent, and the Foreign Office officially asked the Colonial Office, when Lord Kimberley refused. I pressed the matter in angry, but as I think conclusive, minutest Lord Kimberley, however, set his teeth, and refused point blank, and Lord Granville then backed him up, saying that "on a Colonial matter it was impossible to fly in the face of the Colonial Secretary of State." I wrote, 2nd March, 1882:
'"I think Lord Kimberley's decision a great misfortune to British trade and to friendly relations with the Colonies, and wish this minute and opinion to that effect placed on record with the despatch which he wishes to withdraw. We could have stipulated that the mother country should have been entitled to all reductions made to France, a further advantage which, if Canada is angry at the refusal, may be needed but not obtained."'