Sir Charles wished on public grounds to get rid of questions as to these grants, the recurrence of which must always lead to trouble, and to do this by settling them on a principle. But also he was desirous to forward the wishes of the Prince of Wales, and in the month of May he devised a method for meeting the difficulty, which might be proposed by the Prince himself.
'On Friday Mr. Gladstone talked for an hour to me about the Royal Grants question, and the conversation was satisfactory on both sides, for he told the Cabinet yesterday that it had been satisfactory to him. In the course of it he said that many years ago a memorandum on the provision for the younger branches of the Royal Family had been agreed upon by the Cabinet, and shown to the chiefs of the Opposition. He added that this was a course perhaps not so wise as would have been the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons. I at once told him that the consideration of the subject, which had not been discussed by the Civil List Committee at the beginning of the reign, by a later Select Committee, would in my opinion have prevented all but most unreasonable opposition to the various grants. There are many years to spare, and I only write because the matter is fresh in my mind…. My suggestion is that when provision is proposed for the establishment of the eldest son of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, for whom a liberal provision would be made without reasonable opposition, as he is in the direct line of succession, it should (at the same time) be stated by the Government of the day that the question of the extent of the provision for the younger children of the Prince and Princess of Wales should be, on the motion of the Government, considered by a Select Committee. On that Committee all shades of opinion ought in prudence to be represented, and to it as much information be given as is given to the Civil List Committee at the beginning of the reign. Its decisions would be respected by all who value Parliamentary methods, and much unseemly wrangling would be prevented for many years. The fate of this plan, however prudent it may be, would be certain if it came from anyone except His Royal Highness himself or the Prime Minister of the day.'
Sir Charles embodied this suggestion in a letter to Mr. Knollys of May 9th. The proposal was agreed to in principle by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1885, and it was adopted later on.
'On May 3rd I had heard from Knollys that the Prince, who had frequently been restive about not getting Foreign Office information, which Lord Granville would not allow him to have for fear he should let it out, had made Knollys write to Sir Henry Ponsonby to ask him to beg the Queen to direct Lord Granville to send the Prince the confidential telegrams…. On the 7th Knollys sent me Sir Henry Ponsonby's "not very satisfactory reply," and a copy of his answer.'
In the reply Mr. Knollys pointed out that the Prince was under the impression that the Queen would have wished him to know as much of what was going on as possible. The question whether telegrams were to be shown to the Prince depended entirely on Her Majesty, as Lord Granville would not be likely to raise difficulties in the matter if the Prince put his wishes before him. The fact that the private secretaries of Cabinet Ministers had Cabinet keys, and therefore had access to all confidential documents, was quoted as showing the curious position of the Prince.
The Queen persisted in her objection, and Sir Charles supplied the lack of official access to the papers by keeping the Prince privately informed from day to day in critical moments. He spent the first Sunday in February of this year at Sandringham,
'where the company was chiefly sporting, even the clergyman who performed the service being the famous "Jack" Russell, eighty-seven years of age, known in Devonshire as "the hunting parson"….
'On March 21st the Prince of Wales invited me to go with him to see the Channel Tunnel works, and to bring the map of Central Asia, and to explain to him the matters that we were discussing with the Russians. But I was unable or unwilling to go—probably unwilling because of overwork, and dislike to commit myself to the Channel Tunnel project. I was one of those who thought that the Channel Tunnel was far less important in a commercial sense than was generally believed, and, on the other hand, I feared that the creation of it might lead to panic….'
Later: 'I converted the Prince of Wales to oppose the Channel Tunnel.'
The one matter which, Sir Charles notes, still caused serious friction between himself and his Chief came up in this Session. On February 12th