'On this day I wrote a memorandum on the subject of intervention (I have an impression that it was based on Chamberlain's views, but I am not sure). I pointed out that many Liberals thought that intervention was only contemplated on account of financial interests—that if we intervened to protect the Canal and to exact reparation due to us for the Alexandria outrages, this feeling need not be taken into account; but that if we were going to Cairo, we ought to make our position clear. As far as Arabi personally was concerned, his use of the phrase "national party" was a mere prostitution of the term. But there was in Egypt a very real desire to see Egyptians in office, and a certain amount of real national sentiment, and that sentiment we might conciliate. I thought that if we intervened by ourselves the control might be considered dead. The intervention must be placed on the ground either of the need for settled government at Cairo, in order to make the Canal safe and our route to India free, or else on that of the probable complicity of the revolutionary party in the Alexandria massacres, or on both. But in the event of such an intervention I was of opinion that we should say that the recommendations of the Notables for the revision of existing institutions would be favourably considered, with the proviso, however, that the army should be either disbanded or diminished, the only military force necessary in Egypt being one for the Soudan and a bodyguard for the Khedive. To these views I have always adhered, and while I strongly supported an intervention of this kind, I was always opposed to an intervention which made us in the least responsible for Egyptian finance, or to an intervention followed by an occupation.
'Late on this afternoon of July 4th I secretly informed the Khedive, through Rivers Wilson, of the instructions that had been given to Beauchamp Seymour to bombard the Alexandria forts if the construction of new earthworks erected against our ships were not discontinued; for I felt that the man's life was in danger. I had been refused leave to tell him, and I did it without leave. When I saw Wilson he told me that Lesseps had officially informed him—Wilson being one of the British directors of the Suez Canal, and Lesseps Chairman of the Company—that we by our action were endangering the Canal. This was evidently a French menace on behalf of Arabi, and I took upon myself not to report it, as it would have only further weakened the minds of men already weak. Lesseps was not truthful. He told Mr. Gladstone that the Khedive had informed him that he was satisfied with the existing situation. We immediately telegraphed to the Khedive, through Sinadino, his Greek banker, who was representing him in London, to ask him whether this was true, and the Khedive answered by sending us all that had passed between him and Lesseps, from which it was quite clear that it was not true….
'On July 5th there was a Cabinet as to the sending forward of troops, at which it was decided to somewhat "strengthen our garrisons in the Mediterranean." Chamberlain afterwards told me that before this Cabinet Lord Granville had begged his colleagues to remember who Mr. Gladstone was, and not push him too hard. On this day, however, Mr. Bright, Lord Granville, and Mr. Gladstone stood alone against the rest of the Cabinet in supporting a let-alone policy.'
On the 7th, as has been told in the last chapter, Mr. Gladstone, under the combined irritation of Irish and Egyptian difficulties, used words in debate which indicated his intention to resign, and "the two representative Radicals," Dilke and Chamberlain, had to consider what their course would be if he went out.
They agreed, as has been seen, to go with Mr. Gladstone and Bright; to refuse to join a new Administration should Mr. Gladstone be outside it; to reconsider their position if—Mr. Gladstone going to the Lords or quitting political life—they were satisfied with the new Government's programme; but the storm blew over. [Footnote: The full diary dealing with the difficulties of this moment has been given in the chapter on Ireland of this date (see supra. Chapter XXVIII., pp. 446, 447).]
'On Monday, the 10th, it again seemed probable that Mr. Gladstone would resign,' but this time it was in consequence of the loudly expressed intention of the Lords to throw out the Arrears Bill.
Mr. Gladstone, however, decided not to go; the majority prevailed, and Sir
Charles was able to write on Monday, July 10th:
'I had now given the reply which informed the House exactly of the steps which would be taken. Guns having been again mounted on the 9th, the Admiral told the Commander of the troops at daylight on July 10th of his intention to open fire on the forts at daylight on July 11th. Exactly one month after the Alexandria riots reparation for those riots was tardily exacted at the same spot.'
Sir Charles's personal attitude cost him some friends in France. His brother Ashton wrote to him from La Bourboule a letter (received on July 9th), in which he said: "To judge by the French newspapers, you are as popular in France as Pitt at the height of the great war." A note from the Memoir renders this state of feeling explicable: [Footnote: A very different current in French opinion from that of the newspapers found outlet in this letter from M. Émile Ollivier:
"SAINT TROPEZ, "4 Août, 1882.