'On Monday, July 24th, there was a Cabinet to consider the obstruction of the French, who were trying to prevent our intervention. I was not called in, but I believe that my suggestion as to Italy was again mentioned, for on Tuesday, the 25th, Lord Granville told me that he had been intending to ask the Italians to go with us, but that the Queen had objected and caused the loss of a day, and that he thought he should be able to ask them on the morrow.
'On July 25th I made a speech which was much liked by the House, and Northcote congratulated me quite as warmly as did our own people. When Mr. Gladstone was finishing his letter to the Queen late at night, Chamberlain asked him to let him look at it, which I never had the "cheek" to do. The phrase about me was "answered the hostile criticisms with marked ability and with the general assent of the House," and there was no praise of Chamberlain's own speech, which had been spoilt by mine. On this occasion, as in the great Zulu debate in the previous Parliament, when he had been my seconder, it so happened that I took all Chamberlain's points beforehand, and in almost the very words in which he had meant to take them. On the other hand, on occasions when he spoke before me and I had to follow, as, for example, in the famous debate with Randolph Churchill about the Aston riots, [Footnote: At the height of Mr. Chamberlain's influence in Birmingham Lord Randolph Churchill proposed to stand against him, and held a meeting at Aston. Lord Randolph accused Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons of having hired roughs to break up this meeting.] the converse occurred. This was, of course, the inevitable result of our habit of very free and continual conversation.
'When we sounded Paget in advance as to our invitation to the Italians on this evening, he replied that "if we pressed her, swearing she would ne'er consent, she would consent." But, although I afterwards thought and said that I had been amazed at her refusal, my notes of the moment show that I had anticipated it.
'On July 27th a new element of disturbance was introduced by the Prince of Wales applying to the Government for leave to take a military command in Egypt. The Queen at once interfered to stop it; some members of the Cabinet consulted together at a sudden meeting in the Cabinet room at Downing Street, to which I was called in, Childers, Northbrook, and Mr. Gladstone being present, and it was decided to back the Queen's refusal. It was agreed between Lord Northbrook, Childers, and myself that for the future I should see all the Admiralty and War Office telegrams.
'At 5.30 there was a regular Cabinet to consider the tardy consent of the Turks to send troops at once. They were informed that circumstances had changed, and that we must go on with our intervention; but that they would be allowed to occupy forts not at Alexandria.
'One of the first Admiralty telegrams that were brought to me was one which directed the Admiral to inform the Khedive that we were going to restore his authority, which was the most emphatic thing which I had seen.'
On July 29th M. de Freycinet's Government was defeated on a vote of credit for money to send ships to protect the Suez Canal, [Footnote: A new Ministry was formed under M. Duclerc.] and so terminated all possibility of France's partnership in the enterprise. On the same day General Menabrea politely refused an invitation that Italy should co-operate.
But the Turks were still disposed to assist, on their own terms, and these did not yet make it clear what, if they landed, would be their attitude towards Arabi and his partisans. Accordingly,
'On Monday, July 31st, we had to tell the Turks that if they insisted
on going to Alexandria we should sink them, and matters began to look
like a second Navarino.
'On Thursday, August 3rd, the Cabinet approved our previous proposals
to send instructions to the Admiral not to allow the Turks to land in
Egypt until they agreed to all our terms.