'June 13th. As to South Africa, the Colonial Office told us that they hoped to induce the Cape to take Bechuanaland. A little later on the whole of their efforts were directed in the opposite direction— namely, to induce the Cape to let us keep Bechuanaland separate from the Cape. It was announced that Reay had accepted the Transvaal Mission.

'June 23rd. We decided that Reay was not to go out, because the
Transvaal people preferred to come to us.

'November 30th. We talked of the Transvaal, which looked bad.'

The Transvaal deputation is mentioned immediately after this as having arrived.

There are also allusions to South African affairs having been raised at other Cabinets in this year, but no details given.

Late in 1883, Sir Charles says, 'I was pressing for the restoration of Cetewayo, and Lord Derby insisted that he had brought all his troubles on himself.'

At this time Russia had subdued the Turcomans and made herself paramount in the territories north of Persia and Afghanistan. It was only a matter of months before Russian troops would be on the ill-defined frontiers of Afghanistan. Great Britain was bound to the Amir of Afghanistan by an engagement to assist him against external attack, provided that he complied with British advice as to his foreign relations. Not only was a collision predicted between Russia and the Amir, whose territory Great Britain had thus guaranteed, but it was known where the struggle would be.

'It was also about this time' (February, 1883) 'that the Russian Government took up my suggestion as to the delimitation of the boundary of Afghanistan. But, as Currie wrote, "the object of the Russian Foreign Office may only be to keep the British Government quiet, while they are settling the boundary question with Persia and annexing … Merv, with a view to a fresh departure in the direction of Herat as soon as that process is accomplished."'

'We already foresaw that the struggle would be over Penjdeh. A memorandum of 1882, by Major Napier, [Footnote: Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. G. C. Napier, C.I.E., son of the first Lord Napier of Magdala, and twin brother of the second Lord Napier.] had told us that "below Penjdeh the Afghans would not appear to have ever extended their authority." Mr. Currie, [Footnote: Afterwards Lord Currie, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.] as he then was, prophesied that the line proposed by the Russians would strike the Murghab near Penjdeh.'

This was a situation well fitted to arouse Sir Charles, who wrote to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice: "I'm as great a jingo in Central Asia as I am a scuttler in South Africa." His policy was not that of the India Office. He advocated delimitation of the Afghan frontiers, and in October, 1882, the Amir had asked for this. [Footnote: 'On October 17th, 1882, the Amir had proposed to Lord Ripon that delimitation of his frontiers which I was pressing at the time, but which had been refused by Lord Ripon. Lord Granville and Fitzmaurice had come round to my view. Northbrook strongly resisted, and wanted his famous treaty.'] 'The Government of India insisted at this time upon the proposal to Russia of a treaty with regard to Afghanistan.' Sir Charles thought that British interests in India would be better served by strengthening Afghanistan, by ascertaining exactly what the Amir's rights were, and by making him feel that he would be protected in them. To-day, when Afghanistan is one of the self-equipping Asiatic military powers, and admittedly an awkward enemy to tackle, the situation seems plain enough; but in those days Abdurrahman, new on the throne, was still a 'King with opposition.'