Germany also was embarking on a "Colonial policy" disapproved of by Bismarck, but to which later he had to bow. One instance of the difficulties thus created was that of the Congo. A sketch of our proposed treaty with Portugal has already been given; [Footnote: See Chapter XXVI., p. 418.] but while the negotiations were proceeding,
'de Brazza, employed by the French, had been making treaties in the Congo district, which had been approved by the French Government and Parliament. The King of the Belgians pulled the strings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and succeeded in arousing a good deal of feeling against our negotiations with the Portuguese, and ultimately the French and Germans joined the King of the Belgians in stopping our carrying through our treaty.'
Mr. Jacob Bright became the spokesman of those who opposed the Portuguese negotiations, and in 1883 Sir Charles, though offering to express his own clear belief that the treaty was right, foretold to Lord Granville that the House of Commons would not accept the arrangement, and Mr. Gladstone avoided an adverse vote only by promising that the treaty should not be made without the express consent of Parliament. Sir Charles's reference to this lays down an opinion upon the relation of Parliament to the Foreign Office which is interesting as coming from so strong a democrat:
'In the Congo debate, which took place on Tuesday, April 3rd, 1883, Mr. Gladstone went perilously near giving up the valuable treaty- making power of the Crown. What he said, however, applied in terms only to this one case. To Grant Duff I wrote: "In all other countries having parliamentary government, the Parliaments have to be consulted. We stood alone, and it was hard to keep the special position, but it was good for the country, I feel sure."'
In 1883 a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with affairs on the West Coast of Africa, and this Committee 'by its delays and hesitations lost us the Cameroons,' where two native Kings had asked to be taken under British protection. [Footnote: See Chapter XXVII., p. 431.] On the East Coast there was a more serious result of procrastination in regard to Zanzibar.
'As late as November 16th, 1882, I wrote to Lord Northbrook, "Are you going to let Zanzibar die without a kick?" a note which applied to an offer which had been made to us by the Sultan, that we should become his heirs—an offer which Mr. Gladstone had wished us to decline, and which I was in favour of accepting.'
'The Foreign Office, in a memorandum upon this subject, assigned as the chief reason for not accepting this trust "the fear lest it should infringe the agreement entered into with France in 1862." … It may be open to argument whether our acceptance of a voluntary offer by the Sultan of the above nature would have been a breach of the agreement. In the autumn of 1884 the Government, waking up too late, telegraphed to our agent at Zanzibar as to the importance of our not being forestalled by any European nation in the exercise of at least paramount influence over the mountain districts situated near the coast and to the north of the equator. The Foreign Office at my suggestion pointed out at this time that "to the north of the Portuguese dominions we are at present, but who can say for how long? without a European rival; where the political future of the country is of real importance to Indian and Imperial interests, where the climate is superior, where commerce is capable of vast extension, and where our influence could be exercised unchecked by the rivalry of Europe in the extension of civilization and the consequent extinction of the slave trade." The Government, however, delayed too long, and we afterwards lost our position at Zanzibar, and had ultimately to buy half of it back again by the cession of a British colony.' (Heligoland).
Sir Charles was especially concerned at the heedlessness which disregarded the interests of the great self-governing colonies, who had no authority to deal with foreign affairs. He gives the history of the New Hebrides. Here native chiefs had asked to be taken under British protection; New South Wales had urged action; the French had three times declared intention to annex, but Great Britain had done nothing. Australian anxiety as to the French occupation extended to New Guinea, and in March, 1883, officials of the Government of Queensland declared an annexation of half New Guinea. They were disavowed, but their action had created a feeling that something must be done.
'On June 12th, 1883, there was hatched a scheme for the partial annexation of New Guinea, which had been prepared by the Chancellor, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir Arthur Gordon, [Footnote: Sir Arthur Gordon was one of the philanthropists who believed in making the coloured peoples work by a labour tax. Sir Charles had met him in 1879, and described him as one 'who invented, in the name of civilization and progress, a new kind of slavery in Fiji.'] of Fiji and New Zealand fame. On the 13th a Cabinet decided to go slowly in this matter, and they went so slowly that we lost half of our half of New Guinea to Germany, and almost lost the whole of it.'
'As early as June, 1883, we had told Italy that any attempt to occupy any portion of New Guinea without a previous agreement with the British Government would undoubtedly "excite a violent outbreak of public feeling in the Australian colonies." Lord Derby was a party to this communication to the Italians, and it was absurd for the Cabinet and Lord Derby afterwards to argue, when the Germans landed in New Guinea, that steps ought not to have been taken in advance to have prevented such action. The difference was that we were willing to bully Italy, and not willing to stand up to Germany.'