'scamped their work on the draft despatch to Lord Lyons as to what he was to tell the French as to Egypt, and so made a wretched job of it. At night I pointed this out to Lord Granville, and told him that the despatch was slipslop, and on the next day, October 24th, I managed to get a good many changes made—one by telegraph, and the others by an amending despatch.'

'Chamberlain's view of Lord Granville's proposals was that they were childishly insincere. Europe would not be deceived into believing them to be anything more than a proposal to restore the old system in its entirety, with an English nominee as controller in place of the dual control. Nothing, Chamberlain thought, was being done to develop Egyptian interests or promote Egyptian liberties.

'Chamberlain was absent from some of the Cabinets at this moment, detained at Birmingham by the gout, but his memorandum was sent round the Cabinet. He was, however, in London on October 24th to assist me in somewhat improving the despatch. His memoranda show the strong view he held that, in spite of the almost unanimous approval of the Press, the war had not been popular, but had only been accepted on the authority of Mr. Gladstone as a disagreeable necessity; and that dissatisfaction existed upon several points, but above all with regard to the civil reorganization of the country. "There is great anxiety lest after all the bondholders should be the only persons who have profited by the war, and lest the phrases which have been used concerning the extension of Egyptian liberties should prove to have no practical meaning." Chamberlain thought that our first duty was to our principles and our supporters rather than towards other Powers, and that, if the other Powers insisted upon financial control, we should at least put forward as our own the legitimate aspirations of Egyptian national sentiment. Chamberlain refused to believe that an Egyptian Chamber would repudiate the debt, inasmuch as such a course of action would at once render them liable to interference by the Great Powers.'

'On October 27th, 1882, there was a dinner at Lord Granville's, at
which I met Lords Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook' (representing
India, the Colonies, and the Admiralty). 'I noted with regard to
Egypt:

'"Chamber of Notables: decided to do nothing, at which I am furious.
What do four peers know about popular feeling?"'

In view of the temper of the House of Commons, Sir Charles Dilke warned Lord Granville by letter of the danger that the Fourth Party might carry "the mass of the Tories" with Liberals on a cry for the "liberties of the Egyptian people." Considerable delay was occasioned by negotiations as to whether Arabi and his associates should or should not be represented by European counsel at their trial, and in the interval rumours were set afloat as to ill usage of them in prison.

'I had had in the course of this week a good deal of trouble in the
House of Commons, caused by a sensational telegram in the Daily
News, and a letter from a Swiss Arabist in the Times containing
most ridiculous lies as to the treatment of political prisoners in
Egypt, but believed by our supporters, who were backed up by the
Fourth Party.'

These attacks involved the British Agent-General in Egypt, and Sir Edward Malet felt the situation cruelly. He telegraphed home begging to be relieved from the sole responsibility.

'On Sunday, October 29th, 1882, Lord Granville, with the gout, got the French refusal of our proposals, and the bad news from the Soudan' (where the Mahdi was laying siege to El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan). 'He called a Cabinet, but only five Ministers were in town, so it was decided that it was not to be called a Cabinet.'

'On Tuesday, October 31st, the Queen, who had at first approved of the idea of Dufferin being sent to Egypt to supersede Malet, had now been turned against him by Wolseley, who was staying with her, and, not having seen the telegrams of the 27th, because we had made them into private telegrams and kept them back, told us that she thought that to send Dufferin was bad treatment of Malet. We had therefore to send her Malet's telegrams in order to persuade her that it was necessary that Dufferin should go.'